Opinion
03 Civ. 7276 (DLC).
August 17, 2004
Nathan J. Colodney, Pro Se Alexandria, Virginia, for the Plaintiff.
David O. Simon, Esq., Barbara A. Gross, Esq., Shaub, Ahmuty, Citrin, Spratt, LLP, New York, New York, for the Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Nathan J. Colodney ("Colodney") brought this diversity action against his former employer, Continuum Health Partners ("Continuum"), and seven other defendants. In his original complaint filed on September 17, 2003, and in an amended complaint filed on November 5, Colodney alleged, inter alia, twenty-one counts of defamation against the defendants. In an Opinion dated April 15, 2004, the Court granted in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, and among other things, dismissed with prejudice all of Colodney's defamation claims. Colodney v. Continuum Health Partners, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 7276 (DLC), 2004 WL 829158, *1 (S.D.N.Y. April 15, 2004) ("April Opinion"). On May 7, Colodney moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of the defamation claims. For the reasons that follow, the motion for reconsideration is denied. Legal Standard
Specifically, Colodney's amended complaint, which was 76 pages long, and consisted of 353 numbered paragraphs alleging 41 separate claims, charged the defendants with: breach of good faith (Claims 1-3), defamation (Claims 4-18, 27-29, 31-33), breach of implied contract (Claim 19), negligent supervision (Claims 20-22), fraud (Claim 23), "failure to provide opportunity to transition to COBRA" (Claim 24), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Claim 25), fraudulent inducement (Claim 26), conversion (Claim 30), negligence (Claims 34-36), negligent recruitment (Claim 37), a violation of 42 U.S.C. § Section 1983 ("Section 1983") (Claim 38), a violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. ("ERISA") (Claim 39), and a breach of ERISA (Claims 40-41).
The April Opinion declined to dismiss Colodney's claims for fraudulent inducement and for conversion with respect to the $1,500 in business travel expenses he incurred while employed by Continuum, and dismissed without prejudice to amendment Colodney's fraud claim in connection with reimbursement for $1,500 in business travel expenses and his COBRA claim.
The defendants point out that this motion should be dismissed as untimely because Colodney filed it more than ten days after the April 15 Opinion was issued, in violation of S.D.N.Y. Local Rule 6.3. Colodney's motion was filed on May 7, the date on which he was ordered to file his second amended complaint. It is unnecessary to reach the defendants' argument since Colodney's motion for reconsideration is denied.
Despite the dismissal with prejudice of Colodney's defamation claims, on May 7, Colodney filed in conjunction with this motion a second amended complaint repleading all the defamation claims in substantially the same fashion as in the first amended complaint.
"A motion for reconsideration should be granted only where the moving party demonstrates that the Court has overlooked factual matters or controlling precedent that were presented to it on the underlying motion and that would have changed its decision." In re Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 308 F. Supp. 2d 214, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). See also In Re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2003); S.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 6.3. Courts narrowly construe this standard and apply it strictly against the moving party "so as to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have already been considered fully by the court." Cohen v. Koenig, 932 F. Supp. 505, 506-507 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation omitted); Shrader v. CSX Transp. Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (reconsideration "should not be granted where the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided"). In addition, the moving party may not "advance new facts, issues, or arguments not previously presented to the Court." Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 3607 (RWS), 2002 WL 1933881, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2002) (citation omitted). The decision to grant or deny the motion is within the sound discretion of the district court. See Devlin v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 175 F.3d 121, 132 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237 (2d Cir. 1983)). Discussion
Familiarity with the April Opinion is assumed. Colodney's defamation claims center on his assertion that Gail Donovan ("Donovan"), his supervisor at Continuum, had "maliciously and falsely" attributed statements to Colodney regarding his role in aiding an outside consulting group's (the "Feld Group") bid for a Continuum contract, and had mischaracterized Colodney's subsequent description to Donovan of what he had done.Colodney, 2004 WL 829158, at *7. According to Colodney, Donovan concocted the statements in order to "`ensure that a stigma attached' to Colodney," and to conceal Donovan's own fraud. Id.
Relying on Colodney's pleadings, the April Opinion determined that he had undermined his own defamation claims by admitting that he had made the statements and undertaken the actions that Donovan had allegedly fabricated.
In his pleading, Colodney admits that he gave materials to the Feld Group, that he made disparaging comments to them about Continuum executives, and that he lied to Donovan about what he had said to them. Colodney admits that when Donovan confronted him at their July 22 meeting about the statements he had made to the Feld Group, Colodney did not disclose to her either that he had turned over [another executive's] study, or that he had discussed with them how to tailor their proposal to beat [that executive's] offer. Thus, Colodney has actually alleged that Donovan's allegedly libelous statements about Colodney were true.Colodney, 2004 WL 829158, at *7 (emphasis supplied). The April Opinion thus held that Colodney did not state a claim for slander because "the facts contained in his own pleading contradict any naked assertion that Donovan's statements about him were false." Id. (relying on Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir. 1995) (the court need not credit general conclusory allegations that "are belied by more specific allegations of the complaint")).
In support of his motion for reconsideration, Colodney argues that he never made the admissions upon which the Court relied in dismissing the defamation claims. According to Colodney, he "never admit[ted] that he lied to Donovan . . . that he gave away proprietary information, or that he made disparaging remarks about Continuum's executives." He asserts that, in finding that he made these admissions, the April Opinion made impermissible inferences in favor of the defendants.
Colodney does not identify any argument, fact or law presented by the parties and overlooked by the Court in concluding that Colodney's pleadings undermined his defamation claims. Rather, Colodney rehashes arguments in support of this motion originally asserted by him in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss. For example, Colodney's disagreement with the April Opinion's finding that he admitted turning over company materials to the Feld Group is premised on the same argument he previously stated: because Continuum did not have a "proprietary document" policy, he did nothing wrong by showing the documents to the Feld Group. The April Opinion, however, did not rely on the existence of a company policy with respect to proprietary documents in reaching its conclusion. Material to the ruling was Colodney's express admission that he turned over to the Feld Group Continuum's internal documents in order to bolster the Feld Group's bid for a consulting contract with Continuum. With this admission, Colodney's defamation claim could not be premised on alleged statements by Donovan that Colodney turned over company materials to the Feld Group.
Colodney's denial that he made disparaging remarks about Continuum executives to the Feld Group is also based on arguments he previously made, to wit, that the statements were factually true and not disparaging. Colodney argues that the April Opinion's finding that the comments were disparaging can only be based on inferences taken in favor of the defendants. The April Opinion did not make any inferences; rather, it relied on the facts as asserted in the pleadings. In his complaint, Colodney stated that, unbeknownst to his superiors, he met privately with the Feld Group and
described to them "what was happening" at Continuum so that the Feld Group could make a "competitive" proposal. Colodney discussed with the Feld Group the "mess" at the technology department caused by Donovan's lack of management skills, described "the roles that each executive played" in the outsourcing agreement, and gave specific examples of Donovan and Loughlin's managerial shortcomings.Colodney, 2004 WL 829158, at *3.
The gravamen of Colodney's request for reconsideration appears to be his disagreement with the manner in which his pleadings were construed. A motion for reconsideration cannot be granted, however, solely on a party's disagreement with the Court's ruling. In order to succeed, Colodney would have to point to some fact or legal precedent overlooked by the Court that would alter its conclusion that his defamation claims were undermined by his own admissions. This he does not do.
Colodney's motion is an attempt to relitigate issues already considered and rejected in the April Opinion. Because a simple disagreement with the conclusions reached in that Opinion is not a sufficient basis for reconsideration, Colodney's motion must be denied.
Conclusion
The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the April 15 Opinion is denied. It is hereby
ORDERED that the defamation claims in the May 7, 2004 amended complaint are stricken.
SO ORDERED.