The purpose of the WESL, and similar statutes in other states, is to lighten the economic load created by involuntary unemployment. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 131-32, 91 S.Ct. 1347, 1354, 28 L.Ed.2d 666 (1971); ColoradoDiv. of Employment and Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 706 (Colo. 1989). Using state police powers, the legislature acted to protect the general welfare creating unemployment reserve accounts to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. State Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 244 Kan. 678, 772 P.2d 786, 789 (1989).

“A decision of the [P]anel may not be set aside where there are findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.” Colo. Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 707 (Colo.1989).

Moreover, the purpose of the unemployment statute and case law has been to keep the law and procedures as streamlined as possible. See Division of Employment Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989). On the other hand, the scope of the civil wrongful discharge area of law as first established under the Keenan ruling is expanding.

The benefits sections should be construed liberally in order to further the remedial and beneficent purposes of lightening the burden of unemployment on those who are involuntarily unemployed. § 8–70–102; Colo. Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 706–07 (Colo.1989).

We reject Taylor's assertion that the trial court's reliance on Ward in fashioning the jury instructions and special verdict form was error. Citing Colorado Division of Employment Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989), and Lanes v. O'Brien, 746 P.2d 1366 (Colo.App. 1987), Taylor argues that the three-factor test set forth in Mt. Healthy and followed in Ward applies only to unemployment benefits cases where an employee contends that his or her separation from employment resulted from his or her assertion of a constitutionally protected right. However, a closer reading of Hewlett and Lanes reveals that this is not so.

” Instead, it “interpret [ed] ‘employer’ to include coworkers,” and explained that it was construing section 8–73–108(4)(o) “to further the legislative intent that unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own in cases where a worker quits due to personal harassment by coworkers.” In support of its ruling, the Panel cited section 8–73–108(1)(a), C.R.S.2012, Colorado Division of Employment & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo.1989), and Henderson v. RSI Inc., 824 P.2d 91 (Colo.App.1991). ¶ 7 The Panel also ruled that section 8–73–108(4)(c) permits an award of benefits based on unsatisfactory working conditions.

Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to demonstrate that claimant's termination was for a reason that would disqualify the claimant from the receipt of benefits under the provisions of § 8-73-108(5), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 3B). If the employer meets that burden, claimant then must present evidence to justify the acts which led to the separation and show that he or she is entitled to benefits under the provisions of § 8-73-108(4), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 3B). See Division of Employment Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989); Yellow Front Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 882 (Colo.App. 1985); Arvada v. Industrial Commission, 701 P.2d 623 (Colo.App. 1985); Denver Symphony Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 34 Colo. App. 343, 526 P.2d 685 (1974); cf. Lucero v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 812 P.2d 1191 (Colo.App. 1991). The procedures for a claimant to establish a prima facie case at a hearing vary depending on whether the claimant was awarded or disqualified from the receipt of benefits by the deputy.

¶18 The Colorado Employment Security Act was designed to ease "the burden of unemployment on those who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own. " Colo. Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett , 777 P.2d 704, 706 (Colo. 1989) (emphasis added); see also § 8-73-108(1)(a), C.R.S. (2016) ("In granting the benefit awards, it is the intent of the general assembly that the division at all times be guided by the principle that unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own; and that each eligible individual who is unemployed through no fault of his own shall be entitled to receive a full award of benefits"). "Fault" in this context is "not necessarily related to culpability, but must be construed as requiring a volitional act ." City & Cty. of Denver , 756 P.2d at 377 (emphasis added) (quoting Zelingers v. Indus. Comm'n , 679 P.2d 608, 609 (Colo. App. 1984) ); see also Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office , 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo. App. 1998) (defining fault "as requiring a volitional act or the exercise of some control or choice by the claimant in the circumstances resulting in the separation such that the claimant can be said to be responsible for the separation").

The statute contemplates, therefore, that the hearing before the hearing officer be conducted on a de novo basis. Moreover, once a claimant establishes a prima facie case of eligibility, i.e., once he shows the necessary covered employment and that his employment was terminated by the employer, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to demonstrate that claimant's termination was for a reason that disqualifies the claimant from the receipt of benefits under the provisions of § 8-73-108(5), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 3B). Colorado Division of Employment Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989); City County of Denver v. Industrial Commission, 756 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1988); City of Arvada v. Industrial Commission, 701 P.2d 623 (Colo.App. 1985).

In order for benefits to be denied, therefore, the circumstances surrounding the termination must be one of those that is specifically described in the statute as being disqualifying. Colorado Division of Employment Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989). Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that claimant's separation was not a volitional act on his part.