The benefits sections should be construed liberally in order to further the remedial and beneficent purposes of lightening the burden of unemployment on those who are involuntarily unemployed. § 8–70–102; Colo. Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 706–07 (Colo.1989).

The purpose of the WESL, and similar statutes in other states, is to lighten the economic load created by involuntary unemployment. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 131-32, 91 S.Ct. 1347, 1354, 28 L.Ed.2d 666 (1971); ColoradoDiv. of Employment and Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 706 (Colo. 1989). Using state police powers, the legislature acted to protect the general welfare creating unemployment reserve accounts to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. State Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 244 Kan. 678, 772 P.2d 786, 789 (1989).

¶ 14 The Colorado Employment Security Act (Act) is designed to lighten the burden of unemployment on those who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own. Colo. Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett , 777 P.2d 704, 706 (Colo.1989). Pursuant to the Act, benefits must be granted to an employee unless the job separation was due to one or more statutorily enumerated causes.

¶ 13 The Act is designed to ease "the burden of unemployment on those who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own." Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr. Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. , 2017 CO 78, ¶ 18, 396 P.3d 1114 (quoting Colo. Div. of Emp. & Training v. Hewlett , 777 P.2d 704, 706 (Colo. 1989) ); see § 8-73-108(1)(a) (setting forth the guiding legislative principle that "unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own"). Under the Act, fault doesn't require culpability; rather, it requires "some volitional act" or that the employee "exercised some control over the circumstances resulting in the discharge from employment."

” Instead, it “interpret [ed] ‘employer’ to include coworkers,” and explained that it was construing section 8–73–108(4)(o) “to further the legislative intent that unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own in cases where a worker quits due to personal harassment by coworkers.” In support of its ruling, the Panel cited section 8–73–108(1)(a), C.R.S.2012, Colorado Division of Employment & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo.1989), and Henderson v. RSI Inc., 824 P.2d 91 (Colo.App.1991). ¶ 7 The Panel also ruled that section 8–73–108(4)(c) permits an award of benefits based on unsatisfactory working conditions.

We must construe the unemployment act liberally to further its remedial and beneficent purposes. See Colorado Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 707 (Colo.1989); Hopkins v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, –––P.3d ––––, ––––, 2011 WL 6425616 (Colo.App.2011) ( cert. granted2012 WL 3642477 (August 27, 2012)). ¶ 13 Here, the undisputed evidence established that claimant provided personal services to employer by performing work as its president.

“A decision of the [P]anel may not be set aside where there are findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.” Colo. Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 707 (Colo.1989).

Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to demonstrate that claimant's termination was for a reason that would disqualify the claimant from the receipt of benefits under the provisions of § 8-73-108(5), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 3B). If the employer meets that burden, claimant then must present evidence to justify the acts which led to the separation and show that he or she is entitled to benefits under the provisions of § 8-73-108(4), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 3B). See Division of Employment Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989); Yellow Front Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 882 (Colo.App. 1985); Arvada v. Industrial Commission, 701 P.2d 623 (Colo.App. 1985); Denver Symphony Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 34 Colo. App. 343, 526 P.2d 685 (1974); cf. Lucero v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 812 P.2d 1191 (Colo.App. 1991). The procedures for a claimant to establish a prima facie case at a hearing vary depending on whether the claimant was awarded or disqualified from the receipt of benefits by the deputy.

In order for benefits to be denied, therefore, the circumstances surrounding the termination must be one of those that is specifically described in the statute as being disqualifying. Colorado Division of Employment Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989). Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that claimant's separation was not a volitional act on his part.

Moreover, the purpose of the unemployment statute and case law has been to keep the law and procedures as streamlined as possible. See Division of Employment Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989). On the other hand, the scope of the civil wrongful discharge area of law as first established under the Keenan ruling is expanding.