Colo. Division of Employment v. Hewlett

13 Citing cases

  1. Mesa Cnty. Pub. Lib. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office

    396 P.3d 1114 (Colo. 2017)   Cited 5 times

    ¶18 The Colorado Employment Security Act was designed to ease "the burden of unemployment on those who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own. " Colo. Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett , 777 P.2d 704, 706 (Colo. 1989) (emphasis added); see also § 8-73-108(1)(a), C.R.S. (2016) ("In granting the benefit awards, it is the intent of the general assembly that the division at all times be guided by the principle that unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own; and that each eligible individual who is unemployed through no fault of his own shall be entitled to receive a full award of benefits"). "Fault" in this context is "not necessarily related to culpability, but must be construed as requiring a volitional act ." City & Cty. of Denver , 756 P.2d at 377 (emphasis added) (quoting Zelingers v. Indus. Comm'n , 679 P.2d 608, 609 (Colo. App. 1984) ); see also Cole v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office , 964 P.2d 617, 618 (Colo. App. 1998) (defining fault "as requiring a volitional act or the exercise of some control or choice by the claimant in the circumstances resulting in the separation such that the claimant can be said to be responsible for the separation").

  2. Colorado Div. of Emp't & Training v. Accord Human Res., Inc.

    270 P.3d 985 (Colo. 2012)   Cited 12 times
    Applying this principle and holding that the terms “employer” and “employing unit” have different meanings

    The benefits sections should be construed liberally in order to further the remedial and beneficent purposes of lightening the burden of unemployment on those who are involuntarily unemployed. § 8–70–102; Colo. Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 706–07 (Colo.1989).

  3. Casper Iron Metal v. Unemp. Ins. Com'n

    845 P.2d 387 (Wyo. 1993)   Cited 25 times
    In Casper Iron Metal v. Unemp. Ins. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 387, 393 (Wyo. 1993), we held that burden of proof, as part of the substantive law of evidence, is complex and often confusing, citing 1 D. Louisell C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 65 (1977).

    The purpose of the WESL, and similar statutes in other states, is to lighten the economic load created by involuntary unemployment. California Dep't of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 131-32, 91 S.Ct. 1347, 1354, 28 L.Ed.2d 666 (1971); ColoradoDiv. of Employment and Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 706 (Colo. 1989). Using state police powers, the legislature acted to protect the general welfare creating unemployment reserve accounts to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Nat'l Gypsum Co. v. State Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 244 Kan. 678, 772 P.2d 786, 789 (1989).

  4. Mesa Cnty. Pub. Library Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office of Colo.

    399 P.3d 760 (Colo. App. 2016)   Cited 1 times

    ¶ 14 The Colorado Employment Security Act (Act) is designed to lighten the burden of unemployment on those who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own. Colo. Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett , 777 P.2d 704, 706 (Colo.1989). Pursuant to the Act, benefits must be granted to an employee unless the job separation was due to one or more statutorily enumerated causes.

  5. Taylor v. Regents of Univ

    179 P.3d 246 (Colo. App. 2007)   Cited 7 times
    In Taylor, the Colorado Court of Appeals construed a retaliation claim brought under the Colorado State Employee Protection Act (“CSEPA”).

    We reject Taylor's assertion that the trial court's reliance on Ward in fashioning the jury instructions and special verdict form was error. Citing Colorado Division of Employment Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989), and Lanes v. O'Brien, 746 P.2d 1366 (Colo.App. 1987), Taylor argues that the three-factor test set forth in Mt. Healthy and followed in Ward applies only to unemployment benefits cases where an employee contends that his or her separation from employment resulted from his or her assertion of a constitutionally protected right. However, a closer reading of Hewlett and Lanes reveals that this is not so.

  6. Catholic Health Initiatives Colo. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office of Colo.

    491 P.3d 571 (Colo. App. 2021)

    ¶ 13 The Act is designed to ease "the burden of unemployment on those who are involuntarily unemployed through no fault of their own." Mesa Cnty. Pub. Libr. Dist. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. , 2017 CO 78, ¶ 18, 396 P.3d 1114 (quoting Colo. Div. of Emp. & Training v. Hewlett , 777 P.2d 704, 706 (Colo. 1989) ); see § 8-73-108(1)(a) (setting forth the guiding legislative principle that "unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own"). Under the Act, fault doesn't require culpability; rather, it requires "some volitional act" or that the employee "exercised some control over the circumstances resulting in the discharge from employment."

  7. Yotes, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office of State

    310 P.3d 288 (Colo. App. 2013)   Cited 6 times

    ” Instead, it “interpret [ed] ‘employer’ to include coworkers,” and explained that it was construing section 8–73–108(4)(o) “to further the legislative intent that unemployment insurance is for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own in cases where a worker quits due to personal harassment by coworkers.” In support of its ruling, the Panel cited section 8–73–108(1)(a), C.R.S.2012, Colorado Division of Employment & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo.1989), and Henderson v. RSI Inc., 824 P.2d 91 (Colo.App.1991). ¶ 7 The Panel also ruled that section 8–73–108(4)(c) permits an award of benefits based on unsatisfactory working conditions.

  8. Commc's Workers of Am. 7717 v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office

    292 P.3d 1127 (Colo. App. 2012)   Cited 3 times

    We must construe the unemployment act liberally to further its remedial and beneficent purposes. See Colorado Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 707 (Colo.1989); Hopkins v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, –––P.3d ––––, ––––, 2011 WL 6425616 (Colo.App.2011) ( cert. granted2012 WL 3642477 (August 27, 2012)). ¶ 13 Here, the undisputed evidence established that claimant provided personal services to employer by performing work as its president.

  9. Beinor v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office

    262 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2011)   Cited 18 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Ruling employee at fault under C.R.S. § 8-73-108(e)(IX.5) for separation from employment, despite constitutional amendment allowing medical marijuana

    “A decision of the [P]anel may not be set aside where there are findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.” Colo. Div. of Emp't & Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704, 707 (Colo.1989).

  10. Ward v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office

    916 P.2d 605 (Colo. App. 1995)   Cited 6 times
    Holding that the hearing officer did not impose additional legal criteria by considering the absence of a diagnosis of a mental disorder; the hearing officer "was simply articulating some of the factual reasons" why he rejected the claimant's argument

    Once the claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer to demonstrate that claimant's termination was for a reason that would disqualify the claimant from the receipt of benefits under the provisions of § 8-73-108(5), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 3B). If the employer meets that burden, claimant then must present evidence to justify the acts which led to the separation and show that he or she is entitled to benefits under the provisions of § 8-73-108(4), C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 3B). See Division of Employment Training v. Hewlett, 777 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1989); Yellow Front Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 882 (Colo.App. 1985); Arvada v. Industrial Commission, 701 P.2d 623 (Colo.App. 1985); Denver Symphony Ass'n v. Industrial Commission, 34 Colo. App. 343, 526 P.2d 685 (1974); cf. Lucero v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 812 P.2d 1191 (Colo.App. 1991). The procedures for a claimant to establish a prima facie case at a hearing vary depending on whether the claimant was awarded or disqualified from the receipt of benefits by the deputy.