As an initial matter, the parents are correct that the cases which the circuit court cited in its order denying their petition were factually distinguishable, because those were dissolution and paternity cases involving opposed petitions to change a child's last name, and not unopposed petitions to change a child's first name, as in this case. See, e.g., Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (the trial court's paternity judgment did not permit changing the child's last name from the mother's last name to the father's last name unless the record affirmatively showed that such change was required for the child's welfare); Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So.2d 12, 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (the possible adverse effect on the relationship between a father and his child was a valid ground for refusing to change the child's last name from his father's last name to his mother's maiden name). However, the circuit court's order appears to have cited the foregoing cases not based on their facts, but based on the general proposition that a court should deny a name change petition which contains only conclusory assertions and does not affirmatively show how the name change would be in the child's best interests.
A name change is proper "only where the record affirmatively shows that such change is required for the welfare of the minor." Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (quoting Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So.2d 12, 13 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) ). If only conclusory assertions are provided in the record, "the issue should ordinarily be resolved against the party having the burden of proof, the proponent of change." Collinsworth, 508 So.2d at 747 ; Bardin v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 720 So.2d 609, 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). A name change may not be based solely on a finding of paternity.
[Hutcheson v. Taylor, 43 So.3d 921,] 922 [ (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) ]. Under the best interest standard, the record must affirmatively show that a name change is required for the welfare of the child. Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (“This standard, emphasizing best interest of the child rather than parents, would accord effect to the same factors governing custody.”); Levine v. Best, 595 So.2d 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). None of the arguments presented to the trial court here support a finding that a name change would be in the minor child's best interest or required for his welfare.
We conclude the record lacks competent, substantial evidence establishing the name change is in the child's best interests. See Hutcheson v. Taylor, 43 So.3d 921, 922-23 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Bardin v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 720 So.2d 609, 612-13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), and cases cited therein; Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744, 746-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the Final Judgment on Father's Amended Complaint for Paternity rendered October 19, 2010, changing the child's last name, and remand with directions to enter an order returning the child's name to that listed on her birth certificate.
Under the best interests standard, the record must affirmatively show that a name change is required for the welfare of the child. Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) ("This standard, emphasizing best interests of the child rather than parents, would accord effect to the same factors governing custody."); Levine v. Best, 595 So.2d 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). None of the arguments presented to the trial court here support a finding that a name change would be in the minor child's best interests or required for his welfare. Rather, the arguments advanced by Mr. Miller to support the petition either have no bearing on a best interests analysis or have been previously rejected by this court.
Instead, a child's surname may be modified "only where the record affirmatively shows that such change is required for the welfare of the minor." Id.quoting Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); see also Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So.2d 12 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962); McKay v. Haikey, 860 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); and Durham v. McNair, 659 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). The discretion of a trial judge over a request for a change in name "must be exercised on the basis of some evidence other than the parties' conclusory assertions."
On appeal, it is Appellant's burden to show the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the name change and modifying the backup care provisions. Collins-worth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Hastings v. Rigsbee, 875 So.2d 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). Here, the record reflects the trial court considered factors in addition to paternity when ordering the name change.
There is little reason today to fear the stigma of illegitimacy; "it is doubtful that [the child's] retention of [his or] her mother's surname would even raise an eyebrow, let alone subject [him or] her to ridicule or scorn." Lufft v. Lufft, 188 W.Va. 339, 341, 424 S.E.2d 266 (1992); see Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla.Dist.App.1987); Aitkin County Family Service Agency v. Girard, 390 N.W.2d 906, 908 (Minn.App.1986); Gubernat v. Deremer, 140 N.J. 120, 140, 657 A.2d 856 (1995); Petition of Schidlmeier by Koslof, 344 Pa.Super. 562, 569-70, 496 A.2d 1249 (1985); In re M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d 891, 897 (Tex.App.2003). Here, Mother argues that the district court failed to make findings regarding the best interests of the child.
Because the record is devoid of competent, substantial evidence to support the trial court's decision to change the child's last name from that chosen by his mother, we reverse that portion of the final judgment rendered on February 28, 2005, which did so, and remand with directions that the trial court enter an amended final judgment denying the request to change the child's last name from that chosen by the mother. See Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744, 746-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (holding that a court may change a minor's last name over objection only when the evidence establishes it is in the child's best interest to do so); Bardin v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 720 So.2d 609, 612-13 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (same, relying on Collinsworth). REVERSED and REMANDED, with directions.
The mother argues that this was an abuse of discretion because the father did not show that the change would be in the child's best interest. See Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744, 747 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). In this instance, such a showing was not necessary because the mother stipulated to the change in the joint pretrial statement and she acknowledged the stipulation at trial.