Opinion
No. 402 C.D. 2012
11-28-2012
Joseph J. Collins, Petitioner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE COLINS
Joseph J. Collins (Claimant) petitions for review of the February 10, 2012 order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) denying Claimant unemployment compensation benefits. The Board concluded that Claimant was disqualified from receiving benefits under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law) because Claimant voluntarily resigned from employment with Pitt-Ohio Express, LLC (Employer) without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the Board's order.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L., (1937), 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(b). Section 402(b) provides, in relevant part, that "[a]n employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week... [i]n which his unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature." Id.
Claimant applied for unemployment compensation benefits on August 14, 2011; his application was denied by the Department of Labor and Industry (Department) in a September 13, 2011 determination that found Claimant was precluded from receiving benefits, because Claimant had voluntarily resigned from employment following acceptance of a workers' compensation agreement with Employer. (Record Item (R. Item) 5, Notice of Determination.) Claimant appealed and a telephone hearing was held November 1, 2011, before a Board Referee. (R. Item 6, Claimant's Petition for Appeal; R. Item 9, Transcript of Testimony (T.T.).) On November 9, 2011, the Referee issued a decision and order affirming the Department and denying Claimant unemployment compensation benefits. (R. Item 10, Referee's decision and order.) Claimant filed a timely petition for appeal with the Board. (R. Item 11, Claimant's Appeal from Referee.) The Board issued a February 10, 2012 decision and order affirming the Referee and denying Claimant benefits. (R. Item 14, Board's Decision and Order.) In reaching its decision, the Board made the following findings of fact:
1. The [Claimant] was last employed as a full-time customer service representative by [Employer] from October 3, 1985, through July 12, 2011, at a rate of $15.00 an hour.
2. The [Claimant] was assigned to work as a full-time customer service representative as a result of a work-related injury he sustained during his prior position as full-time city truck driver for [Employer].
3. Subsequent to [Claimant's] last day of work, the [Claimant] and the [Employer] entered into a workers' compensation settlement agreement.
4. In exchange for the monetary settlement, the [Claimant] agreed that he would not return to work for the [Employer].(R. Item 14, Board's Decision and Order, Findings of Fact (F.F.) ¶¶1-7.) Claimant, pro se, filed a timely petition for review with this Court.
5. The [Claimant] was represented by an attorney during the settlement process.
6. If the [Claimant] had not accepted the agreement, the [Claimant] could have continued working as a customer service representative indefinitely.
7. The [Claimant] voluntarily quit his employment as of July 12, 2011, in order to accept a workers' compensation settlement.
In an unemployment compensation appeal, this Court's scope of review is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, whether constitutional rights were violated, or whether necessary finding of facts are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704. In addition, where properly raised, as here, we will review to determine whether there has been a capricious disregard of evidence. Wintermeyer v. Workers' Compensation Board of Review (Marlowe), 571 Pa. 189, 812 A.2d 478 (2002). --------
Claimant argues that the Board's conclusions that he resigned voluntarily from employment and that he did not have a necessitous and compelling reason for his resignation were predicated upon the capricious disregard of competent evidence and are not supported by substantial evidence.
Whether a claimant's termination of employment was voluntary and for a necessitous and compelling reason is a question of law reviewable by this Court. Davila v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 926 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). The burden is on the claimant to demonstrate that the reason for resignation was necessitous and compelling by showing that there was real and substantial pressure to terminate employment that would compel a reasonable person under the circumstances to act in the same manner. Philadelphia Parking Authority v. Unemployment Board of Review, 654 A.2d 280, 282 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).
Claimant argues that his resignation from employment was not voluntary, but the result of pressure placed upon him to sign a workers' compensation agreement in return for Employer's approval of needed spine stimulator implant surgery. Claimant contends that evidence of this coercion was capriciously disregarded by the Board.
Capricious disregard has been defined as a deliberate disregard of competent evidence which one of ordinary intelligence could not possibly have avoided in reaching a result. Wintermeyer, 571 Pa. at 203, 812 A.2d at 487. Here, the Board did not disregard competent evidence, but credited competent evidence of record in finding that Claimant voluntarily resigned from employment.
Claimant offered a single exhibit during his hearing before the Referee. (R. Item 9, T.T. at 18, Claimant's Exhibit 1.) The exhibit submitted by Claimant was a one-page letter dated August 17, 2011, and signed by Claimant, which stated: "I, [Claimant], hereby resign from my employment with [Employer] effective immediately." (Id.) Claimant testified at the hearing that he reached a workers' compensation agreement with Employer and that he understood that as a part of the agreement, he would resign from his position as a customer service representative with Employer. (R. Item 9, T.T. at 14, 18.) Claimant confirmed in his testimony that he was represented by counsel during negotiations and settlement with Employer. (R. Item 9, T.T. at 13, 15.) Claimant's testimony, which included acknowledgment of the fact that he was approved for the spinal stimulator, was the only evidence offered to substantiate his argument that he was coerced. (R. Item 9, T.T. at 23.) Claimant's documentary evidence and testimony alone support the Board's findings that he resigned from employment voluntarily in exchange for a monetary settlement. (R. Item 14, Board's Decision and Order, F.F. ¶¶3, 4, 7.) The Board's rejection of Claimant's argument that he was coerced into resigning does not constitute a capricious disregard of evidence.
The Board in unemployment compensation proceedings is the ultimate finder of fact; empowered to resolve conflicts in the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses, the Board's findings are conclusive and binding on appeal when supported by substantial evidence of record. Kelly v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 776 A.2d 331, 336 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). Substantial evidence is defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. City of Pittsburgh, Dep't. of Public Safety v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 927 A.2d 675, 676 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
At the hearing before the Referee, Employer, without objection, submitted into the record a document entitled "Compromise and Release Agreement by Stipulation..." (R. Item 9, T.T. at 9, 10, Exhibit R-15.) This August 16, 2011 agreement, signed by Claimant and a representative of Employer, states that Claimant will receive a lump sum payment of $100,000, plus $25,000 for attorney's fees, and six months of medical benefits and that as a part of this settlement, Claimant "has agreed to resign his employment." (Id.) Also submitted into the record, is an August 18, 2011 decision and order from a Workers' Compensation Judge approving the agreement between Claimant and Employer. (R. Item 9, Exhibit R-15.) Before the Referee, Employer's Director of Safety testified that had Claimant chosen not to sign onto a workers' compensation settlement with Employer, Claimant would have continued in his customer service representative position with Employer. (R. Item 9, at 21.)
In Lee v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 33 A.3d 717, 721 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), this Court stated unequivocally, "we hold that when a claimant agrees to execute a resignation/release in order to settle a workers' compensation claim, the claimant terminates [his] employment voluntarily without necessitous and compelling cause." The situation here is no different from that presented in Lee. The Board found that the Claimant here had a choice to continue to pursue his workers' compensation claim while employed with Employer or to agree to a lump sum payment and resign his position. (R. Item 14, Board's Decision and Order, F.F. ¶¶4, 6, 7.) The Board found that Claimant chose the latter. The Board did not credit Claimant's arguments to the contrary. The Board's conclusion that Claimant did not have a necessitous and compelling reason for voluntarily resigning does not result from a lack of evidence, but clearly reflects the Board's exercise of its power to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses.
The order of the Board is affirmed.
/s/ _________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of November, 2012, the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.
/s/ _________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge