Opinion
03-22-00020-CV
06-30-2023
Bradrick J. Collins, Appellant v. Texas Board of Law Examiners, Appellee
FROM THE 261ST DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D-1-GN-20-007247, THE HONORABLE JAN SOIFER, JUDGE PRESIDING.
Before Baker, Triana, and Theofanis, Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Thomas J. Baker, Justice.
This is an appeal in a suit for judicial review of an order of the Texas Board of Law Examiners conditionally approving attorney Bradrick J. Collins's admission to the Texas State Bar upon his successful completion of probation related to two criminal cases and recommending him for a subsequent two-year probationary law license. The trial court affirmed the Board's order, and on appeal Collins argues that the trial court erred by determining that a no-evidence summary judgment is not appropriate in administrative appeals and by failing to make findings of fact. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
The Board determines the eligibility of candidates for a license to practice law in Texas. See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 82.001, .004. The Texas Supreme Court promulgates and the Board administers and interprets the Texas Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of Texas (RGAB). Board of Law Exam'rs v. Stevens, 868 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. 1994); see also Tex. Gov't Code § 82.022. Among the criteria assessed are the applicant's moral character and fitness to practice law. Tex. Gov't Code § 82.004(c); see also RGAB R. 2(a)(3), 4.
When the Board makes a preliminary determination that an applicant lacks the requisite present good moral character and fitness, the applicant can request a hearing to challenge that determination. RGAB R. 8, 15. Then, "[w]ithin a reasonable period of time after the decision is made, the Board shall furnish to the Applicant or Declarant a written order setting forth the decision of the Board." Id. R. 15(i). An applicant who disagrees with the Board's decision may seek judicial review in a Travis County district court. Id. R. 15(k)(1); see Caldwell v. Texas Bd. of Law Exam'rs, No. 03-21-00125-CV, 2023 WL 2976580, at *1 (Tex. App.- Austin Apr. 18, 2023, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Although the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) does not govern Board procedure, the APA sections addressing the scope of judicial review under the substantial-evidence rule are instructive. Stevens, 868 S.W.2d at 777.
Collins applied five times to take the Texas Bar Examination, passing it on his fifth attempt in July 2017. The Board, however, had made a preliminary determination that Collins lacked the necessary good moral character and fitness required to be recommended to the Supreme Court of Texas for unconditional admission to the Texas Bar. See RGAB R. 8. Collins sought and obtained a hearing to challenge the preliminary determination. See id. R. 8, 15. After an evidentiary hearing, the Board made findings of fact and conclusions of law and issued an order
The specific findings and conclusions are not relevant to the issues on appeal, but they generally include Collins's alleged failure to disclose and material misrepresentation of his criminal history on law-school and State Bar applications and his alleged litigating and filing of frivolous legal actions and motions.
conditionally approv[ing] Collins's present good moral character required for admission . . . but [also determining] that the protection of the public requires the
temporary monitoring of Collins; and that, upon his successful completion of all the requirements for admission, including his satisfactory completion of the terms of his community supervision, he shall be recommended for a probationary license, to expire two years after the date of his licensure, subject to his strict and complete compliance with [the twenty-one] following conditions.
The conditions are not relevant to the issues on appeal, but for illustrative purposes they include requirements that he complete additional ethics CLE beyond the usual requirements, reside continuously in Texas during his probationary period, make periodic reports to the Board, and establish a mentor-mentee relationship with an experienced Texas attorney.
Collins filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's order. He later filed a "No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment," asserting that "there is no evidence of a legitimate application for admission to the Bar of Texas in which the Board's Order is supported." He supported his motion with an argument requiring a legal determination: whether the Board had the authority to make a determination about Collins's moral character and fitness on the basis of an amended application to take the Bar Exam when the amendments were made after Collins had taken and passed the Bar Exam. After a non-evidentiary hearing the trial court signed an order denying Collins's motion for summary judgment and a final judgment affirming the Board's order. Collins timely perfected appeal.
DISCUSSION
Collins does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in affirming the Board's order on the merits or that the order is not supported by substantial evidence. Instead, he argues first that the trial court erred by "holding that summary judgment is not appropriate in Administrative Appeals" and secondly that the trial court erred by failing to make findings of fact, which constituted a "denial of due process."
The record does not indicate that Collins requested the trial court to make findings of fact. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 296.
To support his first argument, Collins cites portions of the reporter's record in which the trial court stated, "we don't generally have no evidence summary judgment motions in administrative appeals or any summary judgment motions in administrative appeals because that-that assumes that [the court] make a decision on the papers and not on live witnesses and other evidence," which is what the court "already ha[s] to do" in an administrative appeal. The trial court rendered an order denying Collins's summary-judgment motion without explaining the basis of its ruling. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion because, even assuming that (a) the trial court based its ruling solely on a determination that summary judgments are not appropriate in administrative appeals and (b) such determination was error, Collins has not demonstrated that he was thereby harmed. See G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297-98 (Tex. 2011) (explaining harmless-error rule); Tex.R.App.P. 44.1(a) (stating that appellate court may not reverse judgment on ground that trial court made error of law unless such error either probably caused rendition of improper judgment or probably prevented appellant from properly presenting case to appellate court).
Although Collins's motion cited Rule 166a(i), see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i), and the no-evidence standard of review; was styled "No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment"; and alleged that the Board could produce "no evidence" that it had based its order on a "legitimate Texas Bar Exam application," the substantive arguments therein were not directed towards a purported lack of evidence but instead posited that the Board did not have the legal authority to require Collins to amend his application after he passed the Bar Exam and to base the findings and conclusions in its final order on such amended application. We therefore construe Collins's "No Evidence Motion" as a traditional summary-judgment motion, see id. R. 166a(c); see also Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. 1999) (directing courts to look to substance of pleading rather than its form or caption to determine its nature), and we consider whether the Board had such authority as a matter of law.
The Board's rules provide that to be eligible for admission as a licensed attorney to the Texas Bar, an applicant must, among other things, comply with the Board's rules; be of present good moral character and fitness; and pass the Texas Bar Exam. RGAB R. 2(a); see also id. R. 1(a)(2), (3) (defining terms "applicant" and "application"). Rule 10 imposes on an applicant a "continuing duty" to ensure the accuracy and completeness of their application responses and to update those responses "until the Applicant is certified to the Supreme Court for licensure." Id. R. 10(e). Furthermore, the applicant "shall promptly furnish any additional documentation requested by the Board in connection therewith." Id. The Board is charged with assessing an applicant's moral character and fitness based on its investigation into the accuracy and completeness of an application, see Tex. Gov't Code § 82.030(a), and the Board's rules (which are adopted by the supreme court, see id. § 82.022(a), (b)) expressly dictate that the Board is "given discretion in the interpretation and application of the Rules, see RGAB R. 20(e).
Because Collins had a continuing duty to update his application until he was certified to the supreme court for licensure-and not merely until he passed the Bar Exam-and because he was required to "promptly furnish" the Board with additional documentation per its request, which Collins admittedly did by amending his application in November 2017, we conclude that the Board had the authority both to require Collins to amend his pending application and to base the findings and conclusions in its final order on such amended application. The only ground that Collins asserted in his summary-judgment motion was that the Board lacked such authority as a matter of law. Because we conclude that the Board had the authority to base its final order on the information in Collins's amended 2017 application and its investigation thereof, see Tex. Gov't Code § 82.030(a); RGAB R. 2, 4, 8, 10, Collins was not entitled to judgment on his motion and cannot, therefore, demonstrate that he was harmed by the trial court's denial of his "No Evidence Summary Judgment Motion," regardless of the reasons for which the trial court made its ruling. We accordingly overrule Collins's first issue.
To support his second argument-that the Board failed to make findings of fact-Collins cites three cases that recite the substantial-evidence standard of review but that neither involve the making of findings of fact nor opine on the necessity or propriety thereof. See Stevens, 868 S.W.2d at 777-78 (noting that courts' duty in judicial review of Board's order is "to determine whether substantial evidence supports it" and "whether reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion that the Board reached on the record presented"); Froemming v. Texas State Bd. of Dental Exam 'rs, 380 S.W.3d 787, 790-91 (Tex. App-Austin 2012, no pet.) (reciting substantial-evidence standard of review and noting that "the test is not whether [the court] believe[s] the Board reached the correct conclusion, but whether the agency's factual findings are reasonable" in light of evidence); Unglaub v. Board of Law Exam 'rs of State of Tex., 979 S.W.2d 842, 845 (Tex. App-Austin 1998, pet. denied) (reciting substantial-evidence standard of review).
For good reason, Collins was unable to cite caselaw supporting his second argument because "[r]esolution of factual conflicts and ambiguities is the province of the administrative body and it is the aim of the substantial evidence rule to protect that function. The reviewing court is concerned only with the reasonableness of the administrative order, not its correctness." Firemen's & Policemen's Civ. Serv. Comm 'n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. 1984); accord Scally v. Texas State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 351 S.W.3d 434, 452 (Tex. App-Austin 2011, pet. denied). When the substantial-evidence rule applies, as it does here, the trial court is tasked with determining whether the agency's factual findings are reasonable in light of the evidence from which they were purportedly inferred, not whether the agency reached the correct conclusion or the only possible conclusion. See Froemming, 380 S.W.3d at 791-91. Indeed, the evidence may preponderate against the agency's decision and still amount to substantial evidence. See Texas Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter Med.-Dall., Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984). Furthermore, substantial-evidence review does not allow a court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency on the weight of the evidence on matters committed to agency discretion, Froemming, 380 S.W.3d at 791, and there is nothing in the record indicating that the trial court did, in fact, resolve any disputed issues of fact. Because it is the province of the Board, not a reviewing court, to make fact findings, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to make fact findings and accordingly overrule Collins's second issue.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Collins's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment affirming the Board's final order.