Collins v. State

31 Citing cases

  1. Yeatts v. Polygon Nw. Co.

    360 Or. 170 (Or. 2016)   Cited 12 times
    In Yeatts Whitman v. Polygon Northwest Company, Polygon, a general contractor, subcontracted with Yeatts's employer to perform framing work on a residential development.

    Finally, that requirement does not comport with the enactment history of the ELL. In Saylor v. Enterprise Electric Co. , 106 Or. 421, 212 P. 477 (1923), this court considered that enactment history and the purpose of the ELL, which originally was proposed by initiative and enacted by a vote of the people in 1910. 106 Or. at 425, 212 P. 477.

  2. C.D. Johnson Lbr. Corp. v. Hutchens

    194 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1952)   Cited 2 times

    A detailed analysis of all the Oregon cases compels the conclusion that the Act does not protect a person who has no employee relation to anyone engaged in the enterprise out of which the injury arose. Saylor v. Enterprise Electric Co., 1923, 106 Or. 421, 212 P. 477, 482. It is therefore imperative that the employment status of a claimant be determined. This the trial court refused to permit.

  3. Maulsby v. Magnuson

    107 N.M. 223 (N.M. 1988)   Cited 4 times

    Since 1907, this court had held that usury required some conscious intent to violate the law by charging or exacting interest above the legal rate. See Priestley v. Law, 33 N.M. 176, 262 P. 931 (1927); American Inv. Co. v. Lyons, 29 N.M. 1, 218 P. 183 (1923); Armijo v. Henry, 14 N.M. 181, 89 P. 305 (1907), all overruled, Hays v. Hudson, 85 N.M. 512, 513, 514 P.2d 31, 32 (1973). This original rule coincides with the general rule regarding usury which reads: "It is the general rule, applicable to both civil and criminal usury, that to constitute usury there must exist an intent that the lender is to take more than the legal rate of interest for the sum loaned."

  4. Groves v. Max J. Kuney Company

    303 Or. 468 (Or. 1987)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that an independent contractor may not bring an action under the ELA

    Oregon's ELA originally was proposed by initiative and adopted in 1910. Or Laws 1911, ch 3; Sacher v. Bohemia, Inc., 302 Or. 477, 481, 731 P.2d 434 (1987); Saylor v. EnterpriseElectric Co., 106 Or. 421, 425, 212 P. 477 (1923). Its purpose was to impose higher standards of care than did the common law on employers whose work involved "risk or danger."

  5. Helzer v. Wax

    272 P. 556 (Or. 1928)   Cited 8 times
    In Helzer, the plaintiff was an independent contractor with whom the defendant had contracted to haul away garbage on a weekly basis.

    We come now to the problem whether Section 6785, Or. L., which is a portion of the statute commonly referred to as the Employer's Liability Act, includes one who is an independent contractor. If employees only are protected by the requirements of the act, the plaintiff cannot recover; but, if an independent contractor, whose duties require their performance in an elevator shaft, or in the presence of an instrumentality which creates a risk, or danger, is also embraced within the protective features of the act, the plaintiff was possessed of a cause of action by virtue of it, if the requirements of the act were breached by the defendant. It is well established that the plaintiff could not recover under the act by virtue of his status as a member of the public: Turnidge v. Thompson, 89 Or. 637 ( 175 P. 281); Malloy v. Marshall Wells Hardware Co., 90 Or. 303 ( 173 P. 267, 175 P. 659, 176 P. 589); Saylor v. Enterprise Electric Co., 106 Or. 421 ( 212 P. 477); Brady v. Oregon Lumber Co., 117 Or. 188 ( 243 P. 96, 45 A.L.R. 812). We revert to the problem whether the foregoing circumstances accompanying his condition as an independent contractor place him in a more favorable situation.

  6. Low v. Sutherlin, Barry Co.

    35 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1929)   Cited 7 times
    In Low v. Sutherlin, Barry Co. (C.C.A. 9) 35 F.2d 443, it was held that a charge for expenses incident to a bond issue could "in no possible view be regarded as an interest payment."

    That a debtor cannot so bring his creditor under heavy penalties is too clear to admit of discussion, and the authorized acceleration of the maturity dates of the bonds does not render the transaction usurious. See 27 R.C.L. p. 234, § 35; Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 200 Cal. 609, 254 P. 956, 255 P. 805, 53 A.L.R. 725; Cissna Loan Co. v. Gawley, 87 Wn. 438, 151 P. 792, L.R.A. 1916B, 807, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 722; Lewis v. Vassar, 132 Wn. 480, 232 P. 312; Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 266 S.W. 612; Kaston v. Butterfield Live Stock Co. et al. (Idaho) 279 P. 716; American Investment Co. v. Lyons, 29 N.M. 1, 218 P. 183; American Investment Co. v. Roberts, 29 N.M. 99, 218 P. 1037; Clement Mtg. Co. v. Johnston, 83 Okla. 153, 201 P. 247; Bank of United States v. Waggener, 9 Pet. (34 U.S.) 378; Nichols v. Fearson, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 103, 8 L. Ed. 623. In both her pleading and her brief plaintiff repeatedly states that defendant intended to take an amount constituting usury, but intent without the act is of no effect, and, as we have seen, had plaintiff complied with the contract, the interest which she would have paid would have been far within the law.

  7. Pacific States Lumber Co. v. Bargar

    10 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1926)   Cited 22 times

    An action for damages under the statute will not lie at the instance of one who is not an employé carrying on his work at the place where he is injured. Turnidge v. Thompson, 89 Or. 637, 653, 175 P. 281; Saylor v. Enterprise Electric Co., 106 Or. 421, 436, 212 P. 477. Every employer whose work involves risk or danger is required by the statute to take the required precautions, not only for the protection of his own employés, but also for the protection of employés of others whose duties bring them within reach of the dangers and risks of such work. The Supreme Court of Oregon has so construed the statute, and this construction is binding on the federal courts.

  8. Simmons v. Stern

    9 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1925)   Cited 9 times

    "Sec. 2. If a greater rate of interest than is hereinbefore, in section 1, allowed, shall be contracted for or received or reserved, the contract shall not therefore be void; but in any action on such contract, proof may be made that a greater rate of interest has been directly or indirectly contracted for or taken or reserved, and the plaintiff shall recover only the principal less the amount of interest accruing thereon at the rate contracted for, and the defendant shall recover costs; and if interest shall have been paid, judgment shall be for the principal less twice the amount of interest paid and less the amount of all accrued and unpaid interest." Section 1 of this act, as construed and applied by the Supreme Court of New Mexico, in suits for foreclosure of real estate mortgages executed by the maker of a promissory note as security therefor (American Inv. Co. v. Lyons, 29 N.M. 1, 218 P. 183; American Inv. Co. v. Roberts, 29 N.M. 99, 218 P. 1037), limits the legal rate of interest which can be contracted for a loan of money, such as is represented by the note and mortgage sued upon, to 10 per cent. per annum. The appellee claims that the defense of usury was not pleaded in the answers, nor otherwise brought to the attention of the court.

  9. Tanner Development Co. v. Ferguson

    561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977)   Cited 72 times
    Refusing to consider demand letter usurious because it claimed unpaid balance and not full face amount of note

    There is also authority for spreading interest paid in advance over the entire term of the loan in other jurisdictions. Green v. Conservative Loan Co., 153 Ark. 219, 240 S.W. 13 (1922); American Inv. Co. v. Roberts, 29 N.M. 99, 218 P. 1037 (1928); American Inv. Co. v. Lyons, 29 N.M. 1, 218 P. 183 (1923); Metz v. Winne, 15 Okla. 1, 79 P. 223 (1904); Montgomery Fed. Sav. Loan Assn. v. Baer, 308 A.2d 768 (D.C.App. 1973). On the other hand, the Ramp approach, which would prohibit "spreading" and apply a year-by-year testing even of long-term contracts, was derived from a 1933 opinion of the Commission of Appeals in Dallas Trust Savings Bank v. Brashear, 65 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.Com.App. 1933, jdgmt adopted).

  10. Hays v. Hudson

    85 N.M. 512 (N.M. 1973)   Cited 6 times

    (Emphasis added.) To the extent that cases such as Priestly v. Law et ux., 33 N.M. 176, 262 P. 931 (1928); American Inv. Co. v. Lyons, 29 N.M. 1, 218 P. 183 (1923); Armijo v. Henry, 14 N.M. 181, 89 P. 305 (1907), are to the contrary, they are hereby overruled. Defendant argues on appeal that plaintiff should not have been allowed to recover attorney fees expended to obtain payment of a debt upon which usurious interest was charged.