Opinion
A22-0496
09-29-2022
Ticortier Rahieem Collins, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-16-629
Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Wheelock, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Sarah I. Wheelock, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 2016, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Ticortier Rahieem Collins with first-degree assault and first-degree criminal sexual conduct after his 20-month-old daughter suffered extensive trauma consistent with child abuse. Collins pleaded guilty to first-degree assault with aggravating factors and was sentenced to 240 months in prison. Collins sought postconviction relief in 2017, requesting that the court vacate the requirement that he register as a predatory offender. The postconviction court denied his petition, determining that a postconviction petition was not the proper avenue for relief. Collins filed a second postconviction petition in 2021, requesting a correction of his sentence and moving to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court denied Collins's second petition as untimely and Knaffla-barred. Collins now appeals.
2. Minnesota law permits persons convicted of a crime to seek postconviction relief when they claim the conviction violates their rights under "the Constitution or laws of the United States or of the state" or when they claim that scientific evidence unavailable at trial establishes their actual innocence. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2020). Petitioners may not request postconviction relief based on "grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal of the conviction or sentence." Id. Petitioners generally must file postconviction petitions within two years of entry of judgment on their conviction or sentence, or their direct appeal's final disposition, whichever is later. Id., subd. 4(a) (2020).
3. Claims that were raised on direct appeal or were known or should have been known but were not raised on direct appeal are procedurally barred, or Knaffla-barred. Sontoya v. State, 829 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2013) (citing State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976)); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1. A claim is not Knaffla-barred if "(1) the claim is novel; or (2) the interests of fairness and justice warrant relief." Sontoya, 829 N.W.2d at 604. The postconviction court may decline to apply these exceptions if the petitioner fails to argue that they apply. Erickson v. State, 725 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn. 2007).
4. In his primary brief on appeal, Collins does not claim that the district court erred by denying his postconviction petition as untimely and Knaffla-barred. His only argument supporting a claim that his petition was not untimely is in his reply brief, where he argues that his petition was untimely because he is self-represented.
5. Collins's appeal fails for two reasons. First, in his primary brief, Collins does not argue that the district court erred when it determined his appeal should be denied because it was untimely and Knaffla-barred. "[O]n appeal error is never presumed. It must be made to appear affirmatively before there can be reversal.... [and] the burden of showing error rests upon the one who relies upon it." Waters v. Fiebelkorn, 13 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (Minn. 1944). In addition, issues not raised or argued in appellant's primary brief cannot be raised in a reply brief. McIntire v. State, 458 N.W.2d 714, 717 n.2 (Minn.App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1990). Collins's appeal focuses on the merits of his postconviction petition and not the procedural bases on which it was denied. Collins has failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his petition as untimely and Knaffla-barred.
6. Second, even if we were to consider Collins's argument in his reply brief that his petition was untimely only because, as a self-represented party, he was unfamiliar with the legal requirements, that argument is unavailing. Collins filed his second postconviction appeal approximately four years after his conviction and does not argue that any exceptions to the limitations period apply. Collins argues only that his petition was not timely because he was self-represented and had limited resources. But we require the same duties of a self-represented party as of one represented by an attorney. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 1.04; see Francis v. State, 781 N.W.2d 892, 896 (Minn. 2010) (stating that self-represented party "is held to the standard of an attorney in presenting his appeal"). A self-represented appellant is "usually accorded some leeway in attempting to comply with court rules." Carpenter v. Woodvale, Inc., 400 N.W 2d 727, 729 (Minn. 1987). Here, considering a second postconviction petition filed two years after the statutory limitation period has expired would be more than the "some leeway" allowed for self-represented parties. Thus, Collins's argument that we should allow his second postconviction petition to proceed after the limitation period has expired because he is self-represented fails.
7. Here, the district court issued a thorough order explaining both that Collins's second postconviction petition was denied due to the procedural requirements of timeliness and Knaffla and that, had the district court reached the issues Collins raised, the petition would have been denied on the merits of the case. We conclude that Collins has failed to show on appeal that the district court erred by dismissing his second postconviction petition because it was untimely and Knaffla-barred.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.