Opinion
Civil Action 22-CV-1310
09-22-2022
NATASHA COLLINS, Plaintiff, v. SHUTTERED VENUES OPERATION GRANT, Defendant.
ORDER
JOHN R. PADOVA, J.
AND NOW, this 22nd day of September 2022, upon consideration of Plaintiff Natasha Collins's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 4), and her pro se Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5), it is ORDERED that:
1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
2. The Amended Complaint is DEEMED filed.
3. The Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for the reasons stated in the Court's Memorandum.
4. Collins may file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Any second amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the second amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the second amended complaint and shall state the basis for Collins's claims against each defendant. The second amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint, the Amended Complaint, or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting the second amended complaint, Collins should be mindful of the Court's reasons for dismissing the claims in her Amended Complaint as explained in the Court's Memorandum. Upon the filing of a second amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court.
5. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Collins a blank copy of the Court's form complaint bearing the above civil action number. Collins may use this form to file her second amended complaint if she chooses to do so.
This form is available on the Court's website at https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/forms/frmcgenf.pdf.
6. If Collins does not wish to file a second amended complaint and instead intends to stand on her Amended Complaint as originally pled, she may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs' decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).
7. If Collins fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Collins intends to stand on her Amended Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff's intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).
The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff's intention to stand on his complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 Fed.Appx. 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend his complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 Fed.Appx. 116, 118 n.2 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff's conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.” (citations omitted)); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).