Opinion
02 C 4493
December 24, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before the court on the motion of Defendants Deborah Seeman, Julie Beethem, Steven Schuck, and Sam Bucalo to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted but Plaintiff Denise Collins is given leave to amend her complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Denise Collins ("Mrs. Collins") is the mother of Ricky Collins ("Ricky"), a former prisoner at the now-defunct Sheridan Correctional Center. While in custody at Sheridan, Ricky committed suicide by hanging himself with a bed sheet. Seeman, Beethem, Schuck, and Bucalo were employees of Sheridan who were working the day that Ricky died. The complaint alleges that each of them were alerted to the possibility that Ricky would attempt to take his own life, and that each ignored the danger with deliberate indifference, thus violating Ricky's Eighth Amendment rights. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 12(b)(6). On November 17, 2003, we requested further briefing by the parties on the application of the exhaustion requirement of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), (c). Briefing is now complete.
LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is used to test the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, construe allegations of a complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept as true all well-pleaded facts and allegations in the complaint.Bontkowski v. First Natl. Bank of Cicero, 998 F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1993); Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1991). The allegations of a complaint "should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Nonetheless, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must allege the "operative facts" upon which each claim is based. Kyle v. Morton High Sch., 144 F.3d 448, 454-55 (7th Cir. 1998). With these principles in mind, we turn to the motion at hand.
DISCUSSION
Defendants' initial motion launched two attacks. The first argued that the named defendants are not responsible for forming policies at Sheridan, so they could not be sued in their official capacities. While this is true, the language of the complaint is clearly directed toward Defendants in their individual capacities for specific failures of their duties on the day of Ricky's suicide. Defendants concede in their memorandum in support that the complaint contains individual capacity claims. Defs.' Memo, in Support, pp. 5-6.
Defendants' second attack, although framed as addressing a deficiency in pleading the knowledge of Beethem, actually pertains to the merits of the claim against her. It is axiomatic that a motion to dismiss examines whether a claim is cognizable, not whether it is meritorious. When read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the allegations against Beethem aver that she knew that Ricky needed help but delayed hi coming to his aid. The details of why she delayed, how long she delayed, etc., are not matters to be decided at the pleading stage. Accordingly, neither of the two bases of the original motion warrants dismissal of the complaint.
The application of the PLRA is another story. The statute provides that:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The parties have not cited and we have not discovered any cases directly addressing whether the PLRA applies to prison suicides. However, the Supreme Court has held that the exhaustion requirement applies to "all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong." Porter v. Nussle, 122 S.Ct. 983, 992 (2002). In light of this broad holding and the lack of any contrary authority, we conclude that Mrs. Collins cannot proceed on the present complaint. In this circuit, failure to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies is grounds for dismissal under 12(b)(6).Massey v. Wheeler, 221 F.3d 1030, 1034 (7th Cir. 2000). Therefore, we dismiss the complaint without prejudice. Mrs. Collins is granted leave to file an amended complaint that alleges exhaustion of remedies if she can do so within the bounds of Fed.R.Civ.Proc. 11.