Summary
affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment on a claim for medical deliberate indifference because the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of the named defendants' personal involvement with plaintiff's medical care
Summary of this case from Avery v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep'tOpinion
No. 19-15272
07-17-2020
LEROY COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DWIGHT NEVEN, Warden; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 2:15-cv-01696-JCM-CWH MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Nevada state prisoner Leroy Collins appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 470 (9th Cir. 2007). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Collins's excessive force claim because Collins failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Hendricks violated his Eighth Amendment rights when Hendricks was driving a maintenance cart that hit Collins. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) (the "core judicial inquiry" in resolving an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim is "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm").
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Collins's medical deliberate indifference claim because Collins failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants Cox, Aranas, and Neven violated his Eighth Amendment rights when they were not personally involved in Collins's medical care. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 "if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation" (citation omitted)); Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The inquiry into causation [under § 1983] must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.").
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Collins's motion for reconsideration because Collins presented no basis for reconsideration. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and bases for reconsideration).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Collins's motion for default judgment against defendant Hendricks where Hendricks had already answered the complaint. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review and factors for determining whether to enter default judgment).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.