Opinion
14-P-1874
08-06-2015
WILLIAM J. COLLINS, JR. v. KELLEY A. COLLINS.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Kelley appeals a judgment of civil contempt wherein a Probate and Family Court judge found that she failed to pay William, her former husband, $30,000 pursuant to a divorce decree. In the contempt judgment, the judge ordered Kelley to pay William the $30,000 plus $2,078.74 in interest, and an additional $1,000 in attorney's fees.
As the parties have the same surname, we use their first names.
According to the parties, these monies have been paid in full. Since Kelley has satisfied the contempt judgment, she is purged of the contempt. See Aroesty v. Cohen, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 220 (2004). Therefore, the issue is moot. Mullen v. Mullen, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 899, 900 (1979). Civil contempt is coercive and not punitive; because Kelley has satisfied the judgment, any action taken by us "would not provide [the] appellant any real or effective relief." International Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Intl. Union, 551 A.2d 1356, 1361 (Me. 1988).
To the extent Kelley contends that the judgment of civil contempt causes a stigma as a collateral consequence, such a claim is not actionable. See Commonwealth v. Rape Crisis Servs. of Greater Lowell, Inc., 416 Mass. 190, 193 (1993).
Kelley asserts that because the Massachusetts Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure do not provide, upon the filing of a notice of appeal of a contempt judgment, for an automatic stay, she was without any other recourse but to pay the monies. Compare Mass.R.Civ.P. 62(d), 365 Mass. 829 (1974), with Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 62(d). This argument lacks substance, as nothing in the record precluded Kelley from moving for a stay of execution of the contempt judgment. See Mass.R.Dom.Rel.P. 62(e).
After oral argument, we ordered the parties to brief the issue of mootness.
We note that neither party disputes that the money was owed.
We recognize that "[w]hen the contempt is purged, the contemner is entitled to have the contempt order vacated." 17 C.J.S. Contempt § 197 (2011). See Mullen, supra. Therefore, the judgment of contempt is reversed, "not on the merits, but because the issue has become moot." Ibid. The case is remanded to the Probate and Family Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint. See ibid.
William's requests for appellate attorney's fees are denied.
So ordered.
By the Court (Sullivan, Maldonado & Massing, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
Clerk Entered: August 6, 2015.