Laches and neglect are always discountenanced, and, therefore, from thebeginning of this jurisdiction, there was always a limitation to suits in this court." Doughty v. Doughty, 10 N. J. Eq. 349; Shipman v. Cook, 16 N. J. Eq. 251; Cooper v. Carlisle, 17 N. J. Eq. 525; Brown v. Insurance Co., 32 N. J. Eq. 809; Wood v. Chetwood, 33 N. J. Eq. 9, 21; McCartin v. Traphagen. 43 N. J. Eq. 323, 338, 11 Atl. Rep. 156; Collins v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 813, 820, 18 Atl. Rep. 860; Van Houten v. Van Winkle, 46 N. J. Eq. 380, 382, 20 Atl. Rep. 34; Lynch's Adm'r v. Vanneman, (N. J.) 18 Atl. Rep. 468; Sullivan v. Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 806, 811; Stearns v. Page, 7 How. 819, 829; Godden v. Kimmell, 99 U. S. 201: Aldridge v. Muirhead, 101 U. S. 402; Randolph v. Quidnick Co., 135 U. S. 457, 462, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 655; Story, Eq. Jur. § 1520.
If the requisite confidential relationship out of which undue influence can be presumed is not evidentially shown, there must be some proof of actual fraud in order to nullify the transfers. Collins v. Collins, 45 N.J. Eq. 813, 820, 18 Atl. 860. In the absence of both classes of proof, the lack of independent advice is not material.
If the confidential relationship out of which undue influence can be presumed is not evidentially shown, there must then be some actual proof of fraud in order to set aside the conveyance. Collins v. Collins, 45 N.J. Eq. 813, 820, 15 A. 849, 18 A. 860. One cannot always precisely delimit and demarcate the so-called dominant confidential relationship from which a factual presumption of undue influence legally springs.
The principles underlying the decisions in Slack v. Rees, 66 N. J. Eq. 447, 59 A. 466, 69 L. R. A. 393; Post v. Hagan, 71 N. J. Eq. 234, 65 A. 1026, 124 Am. St. Rep. 997; Reeves v. White, 84 N. J. Eq. 661, 95 A. 184; In re Fulper's Estate, 99 N. J. Eq. 293, 132 A. 834, from which counsel copiously quotes, have no bearing. The rulings in Collins v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 813, 15 A. 849, 18 A. 860; Soper v. Cisco, 85 N. J. Eq. 165, 95 A. 1016, 1021, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 452, and Voorhees v. Christie, 96 N. J. Eq. 337, 125 A. 13, which counsel overlooked, govern. The deed will stand.
There is ample authority to sustain a conveyance of lands made by a grantor in consideration of maintenance and care during his natural life, when made by one having sufficient mental capacity, in the absence of fraud, duress, or undue influence. Collins v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 813, 15 A. 849, 18 A. 860; Holland v. John, 60 N. J. Eq. 435, 46 A. 172; Soper v. Cisco, 85 N. J. Eq. 165. 95 A. 1016, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 452; Voorhees v. Christie, 96 N. J. Eq. 337, 125 A. 13. In the present case, I feel that the grantor had sufficient capacity to make the deed, which was based upon a fair, valuable consideration under the circumstances existing at the time of the transaction leading up to its execution, and that neither fraud, duress, nor undue influence has been established to subvert it.
Conveyances by an aged parent to a child in consideration of the agreement by the latter to support and provide for the former are upheld, if the transaction appears to have been free from fraud, and the evidence does not show that confidence has been reposed by the infirm in the the stronger, but does show that the parties dealt "at arms-length." Collins v. Collins, 45 N. J. Eq. 813, 18 Atl. Rep. 860. Another principle, however, is to be applied when confidence has been reasonably reposed between the parties which may have been abused. In Low v. Holmes, Dru. t. Nap. 290, at 320, the lord chancellor says: "It is not the duty of this court, and it may not be within its province, to rectify in all cases the various inequalities of contracting parties, or to undo the advantage which may be gained by the strong or sagacious over the weak and improvident; but in every relation which induces confidence, and involves dependence, it is the bounden duty of this court to see that such confidence is not abused."