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Collins v. City of Mason City

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Apr 12, 2006
715 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006)

Opinion

No. 5-947 / 05-0104

Filed April 12, 2006

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Paul W. Riffel, Judge.

Linda Collins appeals the summary dismissal of her claims of age discrimination, gross negligence, tortious discharge against public policy, and intentional interference with a business contract, as well as her husband's claim of loss of consortium, against the city of Mason City. AFFIRMED.

Richard Tompkins, Mason City, for appellants.

Randall Nielsen of Pappajohn, Shriver, Eide Nicholas, P.C., Mason City, for appellees.

Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.


I. Background Facts and Proceedings

On June 5, 2003, Linda and Raymond Collins (Collins) sued the City of Mason City and several of its employees (City) for damages caused by the unlawful termination of Linda's employment with the Mason City Police Department. Linda's theories of liability included age discrimination, gross negligence, tortious discharge against public policy, and intentional interference with a business contract. Raymond claimed loss of consortium damages caused by the unlawful conduct of the City and its employees.

The City denied Collins' allegations, claiming Linda's termination was based on substandard job performance. On July 23, 2004, the City and its employees moved for summary judgment, citing the absence of any genuine issues of material fact concerning Linda's various theories of liability and that they were otherwise entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Their motion was supported by deposition testimony and exhibits documenting Linda's substandard job performance and resulting pre-termination discipline. Collins did not file a written resistance or other documentation showing there were genuine issues of material fact for trial. The trial court's ruling granting the motion for summary judgment states:

The record reflects that during the course of her employment with the City, Ms. Collins received several written disciplinary notices identifying deficiencies in her work performance. She was placed on paid leave from her position and received counseling and additional training. Upon returning to work and resuming her normal activities, she was again cited for performance deficiencies and was terminated on January 21, 2002. In responding to Defendants' motion, the Plaintiffs have not set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial on their claim that Ms. Collins was the victim of age discrimination. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claim should be dismissed as a matter of law.

On appeal Collins argues that the summary judgment record includes genuine issues of material fact concerning Linda's age discrimination claim and contrary to the trial court's ruling, the City is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Collins does not challenge that portion of the trial court's ruling dismissing her remaining claims.

II. Standard of Review.

We review a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors of law. Financial Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Hawkeye Bank Trust, 588 N.W.2d 450, 455 (Iowa 1999).

III. Merits.

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981(3) provides:

Any party resisting the motion [for summary judgment] shall file a resistance within 15 days, unless otherwise ordered by the court, from the time when a copy of the motion has been served. The resistance shall include a statement of disputed facts, if any, and a memorandum of authorities supporting the resistance.

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.981(5) provides:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered.

It can be fatal to the resisting party to rely only on perceived weaknesses in the movant's contention. Suss v. Schemmel, 375 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Iowa 1985). We, like the trial court, find that Collins as the nonmoving party has failed to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Contrary to the express provisions of rule 1.981(3), Collins failed to file a resistance with a statement of disputed facts or memorandum of authorities supporting the resistance. Collins' failure to do so was fatal to all theories of the City's liability, and the trial court appropriately entered summary judgment in the City's favor.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

Collins v. City of Mason City

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Apr 12, 2006
715 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006)
Case details for

Collins v. City of Mason City

Case Details

Full title:LINDA K. COLLINS and RAYMOND D. COLLINS, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. CITY OF…

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: Apr 12, 2006

Citations

715 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006)