In addition, in most of the cases, the lawn-mowing was only one of a number of uses and was not necessarily the most important use. See Dombkowski, 2006 ME 24, ¶¶ 4-7, 31 (mowing, clearing, driving, fencing and drilling a well); Collins v. Cabral, 206 N.E.2d 84, 85 (Mass. 1965) (mowing, clearing land, using land for recreational activities, seeding ground, and constructing septic tank on disputed land); Gorman v. Hess, 754 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (App.Div. 2003) (mowing, planting, making repairs, and marking a border); Brennan v. Manchester Crossings, Inc., 708 A.2d 815, 821-22 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1998) (mowing, raking leaves, planting seed, and using land for storage and recreational activities). In any event, the factual details of other cases are useful, but not determinative, as each case must be decided on its own facts.
Peck v. Bigelow, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 551, 556 (1993), quoting from LaChance v. First Natl. Bank Trust Co., supra at 491. See, e.g., Lyon v. Parkinson, 330 Mass. 374, 380 (1953) (adverse possession established where claimant cleared land, formed rock garden, and installed rip-rap); Collins v. Cabral, 348 Mass. 797, 798 (1965) (adverse possession established where claimants maintained disputed lawn area, cleared land of poison ivy, filled and graded property, and installed septic system); Shaw v. Solari, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 153 (1979) (adverse possession established where claimant erected chicken coop, built picket fence, and maintained driveway). The claimant's acts of dominion and control must be sufficiently open and notorious to constitute "notice to all the world . . . of an adverse claim of title."
Following the general run of authority, the judge recognized that the Stoloffs' continuous maintenance of the lawn, the privet hedge, and railroad-tie retaining wall constituted possession sufficiently open, notorious, exclusive, and adverse, as to vest ownership in them if not interrupted for the prescriptive period. Compare Lyon v. Parkinson, 330 Mass. 374, 380 (1953); Kershaw v. Zecchini, 342 Mass. 318, 320-321 (1961); Collins v. Cabral, 348 Mass. 797, 797-798 (1965); Shaw v. Solari, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 157 (1979); Lebel v. Nelson, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 301-302 (1990); MacDonald v. McGillvary, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 902, 903-904 (1993). The judge ruled, however, that the Stoloffs' exclusive possession was cut short just before the end of the prescriptive period.
Did the actor make "changes upon the land" that constitute "such a control and dominion over the premises as to be readily considered acts similar to those which are usually and ordinarily associated with ownership"? LaChance v. First Natl. Bank Trust Co., 301 Mass. 488, 491 (1938). See also Lyon v. Parkinson, 330 Mass. 374, 379-380 (1953); Kershaw, supra at 319-321; Collins v. Cabral, 348 Mass. 797, 797-798 (1965); Shaw v. Solari, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 151, 157 (1979); Lebel v. Nelson, 29 Mass. App. Ct. 300, 301-302 (1990); Masa Builders, Inc. v. Hanson, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 930, 930 (1991). The defendant made no permanent improvements on the lot, like the stone walls in LaChance and Kershaw, the rock garden and rip-rap in Lyon, the septic tank in Collins, or the house in Kershaw.
The judge's findings and ruling concerning Lebel's acquisition of title to the disputed area by adverse possession are soundly based in the record and the law. See Lyon v. Parkinson, 330 Mass. 374, 380 (1953); Collins v. Cabral, 348 Mass. 797, 797-798 (1965). 2. Title to the tidal flats.
Boutin v. Perreault, 343 Mass. 329, 331-332 (1961). Collins v. Cabral, 348 Mass. 797, 798 (1965). Here even such a short step is unnecessary in view of the express finding that Bennett and his predecessors have claimed ownership in the locus for sixty years.
Kershaw v. Zecchini, 342 Mass. 318, 319-321 (1961). Collins v. Cabral, 348 Mass. 797 (1965). Contrast Cowden v. Cutting, 339 Mass. 164, 167-169 (1959).
However, there is no requirement for an adverse possessor to enclose the disputed parcel, to erect a "no trespass" sign, or to completely block use of the disputed parcel in order to establish the hostile/adverse element of an adverse possession. See Lyon, 330 Mass. at 380 (adverse possession established where the claimant cleared land, formed rock garden, and installed rip-rap; no evidence of a fence or "no trespass" sign); Collins v. Cabral, 348 Mass. 797, 798 (1965) (adverse possession established where claimants maintained disputed lawn area, cleared land of poison ivy, filled and graded property, and installed septic system; no evidence of a fence or "no trespass" sign). The defendants cite to no evidence that indicates that the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s predecessors were using the Parcel with permission from any of the defendants’ predecessors.
To succeed, the claimant must establish changes upon the land that constitute "such a control and dominion over the premises as to be readily considered acts similar to those which are usually and ordinarily associated with ownership." Peck v. Bigelow, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 551, 556 (1993), quoting from LaChance v. First Nat'l Bank Trust Co., 30 Mass. at 491; see, e.g., Lyon v. Parkinson, 330 Mass. 374, 380, (1953) (adverse possession established where claimant cleared land, formed rock garden, and installed rip-rap); Collins v. Cabral, 348 Mass. 797, 798 (1965) (adverse possession established where claimants maintained disputed lawn area, cleared land of poison ivy, filled and graded property, and installed septic system); Shaw v. Solari, 8 Mass.App.Ct. 151, 153 (1979) (adverse possession established where claimant erected chicken coop, built picket fence, and maintained driveway). The claimant's acts of dominion and control must be sufficiently open and notorious to constitute "notice to all the world . . . of an adverse claim of title."
In the case at bar, the Genovas' addition of a shed, bathroom, and landscaping may suffice to establish use which is actual, open, notorious, exclusive, and adverse. See Collins v. Cabral, 348 Mass. 797, 798 (1965) (maintenance of lawn and grading of land sufficient); Kershaw v. Zecchini, 343 Mass. 318, 320 (1961) (construction of house sufficient); Matthys v. First Swedish Baptist Church, 223 Mass. 544 (1916) (overhang of roof sufficient). Smaland, however, contests the dates on which these items were constructed, thereby disputing the Genovas' satisfaction of the 20-year statutory period.