Opinion
24A-DC-681
12-04-2024
Bradd Collins, Appellant-Respondent v. Jennifer Bleem, Appellee-Petitioner
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Nathan K. Vining Vining Legal LLC Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Rachelle N. Ponist Harshman Ponist Smith & Rayl Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Rosanne Tan Ang, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D09-1704-DC-16935
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Nathan K. Vining Vining Legal LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Rachelle N. Ponist Harshman Ponist Smith & Rayl Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
MATHIAS, JUDGE
[¶1] Bradd Collins ("Husband") appeals the Marion Superior Court's order granting Jennifer Bleem's ("Wife") motion to clarify their settlement agreement, which the trial court had incorporated into the dissolution decree ending their marriage. Husband presents a single issue for our review, namely, whether the trial court erred when it ordered Husband to assist with Wife's refinance of the marital residence in exchange for $6,500.
[¶2] We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] Husband and Wife were married and have one child together, Child. In February 2018, Husband and Wife divorced. The trial court incorporated into the dissolution decree a settlement agreement executed by Husband and Wife. The settlement agreement included the following provision:
3.04 Real Estate. Wife shall receive the marital property at 5903 W. 29th Place, Speedway, IN 46224 ("Marital Residence"), subject to the terms set forth herein. Wife shall assume [sic] effective March 1, 2018[,] and be solely responsible for the payment of any and all obligations related to the Marital Residence on the appropriate due date, including but not limited to mortgages, taxes, insurance, utilities, fees, maintenance, repairs, and liabilities, and shall indemnify and hold Wife [sic] harmless therefrom. Wife shall have nine (9) months from the Court's approval hereof to refinance the marital residence and pay Father the sum of $6,500.00[, which is one-half of the parties' equity in the marital residence]. If [Wife] is unable to refinance the house within said nine (9) months then the house
shall revert to Father as his sole and separate property and he shall pay Wife the sum of $6,500.00 for her interest in the marital residence within nine (9) months. If Husband has not paid Wife her $6,500.00 interest in said time period, the property shall be sold and Wife shall be paid her $6,500.00 sum from the closing proceeds. Each party shall cooperate with the other regarding the refinancing and/or sale of the marital residence.
Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 23 (emphasis added).
[¶4] Wife and Child continued to live in the marital residence, but Wife did not get a mortgage in her name within nine months. Neither did Husband take possession of the marital residence nor pay Wife $6,500 within the following nine months. Instead, Wife and Child continued to live in the marital residence, and Wife continued to pay the mortgage, which was still in Husband's name. Wife also purchased new appliances and paid for regular maintenance on the home. Husband took no steps to take possession of the marital residence, and neither party took steps to sell it.
[¶5] In September 2022, Wife filed a motion to clarify the settlement agreement with the trial court. Wife alleged that "the parties need clarification in regards to this matter as the order was not followed by either party and now the terms of the order are essentially impossible to abide by at this point." Id. at 32. Wife also alleged that, because she had been paying the mortgage since the dissolution, Husband would be unjustly enriched if he were to get more than half of the equity that existed at the time of the dissolution decree.
[¶6] At the conclusion of a hearing on Wife's motion, the trial court stated in relevant part as follows:
As far as the house is concerned, so how many years later? Six years later. Any action on this - on this agreement I don't view as a modification of the agreement. Neither party met the terms that are contained in this agreement, so I am left with interpreting - I'm left with interpreting this agreement based on contract law, based on equity and it is undisputed that each was to walk away with the $6,500.00 at the conclusion of this transaction and will, and [Wife] is - is in agreement with paying that to [Husband]. However, I do not think that waiting this long to raise this issue as far as the equity, I - I don't think that that is the appropriate remedy that should have been sought. [Wife's] made all of these things, she has built this equity. [Husband] will have the $6,500.00 that - that was agreed upon because anything beyond that would be in fact be modifying the agreement of the parties. I am going to order that within one week of being presented the paperwork on [Wife] refinancing the home, [Husband] is to sign that paperwork and return that back to [Wife].
Tr. p. 39. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[¶7] Husband contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to help Wife get a mortgage on the marital residence in exchange for $6,500. As our Supreme Court has explained:
When a party asks a court to clarify a settlement agreement, the court's task is one of contract interpretation. This is because settlement agreements are contractual in nature and binding if approved by the trial court. Myers v. Myers, 560 N.E.2d 39, 42, 44
(Ind. 1990).... As such, a settlement agreement is "interpreted according to the general rules for contract construction." Bailey v. Mann, 895 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind. 2008) (citations omitted).
In addition to our Myers and Bailey opinions, there is a plethora of Court of Appeals authority providing that general rules applicable to construction of contracts govern construction of marriage-settlement agreements. This principle was enunciated by our colleagues as early as Higgins v. St. Joseph Loan &Trust Co. of South Bend, 98 Ind.App. 674, 677, 186 N.E. 910, 912 (1933) (en banc), trans. denied, and has been regularly deployed in recent years.[] One frequently quoted passage provides:
When interpreting these agreements, we apply the general rules applicable to the construction of contracts. That is, unless the terms of the contract are ambiguous, they will be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Clear and unambiguous terms in the contract are deemed conclusive, and when they are present we will not construe the contract or look to extrinsic evidence, but will merely apply the contractual provisions.Shorter v. Shorter, 851 N.E.2d 378, 383 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006) (internal citations omitted). Ryan v. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d 359, 363-64 (Ind. 2012). Moreover, as our Supreme Court recently explained, "the Indiana Code generally forbids courts from modifying [property settlement] agreements unless: (1) an agreement authorizes the court to modify it; (2) the parties agree post-decree to modify their settlement agreement; or (3) the agreement is tainted by fraud, Ind. Code § 31-15-2-17(c); I.C. § 31-15-7-9.1(a)." Wohlt v. Wohlt, ___ N.E.3d ___, No. 24S-DR-385, 2024 WL 4849682, at *3 (Ind. Nov. 21, 2024).
[¶8] Husband argues that Section 3.04 of the parties' settlement agreement is unambiguous and provides that, under the circumstances in which the parties now find themselves, they are required to sell the marital residence and Husband is required to pay Wife only $6,500. He maintains that, in ordering Husband to assist Wife in refinancing the marital residence in her name in exchange for the $6,500, the trial court impermissibly modified the terms of the settlement agreement. We must agree.
[¶9] Again, in her motion to clarify the settlement agreement, Wife alleged that "the parties need clarification in regards to this matter as the order was not followed by either party and now the terms of the order are essentially impossible to abide by at this point." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 32. Wife did not allege that the agreement authorized the court to modify it, that the parties had since agreed to modify it, or that the agreement was tainted by fraud. See Wohlt, 2024 WL 4849682, at *3. Still, despite the missed deadlines and the express language in Section 3.04 dictating a sale upon those missed deadlines, Wife asked the trial court to return the parties to their positions as they existed at the time of the final decree.
[¶10] The trial court agreed with Wife and ignored the plain meaning of the unambiguous language in Section 3.04. The court found that "[n]either party [had] met the terms" in the agreement. Tr. p. 39. Thus, the court decided to interpret the agreement "based on equity" and found that "it is undisputed that each was to walk away with the $6,500.00 at the conclusion of this transaction[.]" Id. The trial court agreed with Wife that it was unjust for Husband to reap the benefits of the increased equity in the marital residence that resulted from her years of paying the mortgage and making improvements to the home. Accordingly, the court ordered Husband to execute any necessary documents to help Wife obtain a mortgage on the marital residence.
[¶11] But it is well settled that
"[t]he existence of express terms in a valid contract precludes the substitution of and the implication in law of terms regarding the subject matter covered by the express terms of the contract." Keystone Carbon Co. v. Black, 599 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind.Ct.App.
1992) (citing Kincaid v. Lazar, 405 N.E.2d 615 (Ind.Ct.App.
1980)). "When the rights of parties are controlled by an express contract, recovery cannot be based on a theory implied in law." Id.Zoeller v. E. Chicago Second Century, Inc., 904 N.E.2d 213, 221 (Ind. 2009).
[¶12] The settlement agreement unambiguously provides that, if, as has happened, Wife did not refinance the residence and neither party paid the other $6,500 within the designated timeframes, the residence "shall be sold and Wife shall be paid her $6,500.00 sum from the closing proceeds." Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 23. In other words, where, as here, neither party fulfilled their obligations, the decree requires a forced sale. Because the parties' rights were anticipated by and controlled by the express terms of the settlement agreement, the trial court erred when it awarded Wife an equitable remedy. See Zoeller, 904 N.E.2d at 221.
Wife's argument that the equitable doctrine of laches applies here also fails because the parties' contract controls. See, e.g., Foster v. First Merchants Bank, N.A., 235 N.E.3d 1251, 1256 (Ind. 2024) (holding that equitable doctrine of laches does not apply to a claim for legal relief).
[¶13] Still, Wife contends that we should treat her motion to clarify as a Trial Rule 60(B)(8) motion to modify the parties' settlement agreement. Wife maintains that, in granting her motion, "the trial court simply modified the Settlement Agreement to more accurately reflect the asset distribution existing at the time of the divorce and to effectuate the intended distribution scheme." Appellee's Br. at 17. But, again, Wife ignores the plain meaning of the final provision of Section 3.04 of the settlement agreement which provides that, under the present circumstances, the house shall be sold and Husband shall pay Wife only $6,500. That unambiguous provision, which the parties agreed to, shows that the parties intended that result no matter how long Wife continued to live in the marital residence and no matter how many mortgage payments she made. See, e.g., Wohlt, 2024 WL 4849682, at *5-6 (holding unambiguous provision of property settlement agreement included a catch-all provision whereby cryptocurrencies not specifically identified in marital estate were awarded to husband). Wife's argument under Trial Rule 60(B)(8) is not well taken.
To the extent Wife claims that Husband is receiving a windfall, we cannot ignore that Section 3.04 imposed no deadline on the forced sale of the home. Thus, depending on how long the sale would take, the equity in the home might have increased or decreased over time. Wife agreed to this provision and, absent agreement by Husband to modify it, she is bound by these terms. In other words, she knew the risk of continuing to live in the marital residence and paying the mortgage without seeking a modification of the terms of the settlement agreement.
[¶14] In sum, under the plain meaning of Section 3.04 of the parties' settlement agreement, Husband shall sell the marital residence and pay $6,500 to Wife. The parties, of course, are free to modify the agreement. But the trial court erred when it imposed an equitable remedy in favor of Wife and ordered Husband to help her refinance the marital residence in exchange for $6,500.
During the hearing, the parties appeared to agree that Wife and Child should remain in the marital residence. Husband testified that he never took steps to ask Wife and Child to leave the home for his daughter's sake. See Tr. p. 30.
[¶15] Reversed.
Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.