"Under the direct method, a plaintiff must provide either direct or circumstantial evidence that the employer had a discriminatory motivation." Collins v. Amer. Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 2013). Direct evidence is evidence that, "'if believed by the trier of fact, will prove the particular fact in question without reliance upon inference or presumption.'"

Montgomery v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 626 F.3d 382, 394 (7th Cir.2010). More importantly, if a plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the McDonnell–Douglas inquiry, an employer may not be subjected to a pretext inquiry. Collins v. Am. Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir.2013). In some cases, however, the issue of meeting legitimate job expectations and the question of pretext overlap.

Under the direct method in a discrimination case, "a plaintiff must provide either direct or circumstantial evidence that the employer had a discriminatory motivation," when it took an adverse action. Collins v. American Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 2013). Direct evidence is evidence that, "if believed by the trier of fact, will prove the particular fact in question without reliance upon inference or presumption."

Therefore, the burden is on Dr. Hatcher to come forward with sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to find that the University's proffered reason for its decision is pretextual. Pretext "is a deliberate falsehood," "a lie," "a phony reason for some action." Collins v. Am. Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 2013); Adelman-Reyes v. Saint Xavier Univ., 500 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2007). The question "is not whether the employer's stated reason was inaccurate or unfair . . . [because] [i]t is not the court's concern that an employer may be wrong about its employee's performance, or may be too hard on its employee."

See Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). However, the Court "will not draw inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture," Collins v. Am. Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012)), and Rule 56 "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case." Scott v. Trump Ind., Inc., 337 F.3d 939, 945 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

SeeSmith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir.2012) (citation omitted). However, the Court “will not draw inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture,” Collins v. Am. Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir.2013) (citing Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir.2012) ), and Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case.” Scott v. Trump Ind., Inc., 337 F.3d 939, 945 (7th Cir.2003) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ).

Although there appears to be a genuine dispute of fact as to what actually happened on May 26th, that dispute is not material to Johnson's race discrimination claims. See Collins v. Am. Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 2013) ("The question [in a wrongful termination case] is not whether the employer's stated reason was inaccurate or unfair, but whether the employer honestly believed the reasons it has offered to explain the discharge. It is not the court's concern that an employer may be wrong about its employee's performance, or may be too hard on its employee.

There are two ways of demonstrating a prima facie case of employment discrimination in violation of Title VII: the direct method of proof and the indirect method of proof. Collins v. Am. Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir.2013) (citations omitted). 1. The Direct Method of Proof

Plaintiff asserts both theories on appeal. ¶ 66 Under the direct method for proving intentional employment discrimination, plaintiff must provide either direct or circumstantial evidence that the adverse employment action was taken because of his race. Collins v. American Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir. 2013); see Sola v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 316 Ill. App. 3d 528, 537-38 (2000). Direct evidence would require evidence akin to an admission from the employer that it terminated the plaintiff because of race. Collins, 715 F.3d at 1000.

Third, he maintains that pager duty was not legitimate because it was not written in his job description. All three of Huang's arguments are meritless. First, employers are entitled to determine their scheduling needs, see Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir.1999), and decide whether employees are satisfying them, see Collins v. American Red Cross, 715 F.3d 994, 1000 (7th Cir.2013); Naik v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 627 F.3d 596, 600 (7th Cir.2010). Huang's offer to work Sundays could not satisfy CNA's needs because the company needed him on call throughout all of Sunday and Saturday, and he refused to comply.