The jury could indeed find that whether or not the trip to Louisville on the way home interrupted his employment, he had returned to the business of getting home and had thus reentered the scope of his employment. Such a finding would not be erroneous. Central Truckaway System, Inc. v. Moore, supra; Fleichmann Co. v. Howe, 213 Ky. 110, 280 S.W. 496 (1926); Collin County Motor Co. v. Howard, 121 S.W.2d 460, (Tex.Civ.App. 1938); Buckley v. Harkens, 114 Wn. 468, 195 P. 250 (1921). The statement of questions involved contained a claim of excessive verdict.

Ala. F. I. Co. v. Powaski, 232 Ala. 66, 166 So. 782; Rochester-Hall Drug Co. v. Bowden, 218 Ala. 242, 118 So. 674; Republic I. S. Co. v. Self, 192 Ala. 403, 68 So. 328, L.R.A. 1915F, 516; Birmingham Ledger Co v. Buchanan, 10 Ala. App. 527, 65 So. 667; Hardeman v. Williams, 150 Ala. 415, 43 So. 726, 10 L.R.A., N.S., 653; 39 C.J. 1283, § 1472; 35 Am.Jur. § 553. Although a servant may deviate from his employment to perform a purely personal mission, yet if he has fully performed such personal mission and is acting in the furtherance of his master's business at the time of the accident, he is then acting within the scope of his employment. 39 C.J. 1298, § 1495; Riley v. Standard Oil Co., 231 N.Y. 301, 132 N.E. 97, 22 A.L.R. 1382; Cusimano v. Spiess Sales Co., 153 La. 551, 96 So. 118; Cummings v. Republic Trucking Co., 241 Mass. 292, 135 N.E. 134; Vanneman v. Walker Laundry Co., 166 Mo. App. 685, 150 S.W. 1128; Collin County Motor Co. v. Howard, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 460; Schultze v. McGuire, 241 N.Y. 460, 150 N.E. 516. A temporary deviation or departure from master's business merely suspends the relation of master and servant but, when the object of that departure or deviation has been accomplished and the servant re-engages in the discharge of his duty, he is then acting within the scope of his employment. Edwards v. Earnest, 206 Ala. 1, 89 So. 729, 22 A.L.R. 1387; Riley v. Standard Oil Co., supra; Healey v. Cockrill, 133 Ark. 327, 202 S.W. 229, L.R.A. 1918D, 115; Ritchie v. Waller, 63 Conn. 155, 28 A. 29, 27 L.R.A. 161, 38 Am.St.Rep. 361; 35 Am.Jur. § 555.

The cases relied on by plaintiffs are not in point. Collin County Motor Co. v. Howard, 121 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1938, writ dism'd). The problem was created by the fact that the employee, after beginning a journey admittedly in furtherance of his employer's business, 'deviated' from the performance of his duties in order to perform a mission 'purely his own.' The only holding in Howard is to the effect that, after such deviation, the employee had returned to the performance of his duties and, at the time of the accident, was engaged in the furtherance of his employer's business.

The evidence, wholly apart from any presumption arising out of the facts of employment and ownership of the vehicle, raised the issue of scope of employment and effectively prevented the movant for summary judgment from showing that such element of the plaintiff's cause of action was, as a matter of law, negated. See Collin County Motor Co. v. Howard, 121 S.W.2d 460 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1938, writ dism'd); Ineeda Laundry v. Newton, 33 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.Civ.App. — Beaumont 1930, writ dism'd); McKeage v. Morris Co., 265 S.W. 1059 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1924, no writ); Trachtenberg v. Castillo, 257 S.W. 657 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1923, writ dism'd); Restatement of the Law of Agency 2d sec. 229, Comment d, Illustration 11 (1958); 52 A.L.R.2d 350, 368; 7 Tex.Jur.2d Automobiles sec. 214 (1959); 6 Blashfield, Automobile Law Practice, Sec. 253.34 (1966). Reversed and remanded.

We regard the court's instruction to the jury to disregard the argument as effective, and overrule the contention of appellant that it was of such harmful nature that it could not be cured by the instruction. Texas P. R. Co. v. Gillette, Tex. Civ. App. 100 S.W.2d 170; Collin County Motor Co. v. Howard, Tex. Civ. App. 121 S.W.2d 460. The court submitted to the jury an issue to determine whether at the time appellee signed the release of his claim he "was so mentally incapacitated that he did not know and understand the nature and effect of the instrument he was signing."

In Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co. et al. v. Perkins et al., Tex. Civ. App. 48 S.W.2d 1007, on testimony presenting substantially the same facts and circumstances, the court held the evidence sufficient to sustain the finding of a jury that the driver of the automobile was acting within the scope of and in furtherance of his master's business. In Collin County Motor Co. v. Howard, Tex. Civ. App. 121 S.W.2d 460, it is said: "The uncontroverted evidence shows that, prior to and at the time of the collision in question, Howard B. Franklin, the driver of one of the automobiles and whose acts plaintiff seeks to hold the defendant, Collin County Motor Company, liable, was an employe of Collin County Motor Company * * *. His headquarters was at the Motor Company's place of business at McKinney, Texas. * * *