All the present charges against the defendant arise out of a continuous course of conduct and therefore come within the above quoted standard for joinder of offenses, escape being necessarily a part of the crime. See Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553 ( 261 S.E.2d 364) (1979). There is no merit in this enumeration of error.
Therefore, based on his own testimony, the “criminal scheme” was ongoing when Brockman shot the victim. See generally Collier v. State, supra, 244 Ga. 553, 560(3), 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979) (“A homicide is within the res gestae of the underlying felony for the purpose of the felony-murder rule if it is committed while fleeing the scene of the crime.”). Moreover, Brockman acted with criminal negligence when he pointed the loaded gun at Lynn, rendering the defense of accident inapplicable.
The trial court did not err by sending a written copy of the alleged statutory aggravating circumstances out with the jury during its deliberations, as required by OCGA § 17-10-30(c). See Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 569(13) ( 261 S.E.2d 364) (1979), overruled on other grounds Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23, 25-26(2) ( 426 S.E.2d 895) (1993). 41.
Appellant argues that the exclusion of this testimony prevented the jury from considering all mitigating circumstances, citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 ( 98 S.C. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973) (1978). The witness was allowed to testify as to the facts and circumstances of the appellant's life that were of a mitigating nature and the trial court did not err in excluding the personal opinion of the witness as to whether the death penalty should be imposed. Brooks v. State, 244 Ga. 574 (5) ( 261 S.E.2d 379) (1979); Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553 ( 261 S.E.2d 364) (1979). 11.
In Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979), overruled on other grounds, Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23, 426 S.E.2d 895 (1993), the Supreme Court of Georgia squarely rejected the notion that giving written instructions to the jury on aggravating circumstances without also giving written instructions on mitigating circumstances prejudices the jury in favor of finding aggravating circumstances. 244 Ga. at 569, 261 S.E.2d 364; see also Tucker v. State, 244 Ga. 721, 729, 261 S.E.2d 635 (1979) (rejecting same challenge), overruled on other grounds, Woodard v. State, 269 Ga. 317, 496 S.E.2d 896 (1998).
Evidence that is inadmissible under this State's rules of evidence need only be admitted when the potentially-mitigating influence of the evidence outweighs the harm resulting from the violation of the evidence rule. Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 566-568 (11) ( 261 S.E.2d 364) (1979) (applying Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 ( 99 S.C. 2150, 60 L.E.2d 738) (1979)). Because the evidence rules exist for the purpose of winnowing out unreliable evidence, a trial court, in determining the admissibility of proffered evidence, must consider whether "substantial reasons exist to assume its reliability" Collier v. State, 244 Ga. at 567.
This low dismissal rate corroborates the absence of such prejudicial pretrial publicity as would require the grant of the appellant's motion for change of venue. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 ( 95 S.C. 2031, 44 L.Ed.2d 589) (1975); Tucker v. State, 244 Ga. 721 (12) ( 261 S.E.2d 635) (1979); Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 572 ( 261 S.E.2d 364) (1979). In addition, the prospective jurors were carefully questioned in order to ensure that the jurors selected to try the case were not prejudiced by pretrial rumors.
The evidence of kidnapping and armed robbery was necessarily before them, it being an integral part of the criminal transaction and such evidence authorized a finding that the murder was committed during two felonies, kidnapping and armed robbery. Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553 ( 261 S.E.2d 364) (1979); Stephens v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 596 ( 247 S.E.2d 92) (1978). After a review of the transcript and record in this case, we conclude that the sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Collier's convictions and sentences for felony murder, aggravated assault, and two of the three armed robberies; the court reversed Collier's conviction for one of the armed robbery offenses because it had served as a lesser included offense of the felony murder. See Collier v. State, 261 S.E.2d 364, 374 (Ga. 1979), overruled in part by Thompson v. State, 426 S.E.2d 895 (1993). Collier's petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court was denied.
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Collier's convictions and sentences for felony murder, aggravated assault, and two of the three armed robberies; the court reversed Collier's conviction for one of the armed robbery offenses because it had served as a lesser included offense of the felony murder. See Collier v. State, 261 S.E.2d 364, 374 (Ga. 1979), overruled in part by Thompson v. State, 426 S.E.2d 895 (1993). Collier's petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court was denied.