Opinion
11-08-1895
COLLIER v. COLLIER.
Samuel G. H. Wright, for complainant. Abel I. Smith and Mr. Mabon, for defendant.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Bill by Andrew M. Collier against John J. Collier for injunction and to correct deed. Dismissed.
Samuel G. H. Wright, for complainant.
Abel I. Smith and Mr. Mabon, for defendant.
BIRD, V. C. The defendant in this case having instituted an action in ejectment to recover possession of certain lands, and the complainant coming into this court alleging a mistake in one of the deeds of conveyance under which the defendant claims title, and that the deed which conveyed the title directly to him was procured by fraud, and that the certificate of acknowledgment thereto was illegal, and praying that the former deed might be corrected, and that the latter might be declared null and void because of the fraud and of the illegal acknowledgment, and that the defendant might be enjoined from prosecuting his said action at law; and, failing to establish either the mistake or the fraud, the complainant insists that, since the court had jurisdiction of the questions of mistake and fraud, it has also jurisdiction of the question raised respecting the legality of the acknowledgment, and should therefore proceed to determine that question, notwithstanding the question of the pendency of the action at law. The legal title of the land in question was at one time in the name of the complainant. He conveyed it to his mother. By his bill of complaint he alleges that there was a mistake in this deed, in that the words "heirs and assigns" were inserted, thereby conveying an estate in fee simple absolute, when it was the intention of the parties that only a life estate should be conveyed to the grantee. In this respect he prays that this deed may be reformed. He also alleges that his mother became weak and feeble in mind, and that by fraud and undue influence she was prevailed upon to execute a deed of conveyance for the same premises to the defendant,—another of her sons. For this reason the complainant asks that the last-named deed may be declared void. It is also alleged that when the commissioner of deeds who took the acknowledgment examined the grantor he did not take her examination separate and apart from her husband, and that, consequently, the acknowledgment is ineffectual, and that the deed is likewise void for this reason.
The effort to establish the mistake or the fraud because of the weakness of the mother, or of undue influence in procuring the conveyance to the defendant, has not been successful. Failure in these important particulars, I think, terminates the right of this court to proceed. In other words, when an action at law is sought to be restrained by suit in equity, and part of the grounds upon which the bill rests are purely of equitable cognizance, and part, when considered separately,are strictly of legal cognizance, and the proofs do not establish the allegations which are of purely equitable cognizance, a court of equity has not jurisdiction to further restrain the action at law, and proceed to determine the legal rights of the parties. There is, doubtless, abundant authority for the proposition that, whenever a court of equity properly acquires jurisdiction of matters which may be settled by equitable rules, and grants any relief respecting such matters, it may then proceed to determine the whole controversy, even though one or more of the issues, when independently considered, may be of purely legal character. Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 223-225, 227, 231; Brown v. Edsall, 9 N. J. Eq. 256. But the rule is not so broad in case the complainant who seeks to change the forum by filing a bill in equity fails in obtaining any relief with respect to those matters that are of purely equitable cognizance. Brown v. Edsall, 9 N. J. Eq. 256. In this case the chancellor said: "The bill must show a case of manifest propriety in this court's retaining the cause where a suit has been commenced at law, and the party seeks to change the forum of litigation, and prays for relief as well as discovery." The learned chancellor also said: "The court of chancery in this state has never adopted the principle that, because its jurisdiction has once rightfully attached, it will retain the cause as a matter of right, for the purposes of complete relief." See, also, Little v. Cooper, 10 N. J. Eq. 273; Chase's Ex'r v. Chase, 50 N. J. Eq. 143, 24 Atl. 914; Jewett v. Dringer, 29 N. J. Eq. 174; Red Jacket Tribe v. Hoff, 33 N. J. Eq. 441. In this case the court held that it had jurisdiction to reform the bond by adding the seals to the signatures of the obligors, but denied the prayer for relief as to the amount due thereon, upon the ground that the remedy in a court of law was adequate for that purpose. Iszard v. Water-Power Co., 31 N. J. Eq. 511, to the same effect, in which case a bill was filed for the specific performance of a contract, with a prayer for relief as to damages. It was held that, even though the relief was obtained upon the first issue in this court, it was denied as to the latter, because that was relievable at law. To the same effect are Berry v. Van Winkle, 2 N. J. Eq. 269; Trotter v. Heckseher, 40 N. J. Eq. 612, 4 Atl. 83. A moment's reflection will satisfy every one that nothing could be more mischievous than the adoption of the principle contended for by the complainant. In such case it would only be necessary for the defendant in an action at law to make some pretense of claim against the plaintiff in such action of fraud, mistake, accident, or right to an account, in order to change the forum of litigation, and to compel the determination of questions purely legal in a court of equity. It may be said that in this case the only remaining issue is the legality of the acknowledgment, and that a court of equity can determine that as well as a court of law. If such were to be admitted, it does not in any way change the fundamental principle which lies at the very foundation of the discussion, and which indicates the different planes in which the two systems move. I will advise that the bill be dismissed, with costs.