Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-8844.
June 23, 2003
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Pro se plaintiff asserts this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of Chester Police Department, an arresting officer, the attorneys assigned to represent plaintiff, and the moving defendant, a corporation that managed the prison where plaintiff was incarcerated after his arrest. Specifically as to the moving defendant, plaintiff alleges that Wackenhut Corrections Corp. ("Wackenhut"), a corporation that manages correctional facilities, violated his constitutional rights by denying him access to the prison law library and by placing him on the same block as an inmate against whom he had once testified.
Presently before the court is defendant Wackenhut Corrections Corp.'s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Defendant asserts that plaintiff has failed to plead a legally cognizable claim.
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate when it clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support the claim which would entitle him or her to relief.See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Robb v. Philadelphia, 733 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 1984). Such a motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim accepting the veracity of the claimant's allegations. See Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990); Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1987). A complaint may be dismissed when the facts alleged and the reasonable inferences therefrom are legally insufficient to support the relief sought. See Pennslyvania ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo., Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 1988).
A pro se complaint must be judged by less stringent standards than a formal pleading drafted by an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). See also Urrutia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep't, 91 F.3d 451, 456 (3d Cir. 1996); Evans v. Vaughn, 1998 WL 135096, *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 1998); Miller v. Hahnemann Univ. Hosp., 1994 WL 236447 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1994). A plaintiff acting pro se will be given "the opportunity to offer supporting evidence of his allegations unless it appears `beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Evans, 1998 WL 135096, *2 (quoting Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21).
From what this court can discern from plaintiff's complaint, the pertinent facts as alleged by plaintiff are as follow.
Moving defendant is under contract to provide correctional services to Delaware County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiff's allegations against moving defendants stem from plaintiff's arrest on the afternoon of August 4, 2001. Officer Robert Jones of the Chester Police Department arrested plaintiff at Penn's Wood Tavern at Seventh and Welsh streets in Chester, Pennsylvania. Although unclear from the complaint, as a result of his arrest, plaintiff was incarcerated for an unspecified length of time in the George W. Hill Correctional Facility managed by Wackenhut.
The George W. Hill Correctional Facility is the Delaware County Prison. It houses pre-trial detainees and individuals serving less than a two-year sentence. While plaintiff does not specify when he was incarcerated, defendant does not deny his incarceration.
While there, plaintiff claims that defendant deprived him of adequate access to legal materials that would have allowed him to more easily prepare his case. He further alleges that his lack of access to the library prevented petitions that he filed from ever being ruled upon.
It has been established that prisoners have a constitutional due process right to access to the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941). This right of access must be adequate, effective, and meaningful. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 822; Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1981). It requires prison authorities to assist inmates in preparing legal materials by providing assistance from individuals with legal training, access to a law library, or some combination of both. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830-31. Further, to bring a successful claim, the plaintiff must show that the denial of access affected his impending litigation in some manner. See Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 445 (3d Cir. 1982);Muhammad v. Hilbert, 906 F. Supp. 267, 271 n. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant denied him access to the correctional facility's law library and that this denial of access affected his pending litigation by impairing his ability to file claims and prevented petitions from being ruled upon, he adequately states a § 1983 claim for a due process violation. Accordingly, dismissal would be inappropriate at this time.
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant violated his due process rights when defendant, upon his incarceration, placed him in the same cell block as an individual against whom he had previously testified. Defendant seeks to dismiss these claims on the ground that they do not rise to the level of violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights.
In order to state a procedural due process claim, the plaintiff must allege that the prison "impose[d] atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); see also Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 518, 531 (3d Cir. 2003); Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d. Cir. 1997). To determine which liberty interests created by state law should receive due process protection, a court must consider the "nature" of the interest and whether it "caused the inmate to `suffer a `grievous loss' of liberty retained even after . . . imprisonment.'" Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 545 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480).
Generally, Pennsylvania has not recognized a liberty interest in prisoner placement. See Johnson v. Hill, 910 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1996); see also Anderson v. Horn, 1997 WL 152801, at *8 (E.D. Pa. March 28, 1997). Moreover, plaintiff fails to allege that any harm resulted from his cell-block placement. Rather, prisoner placement is treated as a matter of prisoner administration and a prisoner has no constitutional right to be assigned to a particular cell or section of the prison. See id.
However, as noted above, courts must be lenient when construing a pro se plaintiff's complaint. Although plaintiff's claims do not clearly state a due process violation against moving defendants, the potential exists that § 1983 relief might be available on a set of facts based on the allegations contained in the complaint. Thus, we will not dismiss the claims against Wackenhut.
ACCORDINGLY, this day of June, 2003, upon consideration of defendant Wackenhut Corrections Corporation's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #15) and plaintiff's response thereto, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED.