Opinion
Case No. 3:03CV7595.
January 24, 2005
ORDER
This case involves multiple federal and state law claims. Plaintiffs' complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(2), and 1985(3). Plaintiffs further allege two state law claims suing for: 1) quiet title; and 2) slander of title.
Plaintiffs are owners of property located in Erie County, Ohio. Defendants are various corporate entities, as well as Jonathan Granville, named in his individual capacity and as Director-Secretary of Erie Metroparks. Plaintiffs plead that all events alleged in their complaint occurred in Erie County, Ohio. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367. Venue is appropriate in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
Pending is defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Defendants claim that: 1) because the claim is not ripe for adjudication, the plaintiffs' takings claim should be dismissed; 2) that Younger abstention requires this Court to abstain from matters involving Plaintiff Wickel as there is currently pending state court litigation regarding the same issues Wickel complains of in this suit; and 3) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars those of plaintiffs' claims that already have been litigated in state court. For the following reasons, defendants' motion shall be granted.
BACKGROUND
This case involves a dispute between the Board of Erie Metroparks (Metroparks) and several owners of land either along or part of a "rails to trails" path between Milan and Huron, Ohio.
In 1838, two landowners conveyed property to the Milan Canal Company which dug a canal from Milan to Huron. This canal ceased operation in 1865. In 1881, the canal company leased its lands to a railroad.
By the 1980s, trains were no longer traveling on the rails. In 1995, the railroad quitclaimed its interest in the property — property which was originally leased to its predecessor by the canal company — to Metroparks.
Metroparks instituted appropriation proceedings in state court against several landowners. These landowner-defendants in the state proceedings included, with the exception of Wickel Farms, the plaintiffs in the instant case. The state trial court held: 1) the lease under which Metroparks took the land was limited to the lands conveyed in 1838 by the two grantors; and 2) the railroad had abandoned the premises, so that the lease was no longer valid. Therefore, the court concluded, the railroad could not have conveyed any interest in land to Metroparks.
Wickel Farms moved to intervene in the original litigation. This motion was denied by the trial court; a holding affirmed on appeal.
Ohio's Sixth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's holding. The appellate court held that the trial court's opinion regarding the validity of the lease was erroneous and remanded to the trial court. Erie Metroparks Bd. of Com'rs v. Key Trust Co. of Ohio, N.A., 145 Ohio App. 3d 782, 790-91 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. 2001).
On remand, the trial court held: 1) the lease was valid, and the premises had been conveyed to Metroparks; and 2) the lease covered the entire length of the canal. This judgment was affirmed on appeal. Board of Park Com'rs v. Key Trust Co. of Ohio, 2002 WL 31054032, *5 (Ohio App. 6th Dist. Sept. 13, 2002).
Plaintiffs have claimed throughout the pendency of the state litigation that the property conveyed in 1838 by the two grantors covered only a portion of the canal's length. Thus, they argued, even though the lease maybe valid, and Metroparks maybe the lessee, Metroparks only has a valid lease for a portion of the railroad, rather than the entire length. This issue has been resolved by the state courts — except as to Wickel Farms; however, Wickel Farms is currently a party to pending state court litigation that involves the same dispute sought to be litigated here.
The final outcome of the state court proceedings — except as to Wickel Farms — is: 1) Metroparks is the lessee of the entire length of the former canal/railroad lands; and 2) the lease is valid; Metroparks retains possession for an annual payment of $50.00 to the plaintiffs.
After the state court proceedings, plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action in this Court claiming that their property had been taken without just compensation. The "property" alleged to have been taken includes: 1) the lands not covered by the 1838 conveyance; and 2) a tractor and a deck and stairs removed from the rails to trails path.
DISCUSSION
Defendants seek dismissal on three grounds: 1) the takings claim is not ripe for adjudication; 2) as to plaintiff Wickel Farms, the Younger abstention doctrine requires me to abstain from adjudicating this case while a substantially similar case is pending in state court; and 3) the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine requires me to abstain from adjudicating this case as the case is merely an appeal of a state court judgment.1. Ripeness
Ripeness is a necessary prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction. Bigelow v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 970 F.2d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1992).
For a Fifth Amendment takings claim to be ripe for federal court adjudication, the taking must be final and the plaintiff must have sought compensation through the procedures the state has available. DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 518-19 (6th Cir. 2004) ( citing Williamson Cty. Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985)). A violation of the Fifth Amendment does not occur until a plaintiff "has used the procedure and been denied just compensation." Id. ( quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195). Therefore, if there is an adequate procedure available for a property owner to seek just compensation, a Takings Clause claim will not be ripe for federal court review until the owner has tried the state procedure and failed. Gabhart v. City of Newport, Tenn., 2000 WL 282874, *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 2000) ( citing Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195).
Additionally, it is not necessary for the state to pay in advance; if the state has made available reasonable provisions for obtaining compensation for the taking, then a claim will not be ripe for federal court adjudication until the property owner has attempted and been "rebuffed" by the state. Buckles v. Columbus Mun. Airport Auth., 90 Fed. Appx. 927, 929 (6th Cir., 2004) ( citing Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1974)).
Under Ohio law, when private property is involuntarily taken by the state, mandamus is the appropriate action to compel the state to institute proceedings. State ex rel. Preschool Dev., Ltd. v. City of Springboro, 99 Ohio St.3d 347, 349 (2003) ( citing State ex re. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 95 Ohio St.3d 59, 63 (2002)).
There is no evidence that the plaintiffs applied for a writ of mandamus at the time of the alleged taking. Therefore, this claim is not ripe for adjudication.
I do not reach the question as to whether the damage caused to plaintiffs' property is validly subject to a takings claim as plaintiffs have failed to raise such in applying for a writ of mandamus.
2. Younger Abstention
Defendants ask that, as to plaintiff Wickel Farms, I abstain from jurisdiction under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The Younger doctrine initially applied only to ask federal courts to refrain from jurisdiction in suits properly before them in deference to ongoing state criminal proceedings. Tindall v. Wayne County Friend of the Court, 269 F.3d 533, 538 (6th Cir. 2001). However, the Younger doctrine has been "extended to include certain civil enforcement proceedings and civil proceedings uniquely involving the ability of state courts to perform their judicial functions. . . ." Executive Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 391 F.3d 783, 791 (2004) ( citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1989)).To abstain under Younger, I must apply a three part test: " First, do state [proceedings] . . . constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important state interests; and third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (emphasis added).
As to the first part of the test, there are ongoing judicial proceedings in state court. Further, the proceedings implicate the important state interest of land appropriation for public use without federal interference in the state's judicial process. However, the plaintiff insists that they have not had an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise their constitutional challenges. This contention is without merit.
Wickel Farms is seeking to re-litigate the same suit that was litigated and/or is pending in state court. This is not appropriate. Wickel Farms' only claim that they have not had an adequate opportunity to raise their constitutional challenges in state court is that the state court proceedings have been pending for a long time with no end in sight. Wickel Farms also complains that it has yet to receive compensation for their taken property.
State court proceedings that are lengthy in duration do not preclude an adequate opportunity to raise constitutional claims in state court. Tindall v. Wayne County Friend of Court, 269 F.3d 533, 541 (6th Cir. 2001) (an opportunity is adequate if "the possibility of raising and correcting constitutional claims in state courts" exists (citation omitted)). Further, as the state has, by plaintiff's own admission, deposited funds into escrow for the purposes of compensating the taking, the question is not whether Wickel Farms will be paid (if it prevails), but when and how much. Therefore, I choose to abstain from jurisdiction in the Wickel Farms matter under the Younger abstention doctrine.
3. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Under Rooker-Feldman doctrine the only federal court that may exercise appellate jurisdiction over state court adjudications is the Supreme Court. Executive Arts, 391 F.3d at 793 ( citing D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983)). This doctrine includes claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with issues decided instate court proceedings. Id. The Sixth Circuit had held "that a federal claim is `inextricably intertwined' with a state court judgment and thus implicates Rooker-Feldman when the `federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it[.]'" Executive Arts, 391 F.3d at 793 ( citing Peterson Novelties Inc. v. City of Berkley, 305 F.3d 386, 393 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Plaintiffs claim that they are not trying to relitigate any state court adjudications. Although plaintiffs may not have asserted a § 1983 contention in the state proceedings, that contention in this Court depends entirely on their claim that their property is not covered by the lease. Regardless of the merits of that claim, it is clear that the state courts have concluded that their property — or, rather, that portion of their property that was used for the canal/railroad, and is not part of the rails to trails path — is covered by the lease.
Plaintiffs' suit in this court seeks to relitigate the underlying question of what property is covered by the lease. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this is not permissible. Therefore, I choose to abstain from jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing it is hereby
ORDERED THAT
1. Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness, and the same hereby is, granted;
2. Defendants' motion that Younger abstention requires this Court to abstain from litigation involving Plaintiff Wickel, and the same hereby is, granted;
3. Defendants' motion that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars plaintiffs' claims, and the same hereby is, granted;.
So ordered.