Opinion
Civil No. 9:01-CV-1819 (LEK/GLS)
November 22, 2002
Shabar R. Coles, for the plaintiff, plaintiff, pro se.
Hon. Eliot Spitzer, Office of the Attorney General, Stephen M. Kerwin, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, for the defendants.
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report-Recommendation by the Honorable Lawrence E. Kahn, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.3(c). On July 18, 2002, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 18-19). Plaintiff, pro se, Shabar R. Coles ("Coles") has failed to respond. For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss should be granted in its entirety.
II. Background
Coles brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA")). Coles claims that his rights were violated when the defendants violated the ADA by assigning him to a correctional facility without making alterations to that facility to accommodate his non-ambulatory paraplegic disability. The defendants allege that Coles has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. More specifically, the defendants contend that individuals cannot be held personally liable in their individual or official capacity under the ADA.
III. Facts
Coles is a paraplegic as a result of a fall he took on October 8, 2000, prior to his imprisonment. On August 1, 2001, Coles was placed in a housing unit at the Ulster Correctional Facility ("Ulster"). At that time, Ulster's handicap access was in severe disrepair. Thereafter, Coles' placement in Ulster resulted in a personal injury to him. He also indicates that he has filed a separate action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IV. Discussion
A. Legal standard
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a cause of action shall be dismissed if a complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In other words, the court should dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the complaint which would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999); S.E.C. v. U.S. Environmental, Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 110 (2d Cir. 1998). "The task of the court in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion `is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'" Cooper v. Parsky, 140 F.3d 433, 440 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)). Therefore, in analyzing a motion to dismiss, the facts alleged by a plaintiff are assumed to be true and must be liberally construed in the light most favorable to him. See e.g., Easton v. Sundram, 947 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (2d Cir. 1991).
The Court must "confine its consideration `to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.'" Leonard F. v. Israel Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Allen v. West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991)); Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42, 54 (2d Cir. 1999). "Moreover, `when a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or incorporate by reference a [document] upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the complaint,' the court may nevertheless take the document into consideration in deciding the defendants' motion to dismiss, without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72 (1995) (citation omitted). With this standard in mind, the court turns to the sufficiency of Coles' claims.
B. Individual Liability Under the ADA
Coles fails to identify which Title of the ADA the defendants violated. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment. Since Coles has not stated that there was an employment relation between him and the defendants, this court will construe his complaint as being a claim under Title II. Title II of the ADA provides the following:
"Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity."42 U.S.C. § 12132. Recently, the Supreme Court has held that Title II of
the ADA applies to state prisoners because "[s]tate prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of "public entity." Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-210, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1954-1955 (1998). Furthermore, the Second Circuit has determined that Title II does not provide for individual capacity suits against state officials. Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center, 280 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2001).
In this case, Coles does not specify that he is suing the defendants in their individual capacity. However, to the extent that his complaint can be construed to allege claims against the defendants in their individual capacity, Title II does not provide for individual capacity suits against state officials. See Garcia, 280 F.3d at 107. Accordingly, this court recommends the dismissal of defendants Goord, Wright, and Boxford in their individual capacity.
C. Official Capacity Claims Under the ADA
Coles does not specify that he is suing the defendants in their official capacity. The Second Circuit has not yet addressed whether a defendant can be sued in his or her official capacity under Title II of the ADA. Furthermore, there appears to be some disagreement in the circuit regarding this issue. The courts of the circuit have made a distinction between holding a person liable in his or her individual capacity and holding a person liable in his or her official capacity under Title II of the ADA. See Butterfield v. New York State, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18676, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1998), Romand v. Zimmerman, 881 F. Supp. 806, 812-13 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (Both district courts held that a person may not be held liable in his or her individual capacity but may be held liable in his or her official capacity under Title II of the ADA). However, various district courts have found that an individual cannot be sued in their official capacity under Title II. See Gowins v. Greiner, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14098, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2002), Candelaria v. Cunningham, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8669, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2000), Winokur v. Office of Court Administration, 190 F. Supp.2d 444 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (These district courts have held that individuals cannot sue in their official capacity under Title II). Furthermore, the Second Circuit held that "a private suit for money damages under Title II of the ADA may only be maintained against a state if the plaintiff can establish that the Title II violation was motivated by either discriminatory animus or ill will due to disability." Garcia, 280 F.3d at 112.
In this case, to the extent that Coles' complaint can be construed to allege claims against the defendants in their official capacity, this court finds that the defendants should be dismissed. More specifically, since Coles can assert his Title II claim against the Department of Correctional Services directly, there is no justification for allowing Coles to assert claims against the defendants in their official capacity. Accordingly, this court recommends the dismissal of Wright, Goord, and Boxford in their official capacity.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that the defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. Nos. 18-19) be GRANTED as to all of the defendants since Coles failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation upon the parties by regular mail.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court within TEN days. FAILURE TO SO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).