Opinion
Civ. Action No. 97-6274(JBS).
December 15, 1999
Tyrone Coleman, Sicklerville, New Jersey, Plaintiff Pro Se.
Robert J. Cleary, Acting United States Attorney, By: Louis J. Bizzarri, Assistant United States Attorney, Camden, New Jersey, and Arthur S. Kramer, Esquire, Law Department, Philadelphia Field Office, United States Postal Service, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Attorneys for Defendant.
OPINION
INTRODUCTION
In this contract dispute, plaintiff pro se Tyrone Coleman asks this Court to declare invalid the 1995 settlement agreement pursuant to which he agreed to resign from work with the United States Postal Service ("USPS"). Plaintiff argues that the agreement was invalid because in it the USPS fraudulently promised not to prosecute him for embezzlement in return for his resignation, and falsely promised to later rehire him. Presently before the Court are (1) defendant's motion to dismiss; (2) plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and opposition to defendant's motion to dismiss; and (3) defendant's motion for summary judgment and in opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
This case has a elaborate procedural history. Mr. Coleman has attacked the validity of the settlement agreement in criminal, administrative, and civil proceedings. Plaintiff was convicted of embezzlement of Postal Service funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1711 by plea of guilty before the Honorable Robert B. Kugler, United States Magistrate Judge, and he was sentenced to five months imprisonment on October 1, 1996. This conviction was affirmed on appeal to the Honorable Joseph E. Irenas, United States District Judge, on October 28, 1996. In an effort to overturn his embezzlement conviction, plaintiff is currently appealing Judge Irenas's Order of Affirmance to the Third Circuit. Because the main thrust of plaintiff's Complaint is that, under the settlement agreement, he never should have been prosecuted for embezzlement and should be reinstated to his old job, a necessary piece of information for this Court is whether his conviction for embezzlement is final. Until the factual record is fully developed on the matter of his conviction, plaintiff's suit will not be ripe for decision. The Court also finds this case unripe because there are as-yet unexhausted administrative remedies which may afford plaintiff reinstatement to his former post. As explained in further detail below, this case will not be fit for judicial review until such time as the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has finally decided plaintiff's pending appeal and after plaintiff has attempted to access administrative relief that could lead to his reinstatement absent this Court's intervention. Until such time, this suit is not fit for judicial determination and must be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff's Agreement to Resign From Employment
Plaintiff was an employee of USPS from 1984 until his termination in 1995. (May 18, 1995 U.S. Postal Service Personnel Action Form, Pl.'s Ex. 1 at 4.) In November 1994, USPS found that Coleman should be terminated due to poor attendance. As a veteran, Coleman was given the right to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), and he timely filed for an MSPB appeal. Subsequently, Coleman, represented by counsel, voluntarily withdrew his appeal and entered into a "Last-Chance (Firm Choice) Settlement Agreement" on February 27, 1995, which provided a "last chance for [Coleman] to correct his attendance problem and . . . a firm choice to eliminate his substance abuse problem." (February 27, 1995 Last-Chance (Firm Choice) Settlement Agreement, Pl.'s Ex. 2 at 4.) The Last-Chance Agreement provided that Coleman's termination would be held in abeyance for one year in return for (1) Coleman's completion of an approved substance abuse rehabilitation program; (2) a release of all complaints, appeals or grievances regarding his termination, and; (3) satisfactory work attendance for the duration of the agreement. (Id. at 2:5 through 4:21.)
Three months after the issuance of the last chance agreement, the Postal Service commenced a criminal investigation of Coleman's activities. The catalyst for this investigation was a May 17, 1995, inventory search conducted of Coleman's cash and stamp stock which revealed that four money orders totaling $450.00 were missing. (Def.'s Memorandum of Law by Anne E. Blanchard, AFPD, United States v. Coleman, 95-M-1094 (RBK) (D.N.J., filed January 19, 1996).)
The next day, May 18, 1995, USPS notified Coleman that, because he had missed work more than three times since signing the Last-Chance Agreement, he was in violation of the terms of the agreement and would be terminated effective immediately. (USPS Ltr. of May 18, 1995, Pl.'s Ex. 2 at 6.) After receiving this notice, Coleman entered into an enforceable agreement to resign from the postal service. In this Settlement Agreement, Coleman agreed that, "[p]roviding I pay the Postal Service any and all monies I owe them, no further litigation proceedings will occur against me." (Settlement Agreement of September 11, 1995, Def's Ex. A, at 1:2.) This agreement also provided that Coleman could "apply for reinstatement according to the Employee and Labor Relations Manual, ("ELM") Issue 13, section 873, Reinstatement of Recovered Employees." (Id. at 2:5.) Pursuant to this settlement, Coleman resigned, and, as agreed, USPS did not sue for return of the unspecified sums mentioned in the settlement agreement.
ELM § 873 is addressed to the reinstatement of employees who have recovered from a previous drug or alcohol addiction. The section provides, in relevant part:
873.21 Reinstatement of an individual whose removal or resignation was related to alcoholism or dependency on drugs may be considered when:
a. The individual submits a written request for reinstatement accompanied by a Consent to Disclosure Form
. . .
b. The individual has satisfactorily participated in a recognized recovery program for a minimum of 6 months prior to application for reinstatement and is willing to provide employing officials with written certification.
. . .
873.22 When the above criteria have been met, each case will be judged on its own merits.
. . .
873.31 Employing officials must give serious consideration to requests for reinstatement. Approval must be obtained as outlined in section 323.23 of this manual and in Handbook EL-311, part 313.
USPS ELM 13 § 873 (June 1998). The 1998 version includes language identical to that in effect at the time the settlement agreement was executed. (Supp. Decl. of Arthur S. Kramer, Esq., dated Dec. 10, 1999, at 2.)
This section of the ELM explicitly incorporates USPS Personnel Operations Handbook EL-311, part 313, which sets forth the reasons for which an applicant might be disqualified from employment with the USPS. Among these are:
a. Dismissal from prior employment for cause.
b. Criminal or other conduct of such nature which would undermine the efficiency of the Postal Service . . . .
h. Conviction for theft or embezzlement.
USPS Handbook EL-311 § 313.2 (April 1990). The 1990 version was in effect at the time the settlement agreement was executed. (Kramer Supp. Decl. of Dec. 10, 1999 at 2.)
B. Plaintiff's Criminal Conviction for Embezzlement
Aware that Coleman's Termination Agreement provided that there would be no litigation to recover funds owed USPS, the U.S. Attorney nonetheless determined that criminal prosecution was not barred by the agreement, and authorized Coleman's indictment for misappropriation of funds connected to the May 17, 1995 money order shortage. (Investig. Mem. of Samuel Blow, Postal Inspector, dated October 11, 1996, Pl.'s Ex. 3 at 6.) Coleman first appeared on these criminal charges on October 11, 1995, and U.S. Magistrate Judge Robert B. Kugler subsequently appointed Assistant Federal Public Defender Anne E. Blanchard as counsel.
Shortly after Coleman's arraignment, Blanchard argued on behalf of Coleman that the indictment should be dismissed. In a twenty-seven page brief submitted to Judge Kugler on January 19, 1996, Blanchard asserted that the embezzlement prosecution was improper because Coleman had been promised transactional immunity for the misappropriation of Postal Funds that were the subject of the prosecution. Judge Kugler scheduled oral argument on this motion for February 21, 1996, but Coleman failed to appear. Judge Kugler then adjourned the hearing until February 27, 1996 until such time as Coleman could be located. When Coleman again did not appear on February 27th, Judge Kugler issued a warrant for his arrest.
Coleman was subsequently located, and, after violating the terms of his confinement in a detoxification facility, was detained pending trial. It should be noted that in subsequent court appearances Coleman did not renew his motion to dismiss. Instead, Coleman entered a guilty plea to the embezzlement charge and on October 1, 1996 was sentenced to five months imprisonment with no fine. There is nothing in the record before the Court indicating that Coleman's motion to dismiss was ever decided on the merits.
On July 29, 1998, Coleman moved to set aside his sentence on the grounds that the government failed to disclose facts relevant to the embezzlement investigation and because Coleman at the time of his guilty plea was mentally incapable of making rational decisions. This motion was denied on September 3, 1998. Soon thereafter, on September 10, 1998, Coleman brought a motion for new trial and to vacate the judgment based upon newly discovered evidence, pursuant to Rule 33, Fed.R.Crim.P. Coleman's moving papers do not state the nature of the proffered new evidence, other than to assert an unspecified Brady-type violation because the government failed to disclose evidence favorable to his case. Judge Kugler found the proffered evidence did not merit vacation of Coleman's sentence, and denied this motion on October 9, 1998. See Order Denying Motion for New Trial, United States v. Coleman, 95-M-1094 (RBK) (D.N.J. October 9, 1998). Coleman appealed this Order to U.S. District Judge Joseph E. Irenas, who found that defendant failed to present new evidence that would have resulted in an acquittal, and, in a Order dated October 28, 1998, affirmed Judge Kugler's October 9, 1998 Order. See Order of Affirmance, United States v. Coleman, 98-CR-648 (JEI) (D.N.J. October 28, 1998). Coleman filed an appeal of Judge Irenas's affirmance with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on November 2, 1998. See Notice of Docketing of Appeal, Appellate Dkt. No. 98-5521 (3d Cir. December 2, 1998). The Court of Appeals has not yet issued a decision on this appeal, thus Coleman's conviction has not yet been made final.
C. Plaintiff's Efforts to Obtain Administrative Relief
At the same time Coleman was seeking a new trial he also pursued administrative remedies in an effort to regain his job. In a September 30, 1996 letter, Coleman made his initial request for reinstatement. This first request was denied in a September 30, 1996 letter from USPS Senior Personnel Specialist Moses P. Walton, who explained that Coleman must first pass a mandatory "470 Test Battery" before reinstatement. (Pl's Ex. 5 at 2.) After completing the 470 Test Battery, Coleman again applied for reinstatement in letter dated March 25, 1997. This request was denied on account of Coleman's past work performance in a letter from Walton dated March 27, 1997. (Def's Ex. F.)
The day after this second denial, March 28, 1999, Coleman appealed Walton's decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), arguing that the initial settlement agreement was involuntary. In a decision dated July 1, 1997, the MSPB found that it would only have jurisdiction over the dispute if there was evidence that the Settlement was fraudulently induced. Finding no evidence in support of Coleman's claim of fraud, the MSPB held that it had no authority to review the agreement. Accordingly, the MSPB dismissed Coleman's appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (MSPB decision dated July 1, 1997, Def's Ex. G at 3-4.)
After the MSPB issued its decision and after plaintiff filed the present suit, Mr. Walton, apparently concluding that his previous letter failed to describe adequately the procedures by which Coleman could gain reinstatement, withdrew his March 1997 letter and replaced it with a letter dated March 6, 1998. This letter outlined what Coleman would have to do in order to be reinstated, and referred him to the procedures set forth in ELM § 873 and Handbook EL-311, supra. Walton counseled Coleman that he could apply for reinstatement at any time after completing a certified recovery program. (Def's Ex. H.) Coleman apparently took Walton's March 1998 letter to mean that he was eligible for immediate reinstatement, and requested return to his post in a letter dated June 11, 1998. (Def's Ex. I.) There is no record of any response to this request.
D. Plaintiff's Present Civil Action
Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint in this matter on December 30, 1997, claiming that the settlement contract was unenforceable and involuntary due to misleading language within it. As relief, plaintiff sought a declaration that the agreement was invalid, and monetary damages in the amount of $70,000. In his Amended Complaint, filed June 25, 1998, plaintiff essentially re-words the contract claim, alleging that he was fraudulently induced into signing the settlement agreement. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint expands the relief sought, however, and included demands for expungement of all record of monies owed the USPS; reinstatement to his former job with back pay; and a return of all monies paid to USPS pursuant to the agreement for failure to issue a "Letter of Demand" for said monies.
On its face, plaintiff's Complaint raises a dispute as to the proper interpretation of the September 11, 1995 Settlement Agreement which, plaintiff contends, allowed him to resign from employment in return for defendant's promises (1) not to sue or prosecute him in connection with money Coleman owed USPS, and; (2) to rehire him after completing certain rehabilitation programs. The USPS contests Coleman's interpretation and submits that immunity from criminal prosecution was not part of the September 1995 agreement, and that Coleman's later conviction for misappropriation of postal funds did not violate the Agreement. Further, USPS argues that it never promised Coleman that he would be rehired, but rather that he would be given the opportunity to apply for rehiring.
DISCUSSION
A. General Jurisdiction
The main question posed in this case — whether the USPS violated the terms of the bargain under which Coleman agreed to resign from his employment — is not facially federal in nature. The Third Circuit has held, however, that this Court has general jurisdiction to hear claims brought against the USPS pursuant to 39 U.S.C. § 409(a). This statute does not create an independent cause of action for all of Mr. Coleman's claims, however, and plaintiff is required to plead an independent cause of action for each claim. Moreover, a finding of general jurisdiction does not imply that a particular claim is viable, but rather each claim must stand on its own merit. Licata v. United States Postal Service, 33 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 1994). With this viability requirement in mind, the Court next turns to an examination of whether Coleman's Complaint presents viable claims for relief.
General duties
(a) The Postal Service shall plan, develop, promote, and provide adequate and efficient postal services at fair and reasonable rates and fees. The Postal Service shall receive, transmit, and deliver throughout the United States, its territories and possessions, and, pursuant to arrangements entered into under sections 406 and 411 of this title, throughout the world, written and printed matter, parcels, and like materials and provide such other services incidental thereto as it finds appropriate to its functions and in the public interest. The Postal Service shall serve as nearly as practicable the entire population of the United States.39 U.S.C. § 403(a).
B. Ripeness
The chief demand in plaintiff's Amended Complaint is for a combination of injunctive and declaratory relief; specifically, plaintiff requests an Order from this Court declaring that his resignation was involuntary and that the USPS must reinstate him to his old job. Although the defendant raises specific objections as to this Court's jurisdiction over certain aspects of plaintiff's Complaint, there is a larger question presented by these circumstances, namely, the threshold issue of whether this case as a whole is ripe for decision.
The ripeness doctrine derives from the requirement that federal courts only have subject matter jurisdiction over actual "cases" or "controversies". See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; New Jersey Presbytery of Orthodox Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1994). Ripeness is a prerequisite to all federal actions, including those for declaratory or injunctive relief, and is sufficiently important that courts are required to raise the issue sua sponte even though the parties do not.New Jersey Presbytery, 40 F.3d at 1462; Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, 856 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1988).
Ripeness is invoked by federal courts as a question of timing, i.e., "to determine whether a dispute has yet matured to a point that warrants decision." 13A Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3532 at 112 (1984). The "central concern" of the ripeness doctrine is "whether the case involves uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." Id. With respect to administrative agency actions, "considerations of ripeness reflect the need `to protect th[os]e agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.'" Felmeister, 856 F.2d at 535 (quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967)).
According to the Supreme Court, a determination of ripeness implicates two competing concerns: the fitness of issues for judicial review and the hardship to the parties if judicial consideration is withheld. Abbott Laboratories, 387 U.S. at 149. Whether a question is fit for judicial review depends upon factors such as whether the agency decision is final; whether the issue presented for decision is one of law which requires no additional factual development; and whether further administrative action is needed to clarify the agency's decision.Felmeister, 856 F.2d at 535-36.
Even granting all reasonable inferences to plaintiff as non-movant, finality is absent in this case. The main thrust of plaintiff's Complaint is that his resignation was involuntary due to fraud and that he should be reinstated to his job with back pay. This claim begs the question of whether plaintiff may be reinstated under any circumstance now that he has been convicted of embezzling money from the post office.
Under the terms of the September 1995 Settlement Agreement, the USPS promised Coleman that he "may apply" for reinstatement pursuant to the Postal Service's regulations present in USPS Personnel Operations Handbook EL-313.2(h), supra. The provisions of this handbook list embezzlement as grounds for disqualification from hiring, and, as discussed above, plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to the charge of embezzlement on October 1, 1996. After Coleman had already served his sentence, he moved to vacate his sentence on this charge, presumably so that he could get his old job back. Coleman has now appealed Judge Kugler's denial of his motion to vacate, but as it presently stands, plaintiff has pleaded guilty to a charge which presumptively bars him from further employment at the USPS. See Handbook EL-311 § 3131.2(h),supra. Only when plaintiff's conviction for embezzlement is made final on appeal will the Court be able to assess whether plaintiff is eligible for reinstatement. Because plaintiff's conviction for embezzlement presumptively bars him from obtaining reinstatement, the Court holds that this case involves precisely the type of concerns that demand application of the ripeness doctrine. If the conviction is overturned upon appeal, plaintiff must present his claim to the USPS's administrative process for a final determination. If the conviction is affirmed upon appeal, plaintiff is still free to present his application for reinstatement, and the USPS will have the opportunity to determine his application administratively and compile an appropriate administrative record for review, if necessary.
Additionally, this case is unripe because the USPS has not yet finally barred Coleman from reinstatement. The possibility of Coleman's reinstatement specifically was left open in the settlement agreement. As reiterated in the USPS's March 1998 letter to Coleman, which was sent to Coleman after his conviction for embezzlement, the USPS still might consider plaintiff for reinstatement upon completion of an approved rehabilitation program. If in the future Coleman is denied reinstatement after satisfying the demands of ELM § 873, then this case may be fit for review. Until then, any ruling on reinstatement would impose undue judicial interference the USPS's substantial interest in ensuring that former employees with substance abuse problems receive treatment before being reinstated to their posts. Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that this case is not yet ripe for decision. Further, the Court finds that withholding judicial consideration will not impose undue hardship on the parties because Coleman has himself initiated the criminal appeal which renders this case unripe.
Because plaintiff's Complaint and Brief seem to argue that he was immune from prosecution for embezzlement and should not have been convicted on that charge, it should be noted parenthetically that if Coleman's embezzlement conviction is upheld and if this case should again come before this Court, plaintiff would be expected to overcome the well-settled principle that civil litigation should not be allowed to call into question the validity of a criminal judgment. See Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (civil tort actions not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments and conviction only may be reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, or called into question by federal court's issuance of writ of habeas corpus ); Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973) (petition for habeas corpus the only manner by which a prisoner may challenge the validity of his conviction).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court holds that this case requires further factual development and that it is not yet ripe for decision. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss this matter for lack of ripeness until such time as plaintiff's appeal of his criminal conviction has been decided and plaintiff can demonstrate that the Postal Service has finally denied him reinstatement. The accompanying Order is entered.O R D E R
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., and on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.; and the Court having considered the submissions of the parties; and the Court having determined that this case is not yet ripe for judicial determination;
IT IS this day of December, 1999 hereby ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED in its entirety due to lack of ripeness; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions in this case are moot and are DISMISSED.