Opinion
# 2013-049-106 Claim No. 115446
05-23-2013
SHAWN COLEMAN v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
The Court dismissed a pro se inmate's claim that alleges he was wrongfully confined in violation of his due process rights, and in disregard of the facility's own rules and regulations, as the result of a move to a more restrictive level of confinement. The inmate's placement, made pursuant to facility's Progressive Inmate Movement System, does not constitute "confinement" for purposes of a wrongful confinement claim.
Case information
UID: 2013-049-106 Claimant(s): SHAWN COLEMAN Claimant short name: COLEMAN Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): THE STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 115446 Motion number(s): Cross-motion number(s): Judge: DAVID A. WEINSTEIN Claimant's attorney: Shawn Coleman, Pro Se Eric T. Schneiderman, New York State Attorney Defendant's attorney: General By: Aaron Marcus, Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: May 23, 2013 City: Albany Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
This decision follows the trial of the claim of pro se inmate Shawn Coleman, which was conducted via videoconference from Elmira Correctional Facility on January 25, 2013. The claim, which was filed on June 26, 2008, alleges that on April 15, 2008, while Coleman was incarcerated at Southport Correctional Facility ("Southport"), he was wrongfully confined in violation of his due process rights and in disregard of the facility's own rules and regulations.
By way of background, Southport is composed almost entirely of prisoners that have been placed in a Special Housing Unit ("SHU") (see generally Lee v Coughlin, 26 F Supp 2d 615, 624-625 [SD NY 1998] [summarizing operation of Southport]), and under its Progressive Inmate Movement System ("PIMS"), it is divided into three levels. The privileges to which a Southport prisoner is entitled, and the restrictions to which he is subjected, depend on the level on which the prisoner is placed. Prisoners on PIMS Level III receive the greatest number of privileges, and those on PIMS Level I are granted the least (see generally Callender v State of New York, 38 Misc 3d 651 [Ct Cl, 2012]).
As set forth in the Southport Correctional Facility Special Housing Unit - SHU Staff and Inmate Orientation Manual ("Manual") (Def. Ex. G), movement among the three levels "is at the discretion of the Captain, or his designee" and once a determination has been made to move an inmate, the "physical move [is] made as space permits" (Id.).
Claimant testified that on April 11, 2008, he was found guilty of violating prison rules. Following a superintendent's disciplinary hearing, he was sentenced to 12 months in the SHU and 24 months loss of good-time credit. The former penalty was scheduled to commence on October 9, 2008, but on April 15, 2008, Coleman was moved from PIMS Level III to Level I as part of the sanction for the April 11 disposition. As a result, Coleman asserted that he was deprived of the "little freedom" and privileges that were given to inmates on Level III status, such as extra showers, as well as his due process right to a fair hearing. Coleman reasoned that, in essence, the prison's actions potentially subjected him to two penalties for a single infraction - the first when the prison administratively shifted him to Level I on April 15, while the second was to commence on October 9, when his SHU sentence was set to begin.
On PIMS Level I, prisoners are denied use of headphones and commissary privileges; are placed in waist chain restraints during visits and recreation; and may possess only limited items of property and clothing. Inmates on PIMS Level II may participate in a cell study program and use headphones, and receive a monthly commissary privilege. Restraints are also removed from Level II prisoners during visits and recreation. Inmates on Level III have broader rights to clothing and property, may purchase candy from the commissary, have their handcuffs and waist chain removed in the visiting area and recreation yard, and receive certain limited rights to shower and make phone calls (see Callender, 38 Misc 3d at 653). In his testimony, Coleman made specific reference only to the reduction in the number of showers in describing the differences between levels.
Claimant filed a grievance that disputed his move to Level I, the response to which concluded that Coleman was subject to such movement in accordance with facility policy (Def. Ex. E). Claimant appealed, and the Central Office Review Commission ("CORC") upheld the decision (Id.). On May 27, 2008, however, the sanction imposed on him at the April 11 superintendent's hearing was reversed by the Director of Special Housing/Inmate Disciplinary Programs, on the ground that the hearing officer had "inappropriately" removed Coleman from the proceeding (Cl. Ex. 1). Claimant believed that at some point in June 2008, he was moved from Level I confinement to the less restrictive Level II status.
Under 7 NYCRR 254, a determination made at a Superintendent's Hearing may be appealed to the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections or his or her designee.
On cross-examination, Coleman was questioned about the misbehavior report that led to the April hearing (Def. Ex. A). He acknowledged that he had been charged with use of a controlled substance, and had been found guilty of the charge. The 12-month placement in SHU was to be served from October 9, 2008 through October 9, 2009 (Def. Ex. B). Coleman testified that the sentence was to begin in October, and not immediately, because he was already in SHU serving a prior sentence on an earlier charge, and such sentences are always served consecutively.
Captain Stanley Sepiol, who has been a correction officer at Southport for approximately 25 years, was called as a witness on behalf of the State. Sepiol testified in general about the operation of PIMS, characterizing the system as a tool that is employed at the discretion of the captain and the officer of the day to deter acts of misbehavior. Sepiol explained that when an inmate arrives at Southport, he goes through reception, at which time there is a review of the inmate's disciplinary record. If the inmate had been found guilty at a tier III hearing within the 30 days before his arrival, he is placed on Level I status. If 30 days pass without a misbehavior report, the prisoner is qualified to be moved to Level II, and then, after another 30 days of good conduct, to Level III. Sepiol stated that if an inmate is subsequently found guilty at a tier hearing, pursuant to PIMS the inmate is moved back to Level I. He added that if an inmate has been charged with a serious violation, such as an assault on an officer, the inmate would be moved immediately to Level I, even before a hearing takes place. He noted that this information concerning PIMS is set forth in the Manual, a copy of which is provided to each Southport inmate, and which defendant introduced into evidence at trial.
Sepiol was not specifically familiar with claimant, but stated that his review of the relevant records, including Coleman's Inmate Movement History (Def. Ex. F), indicated that on April 15, 2008, Coleman was moved to PIMS Level I as a result of being found guilty at the superintendent's hearing. After Coleman had been on that level for thirty days, during which time he did not receive another misbehavior report, he became eligible to move to Level II. That move took place on May 19. Then, on May 30, when the facility became aware of the reversal of his disciplinary hearing, Coleman was moved to Level III. Sepiol echoed Coleman's testimony in regard to his SHU sentence, stating that it was scheduled to begin in October because claimant was already serving a sentence in the SHU for a previous disciplinary charge.
Discussion
To state a claim for wrongful confinement, claimant must show: "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975] [citations omitted]). In Callender, supra, I addressed the question of when an inmate - who is already confined in a correctional facility - can show that the imposition of some additional sanction or restriction constitutes "confinement" for purposes of such a cause of action. I found that a wrongful confinement claim "has roots in due process considerations" (id. at 656 [citing Bunting v State of New York, UID No. 2001-007-579 (Ct Cl, Bell, J., Nov. 13, 2001)]), and the Due Process Clause "does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner" (id. at 657 [quoting Sandin v Conner, 515 US 472, 478 (1995)]). Rather, such protections apply only when a prisoner is subject to an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life" (id. at 657 [citing Sandin, 515 US at 484]). In contrast, changes in an inmate's circumstances that are "ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence" (id. at 658 [citing Sandin, 515 US at 480, 486]), do not give rise to a cause of action of wrongful confinement.
Applying these standards, Callender held that an inmate's movement between PIMS levels at Southport - which may be directed administratively, at the discretion of prison officials - does not constitute "confinement" for purposes of a wrongful confinement claim. Nothing in the record before me warrants a different conclusion in this case. The relatively limited changes in conditions of confinement that result from a transfer from Level III to Level I do not impose an "atypical and significant hardship" on prisoners already placed in SHU. Moreover, as noted above, an inmate's PIMS placement may arise from purely administrative purposes, and is vested in the discretion of prison officials (see Manual [inmate may be placed on Level I when he "fails to maintain positive adjustment . . . and becomes involved in acts of misbehavior," and may be carried out "if movement is appropriate"]).
Coleman's penalty of 24 months loss of good-time credit, if imposed in violation of his due process rights, clearly may give rise to a wrongful confinement claim "as it attacks 'the very duration of . . . physical confinement'" (Wilkinson v Dotson, 544 US 74, 79 [2005], quoting Preiser v Rodriguez, 411 US 475, 487-488 [1973]; see also Matter of Tolliver v Fischer, 68 AD3d 884 [2d Dept 2009]). But this issue was not pleaded or developed by claimant at trial, and presumably the May 27th reversal of the disciplinary hearing negated the sanction. Similarly, Coleman's sentence to additional time in the SHU was never implemented, since the sanction was overturned prior to its commencement on October 9, 2008. As a result, claimant has suffered no harm therefrom for which damages may be obtained.
For these reasons, even if I were to find that Coleman's exclusion from his disciplinary hearing in violation of state regulation rose to the level of a due process violation (see Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212, 220-221 [1988] [State not entitled to absolute immunity where prisoner "confined" without a "hearing or other required due process safeguard"]; White v State of New York, UID No. 2013-041-002 [Ct Cl, Milano, J., Feb. 20, 2013] ["[n]ot all disciplinary hearing procedural rules and regulations, if violated, form a basis to abrogate the absolute immunity"]), he would not have proven a cause of action for wrongful confinement. That is because the only consequence he actually suffered as a result of his overturned sanction - placement on Level I - can be imposed without any due process protections at all.
As to Coleman's contention that defendant violated its own rules and regulations by moving him to Level I prior to the date his sanction was scheduled to begin, it is without merit. The "actions of correctional facility employees with respect to inmate discipline matters are quasi-judicial in nature and, unless the employees exceed the scope of their authority or violate the governing statutes and regulations, [defendant] has absolute immunity for those actions" (Loret v State of New York, -- AD3d --, 2013 NY Slip Op 03142 [3d Dept 2013], quoting Holloway v State of New York, 285 AD2d 765, 765 [3d Dept 2001]; see also Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 214 [1988] [actions of correction officials in "making dispositions following Superintendents' hearings" are "quasi-judicial in nature and deserving of absolute immunity"]). Given that the Manual affords full discretion to correctional staff with respect to inmate movement, there is no indication that such staff acted in excess of their authority, or in violation of rules or regulations, in this instance. As a result, no cause of action arises from defendant's transfer of an inmate to a different PIMS level prior to the commencement of a disciplinary sanction (see Dubois v State of New York, UID No. 2003-032-524 [Ct Cl, Hard, J., Dec. 30, 2003] [where regulation authorized State to hold defendant in Southport SHU through practice of "detention admission" after sanction ended, detention was privileged]).
In light of the foregoing, claim no. 115446 is hereby dismissed in its entirety.
On January 14, 2013, claimant filed a document entitled "Amendment to Actual Claim," and then made an application at the time of trial to amend his claim to seek additional damages that arose out of his divorce from his estranged wife, which he attributed to his disciplinary sanction. The application to amend is denied as moot; the claim has been dismissed and thus there is nothing to amend (see Flemming v State of New York, UID No. 2013-038-508 [Ct Cl, DeBow, J., Jan. 24, 2013] ["the claim has been dismissed and therefore there is no extant claim to be amended"]). Moreover, since the amendment concerned only the damages suffered by claimant, its disposition has no impact on the above ruling on the merits of Coleman's claim.
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All objections or motions that have not yet been ruled upon are denied.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
May 23, 2013
Albany, New York
DAVID A. WEINSTEIN
Judge of the Court of Claims