Coleman v. Levkoff

19 Citing cases

  1. Newman v. Brown et al

    228 S.C. 472 (S.C. 1955)   Cited 27 times
    In Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 90 S.E.2d 649, at page 653, it is said: "There is no requirement that one whose automobile is damaged by the negligence of another must have it repaired in order to entitle him to recover his damages.

    See also, Anderson v.Elliott, S.C. 90 S.E.2d 367, and cases there cited. A well considered case upon the measure of damages to an automobile is Coleman v. Levkoff, 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875. The rules of it were substantially followed in the trial of the case at bar in the following instructions to the jury: "Now where you have a case in Court where an automobile is concerned, with reference to actual damages, and bear in mind that actual damages are simply those damages which in the law are designed to compensate a person for the losses that he or she has sustained, the theory being that where you compensate a person as actual damages, you would be putting him back in the same position as near as possible, that he or she was in before they were damaged. Now, where an automobile is involved, in order to arrive at what would be a fair amount to award one as actual damages, you should take into consideration from the evidence that you have heard, what was the reasonable market value of the automobile before the collision, what was the reasonable market value of the automobile after the collision, deduct the latter from the former and then you would have a true rule to go

  2. MCI Commc'n Servs. v. Ertel Constr., Inc.

    414 F. Supp. 3d 831 (D.S.C. 2019)

    Therefore, because it owned the Cable that Defendant severed on June 5, 2014, Plaintiff argues that it "may recover the reasonable costs of restoring the Cable to its condition immediately prior to the incident, together with loss of use during the period of the repairs." (Id. at 15 (citing Newman , 90 S.E.2d at 653 ; Coleman v. Levkoff , 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875, 875 (1924) ).) Plaintiff further argues that it "is entitled to recover for loss of use of the Cable regardless of whether it actually procures a replacement or proffers evidence that it also incurred lost profits, lost revenues, lost business, or any other pecuniary out-of-pocket loss occasioned by the loss of the use of the Cable."

  3. Colter v. Omni Ins. Co.

    Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-04171-JMC (D.S.C. Jan. 6, 2017)

    "The general rule is that the owner of personal property, injured by the negligence of another, is entitled to recover the difference between the market value of the property immediately before the injury and its market value immediately after the injury." Coleman v. Levkoff, 122 S.E. 875, 876 (S.C. 1924) (citations omitted). "If . . . the owner has the property repaired and restored to a condition in which its market value equals or exceeds the market value before the injury, the measure of damages in that case is the reasonable cost of restoring the property to its previous condition, together with the value of the use of the property during the time reasonably required to repair it."

  4. Colter v. Omni Ins. Co.

    Civil Action No. 3:15-cv-04171-JMC (D.S.C. Jul. 12, 2016)

    "The general rule is that the owner of personal property, injured by the negligence of another, is entitled to recover the difference between the market value of the property immediately before the injury and its market value immediately after the injury." Coleman v. Levkoff, 122 S.E. 875, 876 (S.C. 1924) (citations omitted). "If . . . the owner has the property repaired and restored to a condition in which its market value equals or exceeds the market value before the injury, the measure of damages in that case is the reasonable cost of restoring the property to its previous condition, together with the value of the use of the property during the time reasonably required to repair it." Id.

  5. Laney Tank Lines, Inc. United States

    237 F. Supp. 205 (E.D.S.C. 1965)   Cited 3 times

    In the Scott case the Court said: "In the instant case there is no showing that under the circumstances the time to repair the car was unreasonable. Coleman v. Levkoff, 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875; Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 479, 90 S.E.2d 649; and there is no merit in the contention that the rental value of the car used was not a proper element of damages * * *."

  6. Beck v. Gibson

    268 S.C. 627 (S.C. 1977)   Cited 6 times

    Robert L. Kilgo, and O. Allen Alexander, of Darlington, for Appellant, cite: As to the presiding Judge havingerred in allowing Plaintiff to amend the complaint andthen ruling that Defendant could not cross examine Plaintiffas to the original or the amended complaint: 81 Am. Jur. 2d 621, Sec. 611; 1 Elliott on Ev., Sec. 236; 16 CYC 971-973; 2 Wigmore on Ev., Sec. 1067; 57 S.E. 572; 266 S.C. 854, 221 S.E.2d 854; 254 S.C. 50 (1970), 173 S.E.2d 361. As to the trial Judge's having erred in allowingtestimony by Plaintiff as to a loss allegedly due to adelayed sale and a consequent decline in the market price: 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875; 22 Am. Jur.2d Damages, p. 114, 115, Section 81; 22 Am. Jur.2d, p. 115, Sec. 81; 22 Am. Jur.2d, p. 120, Sec. 84; 22 Am. Jur. Damages, p. 368, Sec. 272; 3 Brev. 185; 2 Tread. Const. 688; 261 S.C. 542, 201 S.E.2d 388; 243 S.C. 552, 135 S.E.2d 87; 191 S.C. 310, 4 S.E.2d 270; 175 S.C. 188, 178 S.E. 839; 89 C.J.S., Trial, p. 507, 508, Sec. 661; 75 Am. Jur.2d, Trial, p. 259, 260, Sec. 173; 219 S.C. 284, 65 S.E.2d 114; 219 S.C. 284, 65 S.E.2d 114. Asto the Court's having erred in permitting the entire depositionof the Defendant to be read to the jury: Rule 87, Section D, Use of Depositions; 81 Am. Jur.2d 620, Section 610.

  7. Fuller v. Eastern Fire Cas. Ins. Co.

    240 S.C. 75 (S.C. 1962)   Cited 153 times
    Discussing oral binders in the context of automobile insurance

    The appellant asserts that there was no testimony presented by the respondent as to the reasonable rental value. In the case of Coleman v. Levkoff, 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875, this Court held that the question of the value of the use of property, of which the owner was deprived, the expense of hiring a substitute for that of which he was deprived, is a pertinent consideration. In the case of Newmanv. Brown et al., 228 S.C. 472, 90 S.E.2d 649, 55 A.L.R.2d 929, this Court approved a charge that a jury could award a reasonable sum of money to compensate the owner of an automobile for the loss of use of such automobile for a reasonable length of time during which it was being repaired.

  8. Hoenstine v. Rose

    131 Mont. 557 (Mont. 1957)   Cited 3 times

    The last mentioned item is additional to the repairs could have been made. The last mentioned item is additional to the basic measure of the damages, which is that they are the amount of the difference between the reasonable market value of the automobile immediately before the injury and its reasonable market value immediately after the injury. Coleman v. Levkoff, 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875. * * * "If plaintiff had had the automobile repaired, it would not have diminished her damages as that issue was submitted to the jury (and submitted under proper instructions, as we have seen) which in this case was the difference in market value `before and after,' plus the value of the loss of use of the automobile during the period reasonably necessary for repairs."

  9. Scott v. Southern Rwy. Co.

    231 S.C. 28 (S.C. 1957)   Cited 28 times
    Stating that rental value of car used is proper measure of damages even though substitute vehicle was "furnished gratis" by a third party

    In the instant case there is no showing that under the circumstances the time required to repair the car was unreasonable. Coleman v. Levkoff, 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875; Newman v. Brown, 228 S.C. 472, 90 S.E.2d 649; and there is no merit in the contention that the rental value of the car used was not a proper element of damages because it was furnished gratis by a party other than appellants. Appellants next contend that the Court erred in permitting evidence as to the crossing being defective when there was no charge in the complaint that they had negligently failed to keep the crossing in proper repair.

  10. Reese v. National Surety Corp.

    80 S.E.2d 47 (S.C. 1954)   Cited 21 times

    " It seems to be conceded that the foregoing charge as to property damage was substantially in accord with the rule announced in Coleman v. Levkoff, 128 S.C. 487, 122 S.E. 875, and that the charge on the measure of damages for personal injuries is correct in the abstract. The complaint is that there is no testimony in the case to support several of the elements of damage submitted to the jury.