Opinion
137 C.D. 2021
09-30-2021
Tyson Coleman, Appellant v. Kevin Kauffman and C. Stone
OPINION NOT REPORTED
Submitted: July 23, 2021
BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge, HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge, HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
MEMORANDUM OPINION
ANNE E. COVEY, JUDGE
Tyson Coleman (Coleman) appeals, pro se, from the Huntingdon County Common Pleas Court's (trial court) May 4, 2020 order dismissing his pro se complaint against State Correctional Institution (SCI)-Huntingdon Superintendent Kevin Kauffman (Kauffman) and SCI-Huntingdon Correctional Facility Maintenance Manager II C. Stone (Stone) (collectively, Appellees) (Complaint) pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 240(j)(1), Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1). Essentially, the issue before this Court is whether Coleman's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and, thus, is wholly frivolous.After review, this Court affirms.
According to documents attached to Coleman's pro se complaint (Complaint), Kauffman was SCI-Huntingdon's Facility Manager. See Original Record, Item 2 (Complaint) Ex. F (Facility Manager's Appeal Response) at 1.
Neither the Complaint nor the documents attached thereto include Stone's first name.
Coleman presents three issues in his Statement of Questions Involved: (1) whether the trial court erred by dismissing the Complaint when removal to federal court was required; (2) whether Coleman's pleadings and other attempts to prosecute were treated as if he was a licensed attorney rather than a layman; and (3) whether the trial court should have removed Coleman's action, purportedly filed pursuant to Section 1983 of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to federal court, rather than dismissing it. See Coleman Br. at 4-5. Because these issues are subsumed in this Court's analysis of whether the trial court erred by dismissing the Complaint as frivolous, they will be addressed accordingly herein.
Coleman is currently incarcerated at SCI-Phoenix. On April 22, 2020, Coleman filed the Complaint in the trial court pursuant to Section 1983 of the United States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Section 1983), therein alleging that, while incarcerated and performing his assigned duties in the kitchen at SCI-Huntingdon on July 25, 2018, he "stepped upon the unsecured [floor] drain cover, it dislodged and caused [him] to fall upon the cement floor, thereby injuring his lower back, neck, right knee and left foot." Original Record, Item 2 (Complaint) ¶ 11. Coleman asserted that Appellees violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States (U.S.) Constitution (Eighth Amendment) because their deliberate indifference to a known hazardous risk to his health and safety (i.e., loose, broken and/or missing kitchen drain covers) resulted in his physical injury, pain, and suffering. See Complaint ¶¶ 1, 4-5, 7-13, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28. Coleman demanded "[c]ompensatory damages of $25,000[.00], jointly and severally agains[t] [] Kauffman and Stone." Complaint ad damnum clause.
Section 1983 of the United States Code provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any [s]tate . . ., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]42 U.S.C. § 1983.
U.S. Const. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
Attached to the Complaint were Coleman's grievance documents, which reflect that Appellees received Coleman's drain cover reports and claimed that the necessary repairs were made upon receipt of each work order; however, "the bolts in the[] covers often come l[o]ose due to the carts running over them." Complaint Ex. C (Initial Review Response) at 1; see also Complaint Ex. F (Facility Manager's Appeal Response); Complaint Ex. I (Final Appeal Decision). Coleman responded in his grievance appeals that Appellees never made the repairs, and that the carts did not loosen the bolts where he fell because the carts could not fit into that space. In conjunction with his Complaint, Coleman filed a Petition for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.
On May 4, 2020, the trial court dismissed the Complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 240(j)(1). On September 10, 2020, Coleman filed an appeal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, which was transferred to this Court. By June 17, 2021 letter, the Department of Corrections' Office of General Counsel notified this Court that, although Kauffman and Stone are Appellees, it "will not participate in this appeal as the matter was dismissed by the court of common pleas as frivolous prior to service." June 17, 2021 Non-Participation Letter at 1.
On June 3, 2020, Coleman filed a Motion for an Extension of Time (Motion) to respond to the dismissal because the Department restricted his ability to access the prison law library during the COVID-19 pandemic (Pandemic). The trial court granted the Motion on June 10, 2020, giving Coleman until September 8, 2020 to appeal from the May 4, 2020 dismissal. Although "a trial court relinquishes its ability to act once the 30-day period has passed and a motion for reconsideration has not been expressly granted to toll the appeal period[, ]" Oak Tree Condo. Ass'n v. Greene, 133 A.3d 113, 117 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), on March 16, 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared a general, statewide judicial emergency due to the Pandemic. In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2020) (table). By March 18, 2020 Order, our Supreme Court generally suspended "all time calculations for purposes of time computation relevant to court cases or other judicial business, as well as time deadlines." In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 228 A.3d 1283 (Pa. 2020) (table). In its subsequent orders, the Supreme Court expanded the scope and extended the length of the judicial emergency. Although it is unclear whether the trial court's delay in granting the Motion was due to the Pandemic, Coleman timely filed the Motion, and he is entitled to the benefit of the Supreme Court's time calculation suspensions. Accordingly, the trial court's order granting the Motion is considered timely, such that the trial court retained jurisdiction over the matter.
In his brief to this Court, Coleman declares that he inadvertently filed his Section 1983 action in the trial court, and this matter should have been removed to federal court. However, "Section 1983 claims may be brought in the courts of this Commonwealth . . . ." Watkins v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 196 A.3d 272, 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). "Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, whether the trial court abused its discretion, or whether the trial court committed an error of law." Mohica v. SCI-Mahanoy Sec., 224 A.3d 811, 812 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (quoting Lichtman v. Glazer, 111 A.3d 1225, 1227 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)).
Initially, Rule 240(j)(1) provides, in relevant part:
If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied that the action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous.
Note: A frivolous action or proceeding has been defined as one that "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, [326] . . . (1989).Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1). "An action is frivolous under [Rule 240(j)] if, on its face, it does not set forth a valid cause of action[.]" Bennett v. Beard, 919 A.2d 365, 367 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)). "As we review [Coleman's C]omplaint for validity under Rule 240[(j)(1)], we are mindful that a pro se complaint should not be dismissed simply because it is not artfully drafted." Ocasio v. Prison Health Servs., 979 A.2d 352, 354 (Pa. Super. 2009) (italics omitted); see also Garcia v. Howell (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 800 C.D. 2018, filed Aug. 23, 2019).
This Court's unreported memorandum opinions may be cited "for [their] persuasive value, but not as a binding precedent." Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court's Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
Relative to the instant matter, Coleman
contends that he has stated a claim for a violation of [Section] 1983. See Owens v. Shannon, 808 A.2d 607 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (to state a claim under Section 1983, a
plaintiff must: (1) allege a violation of rights secured under the [U.S.] Constitution or [U.S.] law[;] and (2) show that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law).Bundy v. Beard, 924 A.2d 723, 727 (Pa. Cmwlth.), aff'd, 941 A.2d 646 (Pa. 2007).
Specifically, Coleman claims that Appellees violated his Eighth Amendment rights. "The Eighth Amendment, which applies to the [s]tates through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment [to the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV], prohibits the infliction of 'cruel and unusual punishments' on those convicted of crimes." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991) (citation omitted). Thus, despite that prisoners surrender numerous rights upon conviction and incarceration, they remain entitled to be free from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly,
Notably, although the Complaint specified that Appellees were being "sued in [their] individual capacit[ies, ]" it also declared that they "act[ed] under color of state law[, ]" in their official capacities - Kauffman purportedly as Superintendent (actually, Facility Manager), and Stone as Correctional Facility Maintenance Manager II. Complaint ¶¶ 4-5.
the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners. The [Eighth] Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must "take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates[.]" Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-[]27 . . . (1984).Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation omitted).
Not every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, however. "After incarceration, only the '"unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"' . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment." Ingraham v. Wright, [] 430 U.S. [651, ] 670 . . . [(1977)] (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, [] 429 U.S. [97, ] 103 . . . [(1976)] (citations omitted). To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all[, ] must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner's interests or safety. . . . It is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by the [Eighth Amendment.]Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). In Wilson, the U.S. Supreme Court declared:
[O]nly the "'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'" implicates the Eighth Amendment, [Estelle, 429 U.S.] at 104 . . . (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 . . . (1976) (joint opinion) (emphasis added)), a prisoner advancing such a claim must, at a minimum, allege "deliberate indifference" . . . . [Estelle, ] 429 U.S.[] at 106 . . . . "It is only such indifference" that can violate the Eighth Amendment, []id. (emphasis added); allegations of "inadvertent failure . . .," id.[] at 105 . . ., or of [] "negligen[ce] . . .," id.[] at 106 . . ., simply fail to establish the requisite culpable state of mind.Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297.
This Court has explained:
To succeed, a claim that prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment must satisfy both an objective and subjective requirement - the conditions must be "sufficiently serious" from an objective point of view, meaning that they involve denial of the minimum civilized measure of life's necessities, and the plaintiff must demonstrate that prison officials acted subjectively with "deliberate indifference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 . . .; Rhodes [v. Chapman], 452 U.S. [337, ] 347 . . . [(1981)]. Deliberate indifference exists if an official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 . . . .
Further, the Supreme Court has explained that "[n]o static 'test' can exist by which courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment 'must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'" Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 . . . (quotations omitted).
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that prison "[c]onditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may they be grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment." Id. at 347 . . . . Conditions that "deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" may also constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id.Neely v. Dep't of Corr., 838 A.2d 16, 20 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
Further,
[i]n Farmer . . . , the [U.S.] Supreme Court concluded that the inquiry into whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent is a subjective one, requiring the demonstration of a state of mind akin to criminal recklessness, and held that a prisoner must establish that: (i) the prison official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; (ii) the prison official was aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists; and (iii) the prison official drew the inference. [Id.] at 837, 840 . . . . The [Farmer] Court also emphasized that the duty of a prison official under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety and that prison officials who respond reasonably to the alleged risk cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment, even where the measures taken by prison officials failed to abate the substantial risk. Id. at 844-[]45[.]Tindell v. Dep't of Corr., 87 A.3d 1029, 1039-40 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (footnote omitted). Notwithstanding, "Section 1983 actions against state officials in their official capacity that seek only monetary damages are [] barred, as such a suit against a state official in his official capacity constitutes suit against the state itself." Watkins v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 196 A.3d 272, 275 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citations omitted).
Here, Coleman alleged in the Complaint that Appellees had a duty to ensure that the floor drains in his work environment were secure and did not present an immediate and obvious risk to his health and safety (see Complaint ¶¶ 21, 25); Coleman reported loose, broken and/or missing kitchen drain covers in July and October 2017 (see Complaint ¶ 10); Appellees knew about, but failed to repair the drain covers, and disregarded the excessive risk to his health and safety (see Complaint ¶¶ 9-10, 22, 26); Appellees' conduct created sufficient likelihood that Coleman would suffer personal injury (see Complaint ¶¶ 23, 27); on July 25, 2018, Coleman was injured after stepping upon an unsecured kitchen drain cover that dislodged and caused him to fall (see Complaint ¶ 11); Appellees' deliberate indifference to the kitchen danger resulted in his serious personal injury (see Complaint ¶¶ 11, 22, 26); and, for Appellees' Section 1983 violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, Coleman is entitled to monetary damages. See Complaint ad damnum clause.
The trial court dismissed Coleman's Complaint on the following basis:
[Coleman] has not alleged facts sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment claim. While [he] is correct that "deliberate indifference" is the correct standard for conditions of confinement claims, his [C]omplaint alleges only ordinary negligence on [Appellees'] part. This is not sufficient, as "deliberate indifference" for such claims requires a much higher standard be met - "recklessness," as defined by criminal law. Farmer . . ., 511 U.S. [at] 837, 839-40. . . . Turning to [Section 302(b)(3) of the Crimes Code, ] 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(3):
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, [his] disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation.
That standard has not been met here.
Coleman Br. Ex. 1 (Trial Ct. May 4, 2020 Order) at 2.
This Court agrees with the trial court that Coleman's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In addition, regardless of whether Coleman asserted sufficient facts to support an Eighth Amendment violation based on deliberate indifference, accepting Coleman's allegations against Appellees as true, he cannot succeed on his Section 1983 action in the first instance. Despite that Coleman asserted in the Complaint that Appellees, in their official capacities and under the color of state law, acted with deliberate indifference to his safety and violated his Eighth Amendment rights, see Bundy, "[b]ecause the [C]omplaint asserted only claims for money damages, [Coleman's] claims against [Appellees] in their official capacity [] [does not] state a cause of action under Section 1983." Watkins, 196 A.3d at 275. Consequently, Coleman's Complaint is frivolous. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissed Coleman's Complaint pursuant to Rule 240(j)(1).
For all of the above reasons, the trial court's order is affirmed.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 30th day of September, 2021, the Huntingdon County Common Pleas Court's May 4, 2020 order is affirmed.