Opinion
24-CV-3507 (LTS)
06-27-2024
CHANTE COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. IEH AUTOPARTS LLC, Defendant.
ORDER TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action under the court's federal question jurisdiction, alleging that her employer discriminated against her. She sues IEH Auto Parts LLC. By order dated May 9, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings her claims using the court's Employment Discrimination Complaint form. She has checked the box on the form to indicate that she is asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and in section of the form that requires her to specify her disability or perceived disability, Plaintiff has written “1995.” (ECF 1, at 4.) She has checked off boxes to indicate that her employer terminated her employment, did not accommodate her disability, retaliated against her, and harassed her or created a hostile work environment. (See Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff alleges,
For two years I worked with Autoplus but transfer from N.J. to New York due to domestic viol[e]nce partner[.] When I entered Auto Plus in New York I was working with an employee who was training me[.] For one day I realise later on
she disagree to give me the information to perform the job so I struggled to complete task as the time went by Auto Plus took action on me and that lead me to be fired after Kayla made a hostile work enviro[n]ment. Auto Plus agreed to whatever Kayla would tell them. Auto Plus asked me to go back to where I came from after them knowing why I came to that facilities from a previous write up I had receive due to my situation. Auto Plus denied me to have a personal leave of absence. I was bullied the 4 months I was there until I was fired.(Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the complaint. All other spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless other indicated.
Plaintiff attaches to the complaint a Notice of Right to Sue from the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which is dated February 21, 2024. (See id. at 9.)
Plaintiff does not specify the relief she is seeking.
DISCUSSION
Because Plaintiff checked off the box to assert claims under the ADA, the Court understands the complaint as attempting to assert claims under that statute. “The ADA prohibits discrimination against a ‘qualified individual on the basis of disability' in the ‘terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.'” Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). A person is disabled under the ADA if the person has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Other federal employment discrimination statutes, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, protect against discrimination based on other protected characteristics, such as race, color, sex, national origin, and age.
These federal antidiscrimination statutes prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual's protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions).
Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee's protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against [her], and (2) [her protected characteristic] was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87.
Here, Plaintiff has checked the box on the complaint form to assert a claim under the ADA, but she does not specify her disability. Moreover, her allegations do not suggest that her employer took any adverse employment action against her based on a disability, perceived disability, or any other characteristic that is protected by federal employment discrimination statutes. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under any of the federal employment discrimination statutes.
Plaintiff alleges that she is a victim of domestic violence. (ECF 1, at 6.) Although “many of the physical and mental challenges faced by people who have suffered domestic violence may qualify, in themselves, as disabilities under the ADA, . . . having suffered domestic violence does not alone form a sufficient basis for a claim of disability under the ADA.” George v. New York City Dep't of Corr., No. 12-CV-2963, 2015 WL 5579691, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2015). While the New York State Human Rights Law does make it illegal to discriminate against an employee because of their status as a victim of domestic violence, see N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, Plaintiff alleges that both she and Defendant are residents of the State of New York, and the Court therefore lacks diversity of citizenship jurisdiction to consider such any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Moreover, because Plaintiff has not stated a viable federal claim at this stage, the Court declines, at this time, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint alleging additional facts to state a viable employment discrimination claim.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege enough additional facts to state a valid employment discrimination claim, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend her complaint to detail her claims.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her complaint to allege additional facts suggesting that her employment took an adverse employment action against her because of a protected characteristic such as her race, color, age, sex, national origin, or disability. In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 24-CV-3507 (LTS). An Amended Complaint for Employment Discrimination form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff may consent to receive court documents by email by completing the attached form, Consent to Electronic Service.
If Plaintiff consents to receive documents by email, Plaintiff will no longer receive court documents by regular mail.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.