Opinion
1:22-cv-31
02-06-2024
TAYLOR COLEMAN, Plaintiff v. SERGEANT HEIDER, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge
AMENDED REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ECF NO. 39
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S AMENDED REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 39) filed by Defendants Heider, Ochs, Sissem, and Skinner be granted.
II. Report
A. Introduction
Plaintiff Taylor Coleman, an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (SCI-Albion), initiated this pro se civil rights action against four corrections officers at SCI-Albion. See ECF No. 1. In his Complaint, Coleman alleges that the Defendants used excessive force in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. To redress these alleged violation, Coleman seeks compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment on March 6, 2023, accompanied by a brief in support, concise statement of material facts, and appendix of exhibits. ECF Nos. 39-42. The Court issued a response order the following day in which it directed Coleman to file a “Memorandum or Brief in Opposition to the Motion, a Responsive Concise Statement of Material Facts, and an Appendix of exhibits” on or before April 6, 2023. ECF No. 43. The Court explicitly cautioned Plaintiff that “[e]ach alleged material fact set forth in [Defendants'] Concise Statement of Material Facts will for purposes of the motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless Plaintiff specifically denies or otherwise controverts it in his/her Responsive Concise Statement as required by Local Rule 56(C)(1).” Id. The Court also attached courtesy copies of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and Local Rule 56(C)(1). See ECF Nos. 43-1 and 43-2. Despite these instructions, Coleman filed a brief in opposition, see ECF No. 46, but failed to file a responsive concise statement.
B. Factual background
1. Local Rule 56.C.1
Before summarizing the pertinent facts, the Court notes that Plaintiff failed to properly respond to Defendants' concise statement of material facts, as required by Local Rule 56.C.1. This rule requires non-moving parties to a motion for summary judgment to file a responsive concise statement in which they must: respond to each numbered paragraph in the movant's concise statement; admit or deny the facts contained in the movant's concise statement; set forth the basis for denial if any fact within the movant's concise statement is not entirely admitted by the non-moving party, with appropriate citation to the record; and set forth, in separately numbered paragraphs, any other material facts at issue. See LCvR 56.C.1. Courts in the Western District of Pennsylvania require strict compliance with the provisions of Local Rule 56. See, e.g., Coleman v. Tice, 2018 WL 5724125, at *2 n. 3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 5722316 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2018); First Guard Ins. Co. v. Bloom Services, Inc., 2018 WL 949224, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2018); Hughes v. Allegheny County Airport Authority, 2017 WL 2880875, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2017).
A non-moving party “faces severe consequences for not properly responding to a moving party's concise statement.” Hughes, 2017 WL 2880875, at *1. Any alleged material facts “set forth in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts . . . which are claimed to be undisputed, will for the purpose of deciding the motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party.” LCvR 56.E. While courts provide some leniency to pro se litigants when applying procedural rules, the Court “‘is under no duty to provide personal instruction on courtroom procedure or to perform any legal chores for the [pro se litigant] that counsel would normally carry out.'” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004)). Nor may pro se litigants ignore procedural rules that apply to parties assisted by counsel. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (explaining that “we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel”).
Accordingly, because Coleman has failed to file a responsive concise statement of material facts, each fact stated in Defendants' concise statement is deemed admitted. LCvR 56.E. However, the Court will consider materials of record to the extent they may specifically contradict Defendants' statement of facts. See Boyd v. Citizens Bank of Pa., Inc., 2014 WL 2154902, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 22, 2014) (stating that “[t]o the extent Plaintiffs statement of ‘fact' specifically controverts Defendant's, the Court will consider these facts in determining whether summary judgment should be granted”).
2. Facts
The following factual summary is derived primarily from Coleman's pleadings, Defendants' concise statement of material facts, and the exhibits submitted by the parties. At approximately 7:40 a.rn. on January 31, 2020, Coleman was using a telephone in the common area of E/B Unit at SCI-Albion when an unrelated incident prompted staff to order all inmates to return to their cells and “lock in.” ECF No. 41 ¶ 5; ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 2. According to Coleman, he immediately hung up the phone and headed to his cell. ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 2. He maintains that, as he was entering his cell, Defendant Heider “approached him from behind, shoved him hard in the back, and said: ‘Get your “Bitch-Ass” in there!”' Id. ¶ 3. Coleman contends that the alleged shove caused him to slip on a throw rug and sustain unspecified injuries to his neck, back, and ankle. ECF No. 36 ¶ 6.
Contradicting Coleman's version of events, Heider avers that Coleman “remained on the phone despite the lock-in order” and had to be given a direct order to hang up the phone. ECF No. 42-2 ¶ 4. Heider also accuses Coleman of arguing, shouting, and encouraging other inmates to resist the lock-in order while being escorted to his cell. Id. ¶¶ 5-7. Heider acknowledges that he pushed Coleman into the cell but maintains that he used the minimum amount of force necessary and did so only “to gain compliance” in response to Coleman's resistance. Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
In addition to the parties' respective accounts, the record includes a security surveillance footage of the incident recorded from a fixed camera. ECF No. 42-4. Although the recording does not include audio, the moment where Heider pushes Coleman into his cell is clearly captured on video. At approximately 7:44:13, the camera pans across the room and focuses on the comer of the unit where Heider and Coleman are walking towards Coleman's cell. At 7:44:21, Heider unlocks Coleman's cell door. Coleman begins to enter the cell at around 7:44:24 but then stops in the doorway. Heider appears to give him a slight push to keep him moving, although the amount of force applied is so minimal that it is difficult to see exactly when the contact occurs. Heider then attempts to close the door but is briefly blocked by Coleman. At 7:44:28, Heider closes the cell door and walks away, concluding the relevant portion of the security footage.
Later that day, Heider issued a misconduct charging Coleman with, among other things, using abusive language, refusing an order, and threatening another person. ECF No. 42-3 at 19. Skinner signed off on the misconduct as Heider's supervising officer and escorted Coleman to the Restricted Housing Unit (RHU) for processing. ECF No. 41 ¶ 14. Skinner noted that Coleman did not appear to be injured and did not request to see medical. ECF No. 42-5 ¶¶ 4-5. Coleman's primary complaint to Skinner was not about the push but about having to prematurely terminate his phone call with his family. Id. ¶ 7. Another officer in the area, Jovietta Partsch, corroborated that Coleman did not display any signs of injury or distress while being escorted to the RHU. ECF No. 41 ¶ 17.
After speaking with several officers, Coleman was released from the RHU that same day without being processed. Id. ¶ 18. A disciplinary hearing was held three days later at which the misconduct was dismissed with prejudice based on the hearing examiner's review of the relevant security video. ECF No. 42-1.
Approximately one week later, Coleman filed a grievance against Heider based on the alleged assault. Following an investigation, Coleman's grievance was ultimately denied. ECF No. 42-6.
It appears that Coleman submitted an initial version of his grievance prior to February 11 but had to resubmit it because he wrote the wrong incident date. ECF No. 42-6 at 12.
On February 21, 2020 - approximately three weeks after the incident - Coleman reported to the prison's medical department for the first time with reports of neck and back pain. ECF No. 46-4 at 2. After X-ray images revealed no evidence of injury, Coleman was instructed to take Tylenol as needed. Id. Coleman does not offer any explanation as to why he waited over three weeks to seek medical attention for his alleged injuries.
C. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Under this standard “the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartier, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the absence of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each of those elements. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, “a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).
D. Analysis
1. Personal involvement
To prevail on a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2005). Critically, the plaintiff “must show that each and every defendant was ‘personal [ly] involve [d]' in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005)). This means that each defendant must have played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence of specific allegations that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising prison officials. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that liability for supervisory officials must still be based on “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs”); Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353 (“[L]iability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”). Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, “a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates.” Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, it is “well established that the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show the actual knowledge necessary for a defendant to be found personally involved in the alleged unlawful conduct.” Mearin, 951 F.Supp.2d at 782. See also Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed.Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement.”). Rather, a supervisordefendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. AM. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
In the instant case, Coleman has not leveled any substantive allegations against Skinner. The only reference to Skinner anywhere in Coleman's pleading is his general averment that he complained to Skinner, while being escorted to the RHU, about his phone call being prematurely terminated. This lone allegation is insufficient to establish personal involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right.
As to the supervisory Defendants, Coleman's only factual averments regarding Ochs and Sissem are that each played a role in denying his grievance. ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 15-16. As described above, this type of averment is insufficient to establish personal involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Mincy, 508 Fed.Appx. at 104 (“[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement.”); Kloss v. SCI-Albion, 2018 WL 4609144, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2018) (allegation that supervisory defendant was “made aware of several issues of the plaintiff s and .. . failed to help him” is insufficient to state a claim for reliefs) participation in an administrative appeal process). Because is apparent that Coleman is attempting to hold Ochs and Sissem responsible for the unconstitutional action of other individuals based solely on their roles in the prison grievance hierarchy, Ochs and Sissem are entitled to summary judgment.
2. Excessive force
The heart of Coleman's claim is that Heider violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by using excessive force while escorting him to his cell. More specifically, Coleman claims that Heider “shoved him hard in the back” and caused him to slip on a throw rug and injure himself. ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 3.
In an excessive force claim, the “core judicial inquiry” is whether “force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). In Whitley v. Albers, the United States Supreme Court articulated several factors for courts to consider in determining whether a correctional officer has used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, including: “(1) ‘the need for the application of force'; (2) ‘the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used'; (3) ‘the extent of injury inflicted'; (4) ‘the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them'; and (5) ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.'” Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986)).
Where the events at issue have been captured on video, the court must consider the video evidence in determining whether there is any genuine dispute as to material facts. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007). The court must view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape. See id. (relying on a video recording in assessing summary judgment evidence and admonishing that the lower court “should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.”). If a review of the video recording “refutes an inmate's claims that excessive force was used against him, and the video evidence does not permit an inference that prison officials acted maliciously and sadistically, summary judgment is entirely appropriate.” Smalls v. Sassaman, 2019 WL 4194211, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 4, 2019) (citing Tindell v. Beard, 351 Fed.Appx. 591 (3d Cir. 2009)). See also McCullon v. Saylor, 20134 WL 1192778, at *14 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2013) (“[I]n assessing ... claims in a case where an encounter is captured on videotape we are mindful of the fact that when ‘videotape refutes [an inmate's] assertion that defendant[s] used excessive force,' or when the ‘video shows that [an inmate] did not suffer any physical distress' ... we should conclude ‘viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to [the inmate that], no reasonable finder of fact could view the video of the incident and determine that [defendants] acted maliciously and sadistically,' and may enter summary judgment on the excessive force claim.”) (quoting Tindell, 351 Fed.Appx. at 596).
There is no question that a push or shove represents a use of force. Before addressing the Whitley factors, however, the Court notes that the videotape of the incident decisively refutes Coleman's allegation that Heider applied force in an intentionally malicious or sadistic manner. See Jones, 2017 WL 4284416, at *10 (granting summary judgment where videotape evidence “clearly undermine[d] any potential determination that [there] was a malicious or sadistic use of force.”). Although the camera is filming from a distance, Heider and Coleman are clearly visible on the recording when the alleged shove takes place. Nothing in the movements or body language of either party supports an inference of malicious or intentional misconduct. Neither individual appears irritated, upset, or aggressive. There are no abrupt movements, lunges, or changes in direction to suggest that Heider attempted to injure Coleman. To the contrary, the video demonstrates that any force applied by Heider was plainly de minimis. Even if it ultimately contributed to Coleman's trip and fall, no reasonable jury viewing the video footage could conclude that it happened due to malicious or sadistic misconduct.
Application of the Whitley factors further bolsters this conclusion. Regarding the first factor, there appears to be a factual dispute as to whether Coleman disregarded Heider's direct order to hang up the phone. There is nothing in the record, however, to refute Heider's averment that Coleman became verbally abusive and threatening in response to the lock-in order.Coleman's loud and abusive behavior, coupled with the need to carry out the lock-in order in an efficient manner, supports the need for some application of force.
Although he supplies his version of events in a sworn declaration, Coleman's narrative skips directly from hanging up the phone to arriving at his cell. Coleman does not address or refute Heider's averment that he was behaving disruptively during the intervening period. ECF No. 46-1 at 2.
The second factor assesses the relationship between the need and amount of force that was used. The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be assessed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). This is because “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a prisoner's constitutional rights.” Middleton v. Sanchez, 2016 WL 1089131, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2016) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). In the instant case, Heider's application of force occurred in response to Coleman's verbally abusive behavior and apparent reluctance to enter his cell, delaying his compliance with the ordered lock-in. Given the negligible nature of the force applied, this factor supports summary judgment.
The third Whitley factor considers the extent of the injury inflicted. While the lack of significant injury is not dispositive, it weighs against an excessive force claim. Aruanno v. Maurice, 2019 WL 5597653, at *2 (3d Cir. Oct. 30, 2019); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38) (2010). In the instant case, there is no evidence that Coleman sustained any serious or lasting injuries stemming from the incident. He waited over three weeks after the incident before seeking medical treatment and, once he did, he received prompt medical attention (including an x-ray and pain relievers). This factor decidedly favors summary judgment.
The fourth factor the Court must consider is the extent of the threat and the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials based on the facts known to them. Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d Cir. 2009). As noted above, Heider has supplied uncontradicted testimony that Coleman was behaving in an aggressive and threatening manner at the time of the incident. This behavior included shouting to inmates elsewhere in the unit to resist the lock-up order and warning Heider that “this is why you guys [corrections officers] keep getting punched in the face” by inmates.” ECF No. 42-2 ¶¶ 5-7. Although Coleman was not being physically disruptive, Heider prioritized getting Coleman into his cell to neutralize his verbally combative behavior and restore order and discipline. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. See Johnson v. Clarke, 2022 WL 2835706, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June 2, 2022) (“[E]ven if Clarke could have initially moved away from Johnson's cell to avoid his attacks, Johnson eventually needed to be restrained and secured”). No reasonable finder of fact could conclude that this decision was objectively unreasonable.
Heider perceived the latter statement as a reference to several recent inmate attacks on corrections officers at the facility. ECF No. 42-2 ¶ 6.
Finally, the Court considers whether Heider could have made any effort to temper the severity of the forceful response. Given the extremely de minimis nature of the shove, it is unclear how Heider's response could have been tempered. This factor, like each of the others, supports summary judgment.
In summary, the Court concludes that there is overwhelming evidence to support a finding in Heider's favor as to each of the Whitley factors. Even viewing the evidence of record, including the video recording, in the light most favorable to Coleman, no reasonable jury could conclude that Heider's minimal application of force was excessive. Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted as to this claim.
3. Retaliation
Coleman's final claim is that Heider violated his First Amendment rights by filing a retaliatory misconduct in response to Coleman's protected activity. According to Coleman, after Heider shoved him into his cell, he immediately threatened to file a grievance. ECF No. 10 ¶ 9. Coleman maintains that Heider issued the ensuing misconduct to cover up for his own improper behavior and punish Coleman for threatening to engage in protected conduct.
To establish illegal retaliation for engaging in protected conduct, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse action at the hands of prison officials; and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action. Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417,422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2001)). An “adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). To be actionable, the adverse action “need not be great” but “must be more than de minimis.” McKee v. Hart, 436 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2006). This is an objective inquiry. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352,376 (3d Cir. 2012).
Critically, courts in this Circuit, including the Court of Appeals, have widely rejected retaliation claims based on misconduct charges that are dismissed before they can result in significant punishment. In Walker v. Mathis, for example, the Third Circuit addressed an inmate's allegation that a corrections officer filed a retaliatory misconduct in response to the inmate's complaints about the guard to a supervisor. Walker, 665 Fed.Appx. 140, 141 (3d Cir. 2016). The misconduct was later overturned, resulting in only a brief suspension of the inmate's work privileges. Id. The Court held that the inmate had failed to satisfy the second element of his retaliation claim because “[defendant's] alleged conduct was not sufficiently serious to ‘deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his [constitutional] rights.'” Id. at 142-143 (quoting Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 530). Other courts have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2011) (charging prisoner with misconduct report that was later dismissed for filing a false grievance does not rise to the level of “adverse” action for purposes of retaliation claim); Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 555 (7th Cir. 2009) (“A single retaliatory disciplinary charge that is later dismissed is insufficient to serve as the basis of a § 1983 action.”).
The same outcome is warranted here. Although Coleman was initially sent to the RHU because of the misconduct, he concedes that he was immediately released. ECF No. 46-1 ¶ 6. The misconduct was overturned four days later and, aside from that brief inconvenience, Coleman received no other punishment. Id. ¶ 8. In the absence of an adverse action, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Coleman's retaliation claim. See, e.g., Hernandez-Tirado v. Lowe, 2017 WL 3433690, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 10,2017) (“Plaintiffs retaliation claim related to CO Christensen's issuance of misconduct reports, which were ultimately dismissed, do not state a claim of retaliation.”); Bracey v. Price, 2012 WL 6015727, at * 11 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2012) (rejecting retaliation claim because, even “if the misconduct was indeed false, and issued in retaliation for a past grievance filed against another corrections officer, Plaintiffs temporary loss of television, radio and commissary privileges [while awaiting a disciplinary hearing] is simply insufficient to be considered constitutionally ‘adverse.'”).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [ECF No. 39] be GRANTED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187,194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).