Opinion
NO. 2015-CA-000440-MR NO. 2015-CA-000793-MR
01-20-2017
KEEDRON COLEMAN APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE AND DOMINIQUE CHESTNUT APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: KEEDRON COLEMAN Erin Hoffman Yang Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: DOMINIQUE L. CHESTNUT Karen Shuff Maurer Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky James Havey Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CR-00303-002 APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 14-CR-00303-003 OPINION
AFFIRMING
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BEFORE: MAZE, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. MAZE, JUDGE: Keedron Coleman (Coleman) and Dominique Chestnut (Chestnut) separately appeal from conditional guilty pleas to facilitation of first-degree robbery. They argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence seized following a warrantless entry and search of an apartment. We agree with the trial court that Coleman and Chestnut failed to establish that they had standing to challenge the entry and search. Hence, we affirm.
Judge Laurance B. VanMeter concurred in this opinion prior to being elected to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Release of this opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
On March 18, 2014, a Fayette County grand jury returned a consolidated indictment charging Coleman, Chestnut, and a third person, Lewaco Clay, with first-degree robbery. In addition, the indictment separately charged Chestnut with second-degree fleeing or evading police and third-degree criminal trespass; Coleman with possession of marijuana and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree; and Clay with possession of marijuana and being a persistent felony offender in the second degree.
All three defendants moved to suppress evidence seized by the police during a search of an apartment on Augusta Drive in Lexington. The facts surrounding the search at issue were developed at the suppression hearing and, for the most part, are not in dispute. On January 12, 2014, at around 10:00 a.m., Lexington Metro Police Officers Matthew Laney and John Toler were patrolling on Augusta Drive. They observed two young African-American men, later identified as Clay and Chestnut, walking down the road. Officer Laney testified that, when the men saw the police car, they began to walk faster, change direction, and cross into the grassy area of an apartment complex. The officers drove up to where the men were standing and Officer Toler got out of the cruiser. As Officer Toler approached the men, Chestnut fled the scene. Clay remained at the scene with Officer Toler.
Officer Laney got out of the cruiser and began to pursue Chestnut. He lost sight of Chestnut in the apartment complex. However, Officer Laney stated that the grass was wet, and he followed footprints to the door of Apartment # 6. Officer Laney called for backup, and additional officers arrived at the door approximately two minutes later. Officer Laney knocked on the door, and two women, later identified as Jamie Bates and Melvina Chestnut (Chestnut's sister), answered. He asked whose apartment it was and if they could come in and check the apartment. Melvina Chestnut replied that her boyfriend was in the apartment and that she would go get him.
Officer Laney testified that he asked her if he could step into the apartment, and Melvina Chestnut answered, "Come on in." She turned and began walking down the hallway to the bedroom, and Officer Laney followed. When they entered the bedroom, he saw Joshua Washington laying in the bed, and Coleman standing next to the closet. Officer Laney also saw a baggie containing marijuana sitting on an entertainment center directly in front of him. As he stepped further into the bedroom, he saw another bag of marijuana on the shelf of an open closet. Washington denied that it was his and refused to consent to a search of the apartment.
Officer Laney brought everyone from the bedroom into the living room. Another officer conducted a protective sweep of the apartment and found Chestnut under a blanket in the other bedroom closet. Officer Laney then applied for a search warrant. The district court granted the warrant and Officer Laney returned to execute the warrant with the other officers on the scene. During the course of the search, the police seized multiple bags of marijuana.
The police also found a number of items of personal property. Officer David Collins believed that the items matched those which were reported stolen two days earlier. He also noted that a red 1997 Pontiac Grand Prix in the parking lot matched one reported stolen in the same robbery. Officer Collins obtained a separate search warrant to recover those items. The victim of the robbery identified the vehicle and items stolen. The victim also positively identified Clay and Chestnut as two of the men who robbed him. The victim separately identified Coleman as the third individual who robbed him, but he was not as certain of that identification.
At the hearing, all parties agreed that Washington was the leaseholder for the apartment and Melvina Chestnut lived there. At the scene, Coleman provided a Hopkinsville address, but told Officer Laney that he did not have a regular address in Lexington. At the hearing, Coleman testified that he was homeless, but he had an understanding with Washington that he could sleep at the apartment if he had too much to drink. He testified that he had been sleeping on the couch in the living room, and had just walked down the hall to the bedroom when Officer Laney arrived.
The day after the search, Melvina Chestnut told Officer Collins that Chestnut lived in the second bedroom of the apartment. But at the time of the search, she did not tell Officer Laney that Chestnut lived there. Neither Melvina Chestnut nor Chestnut testified at the hearing.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied the motions to suppress, finding that none of the defendants had standing to challenge the officer's initial warrantless entry into the apartment or their subsequent searches pursuant to warrants. Clay was detained outside of the apartment and never claimed that he lived there. The court noted that, while Coleman was an occasional overnight guest, he had no expectation of privacy beyond the living room where he slept.
As for Chestnut, the trial court noted Officer Collins's testimony that Melvina Chestnut had told him that her brother lived in the second bedroom in the apartment. However, the court found that this testimony was not consistent with any of the other evidence presented. On the day of the search, Melvina Chestnut did not indicate that Chestnut was a resident of the apartment. Furthermore, there was no other evidence that he resided there. Consequently, the trial court concluded that Chestnut had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment.
Turning to the other issues, the court found that Melvina Chestnut, a tenant, consented to the officers entering the apartment. The court also found that she did not object when Officer Laney followed her down the hall into the bedroom, where the first bag of marijuana was in plain view. The court found that Officer Laney likely exceeded the scope of consent when he entered the bedroom and saw the marijuana in the closet. The court also questioned whether Officer Hill was justified in conducting a search of the second bedroom where Chestnut was found. But given that neither Chestnut nor Coleman had standing, the trial court determined that these issues were moot.
Subsequently, Coleman and Chestnut each entered conditional guilty pleas to facilitation to first-degree robbery. They specifically reserved their rights to appeal the trial court's denial of the motions to suppress. Clay did not enter a guilty plea at that time and he is not part of this appeal.
Our standard of review of a ruling on a motion to suppress is two-fold. First, a reviewing court must determine whether the lower court's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. If so, such findings are conclusive. RCr 8.27; Adcock v. Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Ky. 1998). Second, the court must perform a de novo review of those factual findings to determine whether the decision is correct as a matter of law. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996). See also Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. 2001).
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
As an initial matter, a defendant bears the burden of establishing standing to challenge a Fourth Amendment search. That burden requires proof that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises. Ordway v. Commonwealth, 352 S.W.3d 584, 592 (Ky. 2011). The "capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S. Ct. 421, 430, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1987) (citation omitted). See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633 (1980). In Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 109 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home of his or her host. Id. at 98-99, 110 S. Ct. at 1684. On the other hand, a transient social guest generally has no such expectation of privacy. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90-91, 119 S. Ct. 469, 473-74, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998)
In the present case, Coleman was an occasional overnight guest in the apartment, but not on any regular basis. He did not have a key to the apartment, did not keep any clothing in the apartment, and did not contribute to the household expenses. Rather, he simply had an "understanding" with Washington that he could sleep there if he needed a place to stay. The evening before the search, Coleman came to the apartment for a birthday party and fell asleep on the couch. We agree with the trial court that Coleman's expectation of privacy, if any, was limited to the living room area where he slept. There was no evidence that he had any expectation of privacy to the bedroom areas where the evidence was found.
The only evidence regarding Chestnut's status came through the hearsay testimony of Melvina Chestnut as related by Officer Collins. The trial court found this evidence unconvincing, since Melvina Chestnut made the statement the day after the search. The court noted that Chestnut himself never claimed to reside in the apartment. Since Chestnut had the burden of establishing standing, we cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that he did not reside at the apartment.
Consequently, neither Coleman nor Chestnut have standing to challenge the initial warrantless entry or the warrants issued thereafter. For the same reason, Chestnut does not have standing to challenge the protective sweep of the apartment. Therefore, the trial court properly denied their motions to suppress the evidence seized as a result of those searches.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of conviction by the Fayette Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
KEEDRON COLEMAN Erin Hoffman Yang
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
DOMINIQUE L. CHESTNUT Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky James Havey
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky