Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399-400, 95 S.Ct. 553, 557, 42 L.Ed.2d 532, 540-41 (1975); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 713, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 161 (1973); Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 565, 510 A.2d 562, 566-67 (1986) (McAuliffe, J., dissenting). See also Attorney Gen. v. A.A. County School Bus Contractors Ass'n, 286 Md. 324, 328, 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979); Coleman v. Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755, 758, 471 A.2d 1115, 1117 (1984). In Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 349, 46 L.Ed.2d 350, 353 (1975), the Supreme Court made clear that the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine was limited and in the absence of a class action, it was applicable only where the following two elements combined: (1) the challenged action was too short in its duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.
Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not consider the Commission's alternative argument that the matter is not moot because the issue is one of public importance and may recur while evading review. See State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 584, 640 A.2d 1104 (1994); Beeman v. Dept. of Health and Mental Hygiene, supra, 105 Md. App. at 158, 658 A.2d 1172; C.N. Robinson Lighting Supply Co. v. Board of Education of Howard County, 90 Md. App. 515, 526, 602 A.2d 195, cert. denied, 326 Md. 662, 607 A.2d 7 (1992); Coleman v. Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755, 758, 471 A.2d 1115, cert. denied, 298 Md. 353, 469 A.2d 1274 (1984).II.
Because of the probability of repetition and the substantial likelihood that the matter will always be moot by the time it reaches an appellate court, we deem it to be in the public interest for us to answer Mercy's question. See Coleman v. Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755, 758, 471 A.2d 1115, 1117 (1984). See n. 3 supra.
In an analogous area, the courts have consistently held that spouses or putative fathers have no interest in a fetus sufficient either to require or prevent an abortion. (See, Conn v Conn, 525 N.E.2d 612 [Ind Ct App], affd and opn below adopted 526 N.E.2d 958 [Ind], cert denied 488 U.S. 955; Coleman v Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755, 471 A.2d 1115, cert denied 298 Md. 353, 469 A.2d 1274; Doe v Doe, 365 Mass. 556, 314 N.E.2d 128; Doe v Smith, 527 N.E.2d 177 [Ind 1988]; Rothenberger v Doe, 149 N.J. Super. 478, 374 A.2d 57 [Ch Div 1977]; Jones v Smith, 278 So.2d 339 [Fla 1973], cert denied 415 U.S. 958; see also, Przybyla v Przybyla, 87 Wis.2d 441, 275 N.W.2d 112 [Ct App 1978] [woman's exercise of right to terminate her pregnancy without consent of husband cannot support recovery by husband for intentional infliction of emotional distress]; Planned Parenthood of Mo. v Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69; Planned Parenthood of S.-E. Pa. v Casey, 505 US ___, 112 S Ct 2791, 2826-2831.) This is not an abortion case and this court will not treat it as one.