Summary
noting that habeas claim that state court judges who presided over criminal trial did not timely file their oaths of office was dismissed because it was an error of state law
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Case No. 16-cv-06150-EMC
04-04-2017
RAHSAAN COLEMAN, Plaintiff, v. DIANA BECTON BROWN, et al., Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
I. BACKGROUND
Rahsaan Coleman, an inmate at the California State Prison - Solano, filed this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons discussed below, the action will be dismissed.
II. BACKGROUND
Mr. Coleman believes that his conviction and criminal trial were invalid because two state court judges who presided over his criminal case did not timely file their oaths of office. He has unsuccessfully pursued this theory in numerous court actions and in complaints to the California Commission on Judicial Performance. See Docket No. 1 at 23-24 (listing nine state court actions); see also Docket No. 24 at 2 in Coleman v. McGrath, No. 04-cv-4069 PJH (dismissing the oath-of-office claim from habeas action because it was, at most, a state law error claim). In 2012, Mr. Coleman filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting claims based on his theory. This Court dismissed that action, concluding that the action was barred by the rule from Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See Docket No. 5 in Coleman v. Brown, No. 12-cv-6291 EMC. He now returns with the same claims and with an additional fact that he contends allows him to avoid the Heck bar.
In the present action, Mr. Coleman once again claims that his conviction and trial were invalid because two state court judges did not timely file their oaths of office. Mr. Coleman alleges in his complaint that Contra Costa County Municipal Court Judge Becton Brown did not file her oath of office until December 26, 1995, which allegedly was beyond the state law deadline. See id. at 15-16. Mr. Coleman alleges that former Contra Costa County Superior Court Judge Sepulveda did not file her oaths of office until October 31, 1991 and November 26, 1999, which allegedly were beyond the state law deadlines. Id. at 17-18. The complaint suggests these two judges presided over some or all of Mr. Coleman's trial or criminal proceedings. See id. at 12. He alleges that their "practices, acts and/or policies . . . have caused plaintiff to be wrongly or illegally tried, convicted and sentenced on the basis of excess of jurisdiction." Docket No. 1 at 7.
To be clear: the oaths of office had been filed (although allegedly untimely) before Mr. Coleman's case arose. Mr. Coleman was charged with committing a murder on July 31, 1997. His trial was held in 1998, at which he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Docket No. 1 at 8-9.
Mr. Coleman has a new fact that he contends will enable him to avoid the Heck bar that prompted the dismissal of Case No. 12-cv-6291 EMC. Specifically, he contends that he "finally obtain[ed] relief from a wrongful sentence" when he was resentenced pursuant to California Penal Code § 1170.12 in 2016. See Docket No. 15 at 2-3 in Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 12-cv-6291 EMC. He further alleges that the minutes and abstracts from the 2016 sentencing proceedings "illuminate that [he] challenged and successfully appeal[]ed his wrongful sentence, and or imprisonment." Id. at 3.
The present action came to exist because the Court rejected Mr. Coleman's efforts to file an amended complaint in Case No. 12-cv-6291 EMC four years after the case was closed and directed him to pursue his claim in a new action. See Docket No. 17 at 1-2 in Coleman v. Brown, Case No. 12-cv-6291 EMC.
Mr. Coleman's resentencing in 2016 was based on a new interpretation of California's Three Strikes law by the California Supreme Court and not because any of his convictions had been overturned. In People v. Vargas, 59 Cal. 4th 635 (Cal. 2014), the California Supreme Court announced that a trial court must dismiss one of a defendant's two prior strike convictions if those two convictions were based on the same single act. Relying on the newly-announced rule in Vargas, Mr. Coleman filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, requesting resentencing. See In re Rahsaan Coleman, Cal. Ct. App. Case No. A147007 (docket sheet available with text of orders at http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case). The California Court of Appeal requested input from the respondent, and the respondent agreed that resentencing was appropriate. The appellate court therefore ordered the matter remanded to the trial court for resentencing in light of Vargas. Id. In the trial court, Mr. Coleman was resentenced to a determinate term of 22 years, 4 months. See Docket No. 15 at 24 in Coleman v. Brown, No. 12-cv-6291 EMC (May 20, 2016 amended abstract). This was a substantial reduction from the 59-years-to-life sentence he had initially received upon conviction. It thus appears that he was sentenced as a second-strike defendant rather than as a third-strike defendant under California's Three Strikes law.
In Vargas, the defendant received a third-strike sentence because she had two prior convictions from 1999, i.e., a conviction for carjacking and another conviction for robbery even though the "carjacking and robbery convictions were based on the same act of taking the victim's car by force." Id. at 639-40. Vargas held that, under those particular circumstances -- where the two prior convictions were based on a single act -- "the trial court was required to dismiss one of defendant's two prior strike convictions." Id. at 645. As a result, the Vargas defendant was entitled to receive second-strike sentences (rather than third strike sentences) for her current offenses.
III. DISCUSSION
A federal court must engage in a preliminary screening of any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. at § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Generally, a plaintiff may not obtain damages in a § 1983 action for alleged constitutional violations in connection with his criminal trial as long as the conviction remains in place. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that a plaintiff cannot bring a civil rights action for damages for a wrongful conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, unless that conviction or sentence already has been determined to be wrongful. See id. at 486-87. A conviction or sentence may be determined to be wrongful by, for example, being reversed on appeal or being set aside when a state or federal court issues a writ of habeas corpus. See id. The Heck rule also prevents a person from bringing an action that -- even if it does not directly challenge the conviction or other decision -- would imply that the conviction or other decision was invalid. The practical importance of this rule is that a plaintiff cannot attack his conviction in a civil rights action for damages; the decision must have been successfully attacked before the civil rights action for damages is filed. The Heck rule was first announced with respect to an action for damages, but the Supreme Court has since applied the rule to an action that sought declaratory relief as well as damages. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). If success in the § 1983 action would "necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration,' the § 1983 action is barred no matter the relief sought (i.e., damages or equitable relief) as long as the conviction has not been set aside. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005).
Mr. Coleman alleges that Defendants violated his rights by causing his conviction in an allegedly unlawful trial - unlawful because Defendants' oaths of office were defective. Although he alleges at one point that his complaint "is not challenging the criminal conviction or sentence,' he alleges in the next breath that he is "challenging the established state procedure itself which destroyed his rights to a fair trial." Docket No. 1 at 19. In addition to damages and declaratory relief, he requests that the Court issue an order vacating his sentence and conviction, and order a new trial for him. Id. at 22. Mr. Coleman's claims are squarely within the Heck rule because success on them would call into question the validity of his conviction and sentence from the Contra Costa County Superior Court.
The resentencing that occurred in 2016 does not remove the Heck bar because Mr. Coleman's conviction was not set aside and there was no retrial. He was resentenced due to a new interpretation of the Three Strikes law in Vargas, 59 Cal. 4th 635. Neither the new interpretation of the sentencing provision, nor the resentencing, affect the conviction that remains in place.
The Court found only one case from the Ninth Circuit where a prisoner was allowed to pursue a § 1983 claim regarding his criminal trial while a conviction was in place, but that case is distinguishable from Mr. Coleman's situation and actually provides further support for the conclusion that Heck bars Mr. Coleman's complaint. In Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755 (2014), the plaintiff had been "convicted at his first trial in which the prosecution relied on evidence obtained in violation of his Miranda rights, and after the conviction was reversed he was again convicted, this time without the use of the illegally obtained evidence. The plaintiff then sued for the violation of his Miranda rights at the first trial." Id. at 758. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that Heck barred the claim. Because only the second conviction was in place and it was "undisputed that the second conviction was insulated from the inculpatory statements" that were the subject of the § 1983 claim, the claim was not barred by Heck. Jackson, 749 F.3d at 760. The Ninth Circuit determined that a "judgment in Jackson's favor would --far from 'necessarily imply[ing]' the invalidity of his second conviction--not have any bearing on it." Id. Unlike the situation in Jackson, Mr. Coleman's conviction has not been set aside. Mr. Coleman has not received a new trial free of the alleged errors that gives rise to his § 1983 claims; the § 1983 claims would call into question a conviction for which he is currently serving a sentence. Also, unlike the situation in Jackson, Mr. Coleman seeks to have his conviction invalidated in addition to his requests for damages and declaratory relief. See id. at 758 (describing the suit as one for damages and concluding that damages claim could go forward, although plaintiff "will in all likelihood recover only minimal damages" because he was convicted at the second trial at which the un-Mirandized statement was not used). Whereas the Jackson plaintiff was not attempting to overturn the conviction that was in place, Mr. Coleman is attempting to do just that. That Mr. Coleman is seeking to have his conviction invalidated further emphasizes that his claims are directed at the conviction that remains in place, and that is a classic Heck scenario.
The resentencing in 2016 does not remove the Heck bar to Mr. Coleman's § 1983 action. This action cannot proceed because success on his complaint would necessarily imply the invalidity of the outstanding criminal conviction. A determination that his conviction and trial were fundamentally unfair because the judges who presided over his criminal trial had no judicial authority would necessarily imply that his conviction is invalid. The Heck bar remains and dismissal is required. The Court will not grant leave to amend because it would be futile: there do not appear to be any facts that would allow Mr. Coleman to avoid the Heck bar.
The exclusive method for a state prisoner to challenge his state court conviction or sentence in federal court is by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Mr. Coleman already has done so. His habeas petition challenging his conviction was denied in 2012, and both the district court and the Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. See Coleman v. McGrath, No. C 04-4069 PJH. A prisoner who wishes to file a second or successive habeas petition challenging the same conviction or sentence must first obtain from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth Circuit") an order authorizing this Court to consider a second or successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Seeking such an order from the Ninth Circuit would in all likelihood be an exercise in futility for Mr. Coleman because the claim has already been rejected. Mr. Coleman presented his challenge to the judges' oaths in his first federal habeas petition and the district court dismissed the claim because it presented only a question of state law. See Docket # 24, p. 2 in Coleman v. McGrath, C 04-4069 PJH. The court must dismiss a claim presented in a second or successive petition that was presented in an earlier petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). --------
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this action is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Having rejected the federal claims for relief that gave the Court federal question jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: April 4, 2017
/s/_________
EDWARD M. CHEN
United States District Judge