Opinion
21-P-978
12-09-2022
Jamal COLEMAN v. AYER DIVISION OF the DISTRICT COURT DEPARTMENT OF the TRIAL COURT.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After his car slid off the highway in the early morning hours of April 6, 2019, the plaintiff, Jamal Coleman, was arrested for operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), third offense, and negligent operation of a motor vehicle. At booking, he was offered and refused a chemical breath test, thus triggering a five-year statutory loss of his driver's license. See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f ) (1). A District Court jury acquitted Coleman of both criminal charges and, pursuant to G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f ) (1), Coleman moved for restoration of his driver's license. After a hearing, the trial judge denied Coleman's motion, concluding that the Commonwealth had proved facts that "established by a preponderance of the evidence that restoration of [Coleman's] driver's license would likely endanger the public safety." In doing so, the judge made oral findings on the record; she did not reduce them to writing.
He was also charged with a civil marked lanes violation.
To the extent that Coleman did not move for restoration of his license "immediately, upon entry of a not guilty finding," G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f )(1), the Commonwealth did not oppose his motion on that ground and explicitly declined to argue the issue in its brief. Accordingly, we do not consider it.
Those findings included that Coleman had had two prior OUI convictions, engaged in "erratic" driving leading up to his third OUI arrest, and had an "ongoing issue with alcohol," as well as that the Commonwealth had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Coleman had, in fact, operated under the influence on April 6, 2019.
Coleman sought certiorari review of the trial judge's decision not to restore Coleman's license in the Superior Court. See G. L. c. 249, § 4. After a hearing on the parties’ cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, a Superior Court judge (motion judge) ruled in favor of the defendant, and against Coleman, on each motion. This appeal followed. We affirm.
Discussion. "Generally, the standard of review for a certiorari action is calibrated to the nature of the action for which review is sought." Revere v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass. 591, 604 (2017). Because the trial judge's ruling on Coleman's motion for restoration of his driver's license was made as part of "an adjudicatory proceeding where evidence is presented and due process protections are afforded," we apply a "substantial evidence" standard. Id., quoting Figgs v. Boston Hous. Auth., 469 Mass. 354, 361-362 (2014). We, like the motion judge, consider whether "the [trial judge's] decision was ‘legally tenable and supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.’ " Gloucester v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 408 Mass. 292, 297 (1990), quoting Commissioner of Health & Hosps. of Boston v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 410, 411 (1987). "[We] may rectify only those errors of law which have resulted in manifest injustice to the plaintiff or which have adversely affected the real interests of the general public." Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Auditor of the Commonwealth, 430 Mass. 783, 790 (2000), quoting Carney v. Springfield, 403 Mass. 604, 605 (1988). The trial judge's decision readily satisfied this standard.
" ‘Substantial evidence’ means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6).
The question before the trial judge was whether the Commonwealth had "establish[ed], by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that restoration of [Coleman's] license would likely endanger the public safety," thereby rebutting the statutory presumption in favor of restoration of Coleman's license. G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f ) (1). In making that determination, the judge was entitled to rely on the evidence presented at the trial over which she presided. See Commonwealth v. Richards, 480 Mass. 413, 418-419 (2018) (plain language of G. L. c. 90, § 24 [1] [f ] [1], reflects legislative intent for judge who presided over OUI proceedings to make determination based on facts at time of acquittal and in context of evidence then presented). The Commonwealth's case at trial, although controverted on certain points by Coleman and his witness, included substantial evidence supporting the judge's conclusion that Coleman was intoxicated -- notably, the odor of an alcoholic beverage about Coleman's person, his slurred speech, his inability to complete field sobriety exercises to the trooper's satisfaction, his unsteadiness on his feet, his admission to having consumed alcohol earlier in the night, and the manner in which the accident reportedly occurred. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 387-388 (2017) (odor of alcohol, slurred speech, unsatisfactory performance on field sobriety tests, admission to alcohol consumption, all evidence of intoxication). To the extent the judge relied on this evidence, Coleman has failed to demonstrate clear error in the judge's findings. See Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. 635, 642 (2003). The Commonwealth's submissions also included evidence of Coleman's prior convictions for OUI in 2008 and 2012 which, particularly when coupled with the 2019 OUI, supported the judge's finding that Coleman experienced an ongoing problem with drinking and driving. Lastly, there was evidence at trial that Coleman was driving his car in a manner that did not permit him to stop safely when confronted, as he testified, with an animal in the roadway. See Gallagher, supra at 388 (manner of operation indicative of intoxication). It was for the trial judge to assess the weight and credibility of that evidence. See, e.g., Buster, supra. Given the trial judge's determinations on that score, as evidenced by her oral findings, we are satisfied that her conclusion that, notwithstanding his acquittals, Coleman would likely pose a danger to public safety if his license were restored, was properly supported and without error.
In doing so, the trial judge did not, as Coleman contends, convert the motion hearing into a bench trial. The hearing was not a trial of any kind; it was a nonpunitive regulatory matter. See Commonwealth v. Bauer, 455 Mass. 497, 499 (2009) ; Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415, 421 n.11 (1995).
Coleman's continuation without a finding in 2008 was a "conviction" for the purposes of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f )(1).
Coleman correctly points out that although G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (f ) (1), provides that the judge "shall issue written findings of fact with [the judge's] decision" on a motion for license restoration, the trial judge did not do so. The transcript of the hearing, however, reflects that the judge here made clear oral findings confirming her application of the proper standard and listing the facts on which she relied in deciding the motion. In these circumstances, we conclude that the trial judge's failure to repeat her findings in written form was not error, or even if error, was harmless. See Commonwealth v. King, 71 Mass. App Ct. 737, 739 n.5 (2008), citing Fay v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 498, 504-505 (1980) (failure to make written findings as required by rule 6 [b] of District Court Rules for Probation Violation Proceedings not reversible error because judge's oral recitation of reasons for revocation "satisfie[d] the requirement of a written statement").
Conclusion. The order entered on September 2, 2021, is affirmed.
So ordered.