Colebrook Water Co. v. Comm'r, Dep't Pub. Works

8 Citing cases

  1. ERG, Inc. v. Barnes

    137 N.H. 186 (N.H. 1993)   Cited 48 times
    Construing dismissal for failure to state a cause of action as "on the merits," because such a dismissal "does not rest upon a purely procedural ground, but rather upon the conclusion of the trial judge that the cause alleged is without substantive merit"

    This court has held that the dismissal of a writ for failure to state a cause of action is a dismissal on the merits. Colebrook Water Co. v. Commissioner of Dep't of Pub. Works, 114 N.H. 392, 394-95, 324 A.2d 713, 715 (1974). "A dismissal for failure to state a cause of action does not rest upon a purely procedural ground, but rather upon the conclusion of the trial judge that the cause alleged is without substantive merit."

  2. Bosonetto v. Town of Richmond

    Civil No. 12-cv-277-JL (D.N.H. May. 31, 2013)   Cited 1 times

    But many of those doctrines have long occupied an important place in the law--in the case of res judicata, to ensure that "at some point litigation over the particular controversy come to an end." Colebrook Water Co. v. Comm'r of Dep't of Pub. Works & Highways, 114 N.H. 392, 395 (1974). Here, the controversy is between the plaintiffs, Nicolas and Jill Bosonetto, and certain boards and officials of the Town of Richmond, over their refusal to grant a building permit.

  3. Kerouac v. F.D.I.C.

    825 F. Supp. 438 (D.N.H. 1993)

    In the context presented here, a state dismissal for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted, if not modified or appealed, operates as a final judgment on the merits under New Hampshire law. ERG, Inc. v. Barnes, ___ N.H. ___, 624 A.2d 555 (1993) ("dismissal of a writ for failure to state a cause of action is a dismissal on the merits. . . . Once leave to amend has been given, a second action will be precluded where the plaintiff fails to a mend or the amendment fails to cure the deficiency. . . . [plaintiff's] remedy from the trial court's denial of the motion to amend . . . was to appeal, not to file a new action.") (emphasis added); Colebrook Water Co. v. Commissioner of Dept. of Public Works Highways, 114 N.H. 392, 324 A.2d 713 (1974) ("a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action does not rest upon a purely procedural ground, but rather upon the conclusion of the trial judge that the cause alleged is without substantive merit"). Although not directly applicable in this context (because New Hampshire law applies), federal cases addressing this issue and applying federal and state law support the familiar premise that a dismissal for failure to state a cause of action is a dismissal on merits.

  4. Shepherd v. Town of Westmoreland

    130 N.H. 542 (N.H. 1988)   Cited 10 times
    Finding barred plaintiff's constitutional and inverse condemnation claims that arose out of the same factual transaction as did her previous claim for a variance

    We have consistently barred such claims when, as here, the subsequent action is so closely related to the earlier action. Colebrook Water Co. v. Commissioner of Dep't. of Pub. Works, 114 N.H. 392, 394, 324 A.2d 713, 715 (1974). The fact that the plaintiff attaches a new label to her cause of action is insufficient to remove the bar of the earlier adjudication against her. Eastern Marine Const. Corp., 129 N.H. at 275, 525 A.2d at 713; Lougee v. Beres, 113 N.H. 712, 714, 313 A.2d 422, 423 (1973).

  5. McAuliffe v. Colonial Imports, Inc.

    116 N.H. 398 (N.H. 1976)   Cited 4 times

    In order for res judicata to justify dismissal of an action on the merits there must have been a judgment on the merits in the previous action. Colebrook Water Co. v. Commissioner of Dep't of Pub. Works, 114 N.H. 392, 324 A.2d 713 (1974); Lougee v. Beres, 113 N.H. 712, 313 A.2d 422 (1973). The federal court dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction was not a judgment on the merits; on the contrary, it was a ruling that the court was powerless to determine the merits of the case.

  6. Innie v. W R, Inc.

    116 N.H. 315 (N.H. 1976)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that gravel roadways are subject to mechanics' liens

    The default judgment entered against Nutfield and W R on November 26, 1974, was a final judgment on the merits, conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies, and constituted an absolute bar to a subsequent litigation involving the same cause of action. Colebrook Water Co. v. Commissioner of Dep't of Pub. Works, 114 N.H. 392, 324 A.2d 713 (1974); Ainsworth v. Claremont, 108 N.H. 55, 226 A.2d 867 (1967); Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1410, 1423 (1961). As successor in interest, defendant Levitt is in privity with W R and Nutfield, and took title subject to the judgment.

  7. University of N.H. v. April

    115 N.H. 576 (N.H. 1975)   Cited 11 times

    The underlying rationale for the general rule that a prior judgment for a defendant bars a subsequent action on the same claim is that "fairness to the defendant, and sound judicial administration, require that at some point litigation over the particular controversy come to an end." Colebrook Water Co. v. Commissioner of Dep't of Pub. Works, 114 N.H. 392, 395, 324 A.2d 713, 716 (1974); Restatement (Second) of Judgments 48, Comment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).

  8. Indian Head Nat'l Bank v. Simonsen

    338 A.2d 546 (N.H. 1975)   Cited 5 times

    In this State, res judicata bars relitigation of issues between parties in interest, absent some extenuating circumstance. Lougee v. Beres, 113 N.H. 712, 313 A.2d 422 (1973); Colebrook Water Co. v. Commissioner of Dep't of Pub. Works, 114 N.H. 392, 324 A.2d 713 (1974). Here, as in the divorce action, the real parties in interest are Edwin C. Simonsen and Joan D. Simonsen. The bank and Agnes Simonsen are nominal participants only.