Opinion
Civ. No. 98-442 (DRD)
December 28, 1998
Richard A. Cole, M.D., Newburyport, MA, Pro se Plaintiff.
Charles A. Reid, III, Esq., H. Lockwood Miller, III, Esq., Shanley Fisher, P.C., Morristown, N.J., for Defendants.
OPINION
In this ERISA action a doctor is suing a health insurer for allegedly covered charges which former patients received. The doctor, plaintiff Richard A. Cole, M.D. ("Cole"), moves for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). For the reasons set forth below, Cole's motion will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Cole was a licensed physician who practiced in Erie, Pennsylvania until the early 1990s. See Amended Complaint ¶ 1. In or about November 1991, a grand jury for the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania indicted Cole on 561 counts of, inter alia, improper distribution of methamphetamine in the form of Dexedrine and mail fraud in connection with the submission of bills to patients and/or claims to insurance carriers. See Cole Dep. 143:10-145:6. On November 9, 1992, Cole signed a plea agreement on behalf of himself and his professional corporation admitting to the commission of the acts outlined in the indictment. Id. 149:6-150:13. On December 31, 1992, the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine issued a "Notice of Automatic Suspension" and ordered Cole to cease and desist from the practice of medicine within the state of Pennsylvania. Id. 163:5-164:14.
Prior to his suspension from the practice of medicine, Cole allegedly provided various treatments to several patients who, he contends, were covered under one or more employee benefit plans issued by Prudential. See Amended Complaint. Cole contends that he did not receive payment from Prudential as to nine of these patients. The allegedly unpaid services that Cole rendered to these patients were the subject matter of this action.
Prior to instituting the present action, Cole filed collection suits against several of these patients in Pennsylvania state court seeking to recover the cost of his services. Id. 59:19-60:1, 85:9-15, 100:4-10. The state courts dismissed these suits for various reasons including real-party-in-interest grounds and statute of limitations grounds. See, e.g., Cole v. Lawrence, 701 A.2d 987 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1997). Additionally, the Pennsylvania Attorney General filed suit against Cole seeking civil penalties for Cole's untimely suits against his former patients and for an order permanently enjoining Cole from filing any more collection suits in state court. See Pennsylvania v. Cole, 709 A.2d 994 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 1998).
Thereafter, on November 10, 1997, Cole filed a complaint in the New Jersey Superior Court (the "Complaint"). Prudential filed a notice of removal with this court, alleging federal question jurisdiction under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 et seq. ("ERISA"). See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). Cole's Complaint alleged breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud claims against Prudential. Cole sought to have Prudential satisfy the alleged outstanding claims of three patients. See Complaint ¶ 5. On February 13, 1998, Cole filed an amended complaint (the "Amended Complaint") in which he asserted similar claims against Prudential. See Miller Aff. ¶ 3. The theories of recovery asserted by Cole in the Amended Complaint were the same as the Complaint but additional patients were added.
On October 29, 1998, Prudential filed a motion for summary judgment based on the argument that Cole's claims against it were barred by the statute of limitations. That motion was granted and this case was dismissed on November 25, 1998.
II. DISCUSSION
Cole has moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Cole argues that the he is entitled to relief from judgment because the grant of summary judgment was "improper as a matter of law." Specifically, Cole argues that the Court improperly relied upon the Pennsylvania state court decisions which dismissed, as untimely, the cases Cole filed against his patients. By giving the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts full faith and credit and precluding him from arguing that the statute of limitations had not run on his claims against Prudential, Cole insists that this Court erred and "robbed [him] of his day in court." Prudential opposes the motion and contends that Cole has presented no new evidence or alleged any factual mistake by the Court. Instead, Prudential argues, Cole merely repeats the same unsuccessful arguments he made in opposition to it's motion for summary judgment.
A. Standard of Review for Rule 60(b) Motion
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part that
[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). A motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) is "addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court guided by accepted legal principles applied in light of all the relevant circumstances." Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 648 (3d Cir. 1981);Dietsch v. United States, 2 F. Supp.2d 627, 630-31 (D.N.J. 1998); Smith v. Holtz, 879 F. Supp. 435, 438 (M.D.Pa. 1995),aff'd, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 611, 136 L.Ed.2d 536 (1996). Rule 60(b), however, "does not confer upon the district courts a `standardless residual of discretionary power to set aside judgments.'" Moolenaar v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 822 F.2d 1342, 1346 (3d Cir. 1987). Rather, relief under Rule 60(b) is available only under such circumstances that the "`overriding interest in the finality and repose of judgments may properly be overcome.'" Harris v. Martin, 834 F.2d 361, 364 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Martinez-McBean v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 913 (3d Cir. 1977)); see also Moolenaar, 822 F.2d at 1346; Wilson v. Fenton, 684 F.2d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 1982); Mayberry v. Maroney, 529 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring); Smith, 879 F. Supp. at 438. "The remedy provided by Rule 60(b) is `extraordinary, and [only] special circumstances may justify granting relief under it.'" Moolenaar, 822 F.2d at 1346 (citations omitted).
As explained in Kock v. Government of the Virgin Islands, 811 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1987), Rule 60(b) must be applied "[s]ubject to the propositions that the finality of judgments is a sound principle that should not lightly be cast aside, [and] that clause (6) is not a substitute for appeal." Id. at 246. "It is intended to be a means for accomplishing justice in extraordinary situations, and so confined, does not violate the principle of the finality of judgments." Id. (citing Page v. Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 1986); Martinez-McBean, 562 F.2d at 911;Mayberry v. Maroney, 558 F.2d 1159, 1163 (3d Cir. 1977)).
B. Application to Cole's Motion
In his motion for relief from the order granting summary judgment, Cole argues that this Court neglected to recognize four facts which, had they been acknowledged, would have changed the outcome of that decision. First, Cole argues that this Court failed to recognize that this lawsuit was an ERISA action and not a state-law contract claim. Second, Cole contends that this Court erred by not recognizing that, although ERISA uses state law statutes of limitations, the remedial purpose of ERISA is not to protect health insurers from paying benefits. Third, Cole argues that the Court erred when it applied Pennsylvania's statute of limitations to his claims against Prudential. Finally, Cole contends that this Court erred when it applied the doctrine of issue preclusion. Cole contends that issue preclusion is a matter of state law and that because this is an ERISA action, ERISA preempts the application of this doctrine.
These arguments, however, do not present the special circumstances needed to justify granting the extraordinary remedy provided by Rule 60(b). In fact, all of these arguments, in one manner or another, were presented in Cole's opposition to Prudential's motion for summary judgment. Cole presents no new evidence and alleges no factual mistake by this Court. Cole only alleges that the Court made "legal errors" when it precluded him from arguing that the action against Prudential was timely. Bare allegations of legal errors, however, do not constitute a proper basis for relief under Rule 60(b). See Smart Unique Serv. Corp. v. Mortgage Correspondence, 158 F.R.D. 114, 116 (N.D.Ill. 1994); see also Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1988). "The proper forum for challenging [a] court's legal rulings is an appeal, not a motion for relief from judgment." See Parke-Chapley Constr. Co. v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907, 915 (7th Cir., 1989); see also Swam v. United States, 327 F.2d 431, 433 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 852, 85 S.Ct. 98, 13 L.Ed.2d 55 (1964) ("if plaintiff believed the district court was mistaken as a matter of law in dismissing the complaint, he should have appealed"). Because Cole has not made any additional factual allegations that would support his position, and his only arguments in support of the motion go to this Court's alleged legal errors, relief under Rule 60(b) is not warranted. Accordingly, Cole's motion will be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Cole's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) will be denied. An appropriate order will issue.
ORDER
Richard A. Cole, M.D. ("Plaintiff"), having moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), and the Court having considered the papers submitted; and for other good cause shown; and in accordance with this Court's opinion of even date;
IT IS this day of December, 1998, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment be and hereby is DENIED.