Cohan also claims on appeal that the trial court erred by not awarding him damages pursuant to the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Because we conclude that the court’s finding that Cohan was entitled, pursuant to our Supreme Court’s decision in Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 230, 21 A.2d 396 (1941), to recover $9000 for the reasonable value of the services he performed on the plaintiff’s behalf is not clearly erroneous, we need not reach Cohan's claim with respect to unjust enrichment. The following facts, as found by the court, and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the appeal and cross appeal.
But a strong and growing minority hold that under a contingent fee contract an attorney may recover only the reasonable value of services rendered by him prior to discharge. ( Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223 [ 21 A.2d 396, 136 A.L.R. 226]; Hubbard v. Goffinett, 253 Ky. 779 [ 70 S.W.2d 671]; Pye v. Diebold, 204 Minn. 319 [283 P. 487]; Krippner v. Matz, 205 Minn. 497 [ 287 N.W. 19]; Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170 [ 114 N.E. 46]; Wright v. Johanson, 135 Wn. 696 [ 233 P. 16, 236 P. 807]; Cavers v. Old Nat. Bank Union Trust Co., 166 Wn. 449 [ 7 P.2d 23], and other cases cited 136 A.L.R. 254.) Sound reasons of policy and justice support the minority rule and it should be followed by this court.
5 Am.Jur. 319." Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 227 (1941). This position has been subsequently reaffirmed by our Supreme Court.
In a situation in which the attorney is discharged before he is able to perform under the terms of the contract, the attorney may still recover a reasonable fee, albeit not the contracted fee, for the work performed for the client by way of quantum meruit. See Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 230, 21 A.2d 396 (1941). The policy behind that principle is based on the unique relationship between attorney and client.
"It is well settled that a client has the right to discharge [her] attorney and to substitute another at any time without cause and in spite of any contract." Cole v. Meyers, 128 Conn. 223, 229 (1941). "In a situation in which the attorney is discharged before he is able to perform under the terms of the contract, the attorney may still recover a reasonable fee, albeit not the contracted fee, for the work performed for the client by way of quantum meruit."
When an attorney employed under a contingent fee contract is discharged without cause, he should be entitled to recover the reasonable value of the services performed by him prior to his discharge. (See concurring opinion in Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal.2d 150, 156 [ 124 P.2d 21]; Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223 [ 21 A.2d 396, 136 A.L.R. 226]; Hubbard v. Goffinett, 253 Ky. 779 [ 70 S.W.2d 671]; Pye v. Diebold, 204 Minn. 319 [ 283 N.W. 487]; Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170 [14 N.E. 46, L.R.A. 1917F 402]; Cavers v. Old Nat. Bank Union Trust Co., 166 Wn. 449 [ 7 P.2d 23]; see also cases in 136 A.L.R. 254.) He should not be permitted to recover the fee fixed in the contract, however, for the reasons stated in the concurring opinion in Salopek v. Schoemann,supra.
Makins v. District of Columbia, 861 A.2d 590, 593 (D.C. 2004). Our Supreme Court expressly has noted that "[a]n attorney who is authorized to represent a client in litigation does not automatically have either implied or apparent authority to settle or otherwise to compromise the client's cause of action." Acheson v. White, 195 Conn. 211, 213 n. 4, 487 A.2d 197 (1985); Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 227, 21 A.2d 396 (1941). The court found that Sansone had been retained by the plaintiff in 1986 and had been involved in the dispute over the shed and walkway from 2001.
In a situation in which the attorney is discharged before he is able to perform under the terms of the contract, the attorney may still recover a reasonable fee, albeit not the contracted fee, for the work performed for the client by way of quantum meruit. See Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 230, 21 A.2d 396 (1941). The policy behind that principle is based on the unique relationship between attorney and client.
(Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shapero v. Mercede, supra, 262 Conn. 7; see Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 230, 21 A.2d 396 (1941). In the sixth count, labeled "Quantum Meruit," the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that (1) "the [d]efendant retained the [p]laintiff," (2) "[t]he legal fee agreement between the [p]laintiff and the [d]efendant was reduced to writing and set forth the contingent nature of the legal fee arrangement," (3) "[t]he [d]efendant terminated the legal fee agreement so as to avoid paying a contingent legal fee to the [p]laintiff," and (4) "the [p]laintiff is entitled to the reasonable value of the legal services he performed which has benefited of the [d]efendant to the [p]laintiff's financial detriment."
5 Am. Jur. 319." Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 227, 21 A.2d 396 (1941). "Our Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Acheson v. White, 195 Conn. 211, 213 n. 4, 487 A.2d 197 (1985), where the court noted: `[a]n attorney who is authorized to represent a client in litigation does not automatically have either implied or apparent authority to settle or otherwise to compromise the client's cause of action.