The medical testimonies merely indicate that the accident caused the injuries and nothing more. Relatedly, plaintiff's attempt to distinguish Cole v Austin, 321 Mich 548; 33 NW2d 78 (1948), on which defendant relies, suffers from this same blurring of cause in fact and proximate cause. In Cole, the Supreme Court held that questions of fact existed on the issue of proximate cause where the defendant driver was traveling at 25 miles per hour when he struck two kids on a bike who were not looking where they were going.

We are required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee in considering the denial of the motions for directed verdict. Anderson v. Kearly, 312 Mich. 566, 20 N.W.2d 728; Lane v. B. J. Theatres, Inc., 314 Mich. 666, 23 N.W.2d 120; Cole v. Austin, 321 Mich. 548, 557, 33 N.W.2d 78. With this rule in mind, we think substantial evidence was presented supporting the verdict. Ample evidence was introduced to the effect that the time between the first operation of the signal and the arrival of the train at the crossing was extremely short, and an issue of fact was thus presented as to whether there was reasonable warning.

"A. Yes, sir." Keeping in mind that the west half of Dix highway was 20 feet wide and also that on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the testimony must be construed most favorably to plaintiff ( Burgdorf v. Holme-Shaw, 356 Mich. 45; Cole v. Austin, 321 Mich. 548; Alley v. Klotz, 320 Mich. 521), it appears with plaintiff standing not more than 3 feet from the curb line, in plain view of defendant, observing the traffic from both directions, reasonable men might differ as to whether he was guilty of negligence, particularly when defendant had 17 feet to the center of the highway in which he could have turned to avoid hitting plaintiff. It would appear that plaintiff in standing within 3 feet of a curb line on a highway with 17 feet of road to the center line in front of him was not negligent as a matter of law. Surely a question of fact existed for the jury, as was admitted by the trial court at the time of the court's denial of motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff's proofs and at the conclusion of the trial of the case.

In considering a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the proofs must be construed as strongly as possible in favor of the opposite party. Cole v. Austin, 321 Mich. 548. A jury verdict may not be properly set aside unless found to be against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Tumey v. City of Detroit, 316 Mich. 400. The jury, by its verdict, determined that there had in fact been an agreement to pay plaintiff a $15,000 bonus and that the sum due was a liquidated amount.

"2. A jury may draw reasonable inferences from the established facts and circumstances, in the absence of direct proofs." See, also, Lane v. B J Theatres, Inc., 314 Mich. 666; Michigan Fire Marine Insurance Co. v. Pretty Lake Vacation Camp, Inc., 316 Mich. 197; Cole v. Austin, 321 Mich. 548; Greenberg v. Greenberg, 337 Mich. 390; Hopkins v. Lake, 348 Mich. 382; Stewart v. Eldred, 349 Mich. 28; Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co. v. Matthew Stores, Inc., 349 Mich. 441; Shandor v. Lischer, 349 Mich. 556. In light of these decisions, it is necessary to relate at some length facts the proofs developed during the course of the trial in order to properly understand a disposition of the questions presented in this case.

In determining the issues presented, the testimony must be construed as strongly as reasonably possible in plaintiff's favor. Hulett v. Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Co., 299 Mich. 59, 63; Anderson v. Kearly, 312 Mich. 566; Cole v. Austin, 321 Mich. 548. Under plaintiff's proofs, Mr. Phippard was an invitee, and the duties resting on defendant must be determined accordingly. In operating the restaurant he was not an insurer of the safety of his customers, but the burden rested on him to use proper care for their safety.

When a motion is made to direct a verdict, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the opposite party. See Cole v. Austin, 321 Mich. 548, and Ballinger v. Smith, 328 Mich. 23. The interest of the witnesses in the subject matter in dispute, their credibility and the weight to be given their evidence are questions for the jury; and as between direct and circumstantial evidence their relative convincing power is for a jury. See Cuttle v. Concordia, Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 295 Mich. 514.

Upon a motion for directed verdict at the conclusion of the trial of a negligence case, the evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Romero v. King (1962), 368 Mich. 45, Cole v. Austin (1948), 321 Mich. 548. Our Supreme Court has defined negligence on many occasions and has indicated on what conditions a verdict can be directed.