Colburn's Appeal

9 Citing cases

  1. Davis v. Claxton

    82 Mont. 574 (Mont. 1928)   Cited 12 times

    The assignments worked a complete change of ownership. ( Appeal of Colburn, 74 Conn. 463, 92 Am. St. Rep. 231, 51 A. 139.) The delivery of the assignments was a delivery of the money, — debt owing by insurance companies to Mattingly.

  2. Supreme Colony v. Towne

    87 Conn. 644 (Conn. 1914)   Cited 25 times

    As a consequence the beneficiary on designation acquires, and during the life of the insured secures, merely an expectancy, revocable by the insured, and not ripening into a property right until the death of the insured member. Masonic Mut. Ben. Asso. v. Tolles, 70 Conn. 537, 544, 40 A. 448; Colburn's Appeal, 74 Conn. 463, 468, 51 A. 139; Supreme Lodge, N.E. O. P. v. Hine, 82 Conn. 315, 320, 73 A. 791; Marsh v. American Legion of Honor, 149 Mass. 512, 515, 21 N.E. 1070; Attorney General v. American Legion of Honor, 206 Mass. 158, 165, 92 N.E. 136; Warner v. Modern Woodmen of America, 67 Neb. 233, 237, 93 N.W. 397; Pilcher v. Puckett, 77 Kan. 284, 288, 94 P. 132; Golden Star Fraternity v. Martin, 59 N.J.L. 207, 213, 216, 35 A. 908. The death of the beneficiary wife prior to the decease of the insured voided her contingent expectancy, so that she never obtained a vested interest in the benefit, and her administratrix cannot secure what she never possessed.

  3. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Tremblay

    223 U.S. 185 (1912)   Cited 35 times
    Refusing to review Maine decision denying recognition to Canadian judgment because case did not involve federal question

    Where a life insurance policy is issued by a company of one State to one domiciled in another State, and the insured assigns the policy in the latter State, the law of the place where the assignment was executed shall govern. Coburn's Appeal, 74 Conn. 463; Lee v. Abdy, 17 Q.B.D. 309; Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Woods, 11 Ind. App. 335; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 138 Mass. 24; Miller v. Campbell, 140 N.Y. 457; Spencer v. Myers, 150 N.Y. 269; Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank, 68 Mich. 116; 19 Am. Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 90. This judgment is a valid and binding judgment in the Province of Quebec and by the decisions of this court is valid and binding upon our courts.

  4. Houtz v. General Bonding Insurance Co.

    235 F.2d 591 (10th Cir. 1956)   Cited 7 times

    " Appeal of Colburn, 74 Conn. 463, 51 A. 139; Lincoln v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 124 Miss. 153, 87 So. 6; Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wright, 153 Wis. 252, 140 N.W. 1078; Finegan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 300 Mass. 147, 14 N.E.2d 172, 116 A.L.R. 535; Thompson's Executrix v. Thompson, 190 Ky. 3, 226 S.W. 350; Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City Nat. Bank, D.C., 95 F. Supp. 276; McPhail v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., D.C., 108 F. Supp. 902; Ratsch v. Rengel, 180 Md. 196, 23 A.2d 680. The instant case presents a plausible situation where there might be a transfer without physical delivery of the assignor's policy.

  5. Heller v. Buchbinder

    399 A.2d 850 (D.C. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, Vol. 1 at 331 (1965), remarks that the reference in Subsection (5) to the location of the accounts invites courts to make use of pre-Code common law rules relating to the situs of choses in action. But pre-Code case authority is ambiguous. It is possible to find authority for the proposition that such accounts are "located": (a) where the assignor resides: Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley, 150 F. 510 (6th Cir. 1907); (b) where the assignee resides: Appeal of Colburn, 74 Conn. 463, 51 A. 139 (1902); (c) where the debtor resides: Gordon v. Vallee, 119 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1941), and see Geo. H. Jett Drilling Co. v. Tibbets, 230 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.La. 1964); (d) where the assignment was made; and (e) where payment is to be made. Accordingly, rather than decide where the DBI accounts were located, we base our opinion solely on the "appropriate relation" test. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, Vol. 1 at 331 (1965), discussing the meaning of "appropriate relation" under subsection (5) states that:

  6. Sigal v. Hartford National Bank Trust Co.

    119 Conn. 570 (Conn. 1935)   Cited 14 times

    A life insurance policy is a contract to pay a sum of money upon the death of the insured, in consideration of a payment or payments duly made during his life. Allen v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 72 Conn. 693, 695, 45 A. 955; Reed v. Provident Savings Life Assur. Soc., 190 N.Y. 111, 118, 82 N.E. 734; Keckley v. Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 225, 99 N.E. 299. Such a policy may contain provisions for its surrender for cash, and the insured may often borrow money upon it; so under some circumstances he may create in another a right to receive the proceeds of the policy, and this he may do for a consideration accruing to him as well as by way of gift. Allen v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 72 Conn. 693, 45 A. 955; Colburn's Appeal, 74 Conn. 463, 51 A. 139. In these, and perhaps other ways, an insured may realize money for himself upon the policy.

  7. Montgomery v. Ins. Ass'n

    47 Wyo. 86 (Wyo. 1934)   Cited 2 times

    12 R.C.L. 943. The surrender of the policy is not essential when the donor has made a valid written assignment. Kulp v. March, 37 A. 913; 6 Couch's Sys. of Insurance Law, 5228; Penn Mutual Co. v. Forbes, 200 Ill. App. 441; 2 Cooley's Briefs on Insurance, 1823; Appeal of Colborn (Conn.) 51 A. 139; Richardson v. White (Mass.) 44 N.E. 1072; Howe v. Hagan, 97 N YS. 86. The judgment should be affirmed. BLUME, Justice.

  8. State v. Rizzo

    2005 Ct. Sup. 10882 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005)

    As the Connecticut Supreme Court once noted, "When an instrument is executed in duplicate, each is an original . . ." Colburn's Appeal, 74 Conn. 463, 467, 51 A. 139 (1902). Consequently, the yellow version of the document is as much the original as the white version that has been lost.

  9. Century Mortgage Company v. George

    1993 Ct. Sup. 1054 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993)

    In addition to the forged note, there is an authentic note signed by Mary at the closing. But FHLMC possesses only the forged note. What are the legal consequences of this situation? Under pre-UCC law, it was reasonably clear that FHLMC could bring an action on the debt anyway, for neither a written assignment nor physical delivery of an obligation were essential — see Colburn's Appeal from Probate, 74 Conn. 463, 467, 51 A. 139 (1902) — and it is clear that Century intended to assign the underlying debt to FHLMC in this case. But this, as just stated, is an action on the note rather than an action on the debt.