Opinion
No. 2:01 cv 296
May 9, 2002
ORDER
Two defendants, John Buncich and the Lake County Sheriff's Department are presently before the court with a jointly-filed motion to dismiss. The factual allegations germane to this dispute are relatively straightforward.
Colbert is blind, and requires a cane to walk. (See Compl. at ¶ 6.) While incarcerated at the Lake County Jail from March through early September 1999, he was denied use of his cane and as a result "he frequently fell and ran into things." (Id.) During his term of confinement, he was also deprived of access to a tape recorder, which is apparently "his primary source of communication." (Id. at ¶ 7.) On April 16, 2001, Colbert commenced this action. He advances five claims, three of which (Title II of the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983) raise a federal question. The other two claims, brought pursuant to article I, section 12 of the Indiana Constitution, and Indiana tort law, fall within the purview of the court's pendant jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
The pleading requirements in the federal system are lax. "[A]ll that's required to state a claim in a complaint filed in federal court is a short statement, in plain (that is, ordinary, nonlegalistic) English, of the legal claim." Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999); accord South Austin Coalition Cmty. Council v. SBC Communications, Inc., 274 F.3d 1168, 1171 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[C]ourts must follow the norm that a complaint is sufficient if any state of the world consistent with the complaint could support relief."). Nevertheless, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit trial courts "to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal is appropriate when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of its claim which would entitle it to relief." Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM General Corporation, No. 01-2164, slip op. at 14 (7th Cir. Mar. 15, 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting in part); accord Tobin for Governor v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 268 F.3d 517, 521 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 122 S.Ct. 1300 (Mar. 18, 2002); Pokuta v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 191 F.3d 834, 839 (7th Cir. 1999). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must "accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff[']s favor." Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Lashbrook v. Oerkfitz, 65 F.3d 1339, 1343 (7th Cir. 1995)). The court need not accept, however, "conclusory statements of law or unsupported conclusions of fact." First Insurance Funding Corp. v. Federal Insurance Co., No. 01-2855, slip op. at 7 (7th Cir. Mar. 28, 2002) (quoting McLeod v. Arrow Marine Transp., Inc., 258 F.3d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 2001)). Lastly, the court may dismiss the whole complaint or any portion thereof, as circumstances warrant. Cf. Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1020 (7th Cir. 1992); Enis v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank Trust Co. of Illinois, 795 F.2d 39, 40 (7th Cir. 1986). With these principles in mind, the court turns to the six bases upon which Buncich and the Sheriff's Department seek dismissal.
First, Buncich argues he is not liable in his individual capacity for Colbert's ADA Title II claim. Specifically, he maintains ADA Title II "does not permit personal capacity suits against individuals who do not otherwise qualify as employers under the [ADA]." (Mot. at ¶ 1.)
In this context, "individual capacity" and "personal capacity" are synonymous.
Title II proscribes discrimination by "any public entity." This includes "(A) any State or local government; [and] (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government." 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1). A plaintiff may proceed against the entity itself, or against a natural person in his/her official capacity, as a proxy for the governmental body. See Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1190 (2000). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held, however, that Title II does not permit a suit against a natural person in his/her individual capacity. See id. ("[A]s a rule there is no personal liability under Title II."). In this case, Colbert has interposed his Title II claim against Buncich in both his official and individual capacities. The law, however, is clear that Buncich is not amenable to suit under Title II of ADA in his individual capacity. Colbert is, therefore, unable to state an ADA Title II claim against Buncich in his individual capacity, and dismissal is appropriate.
Second, Buncich and the Sheriff's Department together argue the court should dismiss Colbert's Rehabilitation Act section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), claims. "Section 504 is a civil rights provision that prohibits a federal grant recipient from discriminating against otherwise qualified handicapped individuals solely because of that handicap." Mallett v. Wisconsin Div. of Vocational Rehabilitation, 130 F.3d 1245, 1257 (7th Cir. 1997); accord Byrne v. Board of Educ., Sch. of West Allis-West Milwaukee, 979 F.2d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1992). The court notes that a plaintiff may establish a claim under section 504 by showing: "1) he is a handicapped individual as defined by the Rehabilitation Act, 2) he is otherwise qualified for participation in the program, 3) the program receives federal financial assistance, and 4) he was denied the benefits of the program solely because of his handicap." Mallett, 130 F.3d at 1257; accord Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 478 (7th Cir. 1996).
Buncich and the Sheriff's Department maintain "the Lake County Jail does not receive federal funds for its operation." (Defs. Mem. at 4.) According to the movants, it is therefore impossible for Colbert to establish the third element of the claim. Even if the Lake County Jail receives no funding from Uncle Sam, dismissal of Colbert's claim is not appropriate for two interrelated reasons. First, Colbert has indeed stated a claim for recovery under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, including an allegation that the Lake County Jail receives federal funding. (See Compl. at ¶ 4.) The court finds Colbert's pleading more than adequate for purposes of placing the defendants on notice of the claims against them. Second, Buncich and the Sheriff's Department failed to provide evidence in support of naked assertion that the Lake County Jail receives no federal financial assistance (if they had done so, the court could have converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, see FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b) (last sentence), thereby requiring Colbert to respond with evidence on the federal funding element). Colbert's pleading as it relates to his Rehabilitation Act claim is sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Next, Buncich and the Sheriff's Department argue the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA") "precludes Plaintiff's claims for mental and emotional injuries under [ADA]." (Mot. at ¶ 4.) The dual purpose of the PLRA is to "filter out groundless claims, and foster better prepared litigation of claims aired in court." Porter v. Nussle, 122 S.Ct. 983, 990 (2002). To aid district courts in weeding out frivolous prisoner litigation, PLRA section 7(e) provides that "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner . . . for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." (Emphasis added). Colbert has pleaded physical injury. In fact, it is the crux of his claim. In paragraph six of his complaint, he alleges "[w]ithout his cane, he frequently fell and ran into things, resulting in significant injuries." If Colbert fails to produce evidence suggesting it is more likely than not that he did suffer physical injury, Buncich and the Sheriff's Department will be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. It is premature for the court to make such a determination. Cf. Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zürich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Complaints in a system of notice pleading initiate the litigation but recede into the background as the case progresses."). The motion to dismiss based on PLRA section 7(e) can not be sustained.
The court notes that Buncich and the Sheriff's Department limit (perhaps unnecessarily) their PLRA § 7(e) argument to Colbert's ADA claims. (See Mot. at ¶ 4.) The statute extends to all civil actions, no matter the theory of recovery. It appears, therefore, Buncich and the Sheriff's Department could have moved to dismiss Colbert's entire complaint, instead of only the ADA claims. Since their PLRA § 7(e) contention is a non-starter (at least in the current procedural posture), the court need not delve further into this issue.
The remaining three arguments in favor of dismissal deserve a few brief comments. Buncich and the Sheriff's Department contend (1) ADA Title II does not require that Colbert receive a tape recorder; (see Mot. at ¶ 2) and (2) depriving Colbert of his cane was reasonable because at the time of the confinement at issue in this civil action, Colbert was a martial arts expert, a previously-convicted violent felon, and awaiting trial for aggravated battery (see id. at ¶ 3). These types of determinations are not appropriate for adjudication on a motion to dismiss. See Davis v. Ruby Foods, Inc., 269 F.3d 818, 820 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[T]he essential function of a complaint under the civil rules . . . is to put the defendant on notice of the plaintiff's claim."). Lastly, Buncich and the Sheriff's Department assert that if the court dismisses Colbert's federal claims, it should also dismiss the pendant state claims. (See Mot. at ¶ 6.) Since federal claims remain in this litigation, the court will continue to exercise jurisdiction over the pendant state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
For the foregoing reasons, this motion to dismiss (Dkt. Entry #22) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. IT IS ORDERED THAT Colbert's ADA claim against Buncich in his individual capacity be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.