Opinion
# 2017-018-824 Claim No. 128996 Motion No. M-89929 Motion No. M-90210
07-10-2017
ANTHONY COKER v. STATE OF NEW YORK
ANTHONY COKER Pro Se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
Claimant's motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. Defendant's motion seeking permission to amend its answer is denied.
Case information
| UID: | 2017-018-824 |
| Claimant(s): | ANTHONY COKER |
| Claimant short name: | COKER |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 128996 |
| Motion number(s): | M-89929, M-90210 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | |
| Judge: | DIANE L. FITZPATRICK |
| Claimant's attorney: | ANTHONY COKER Pro Se |
| Defendant's attorney: | ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State of New York By: Ray A. Kyles, Esquire Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | July 10, 2017 |
| City: | Syracuse |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant brings a motion for summary judgment. Defendant opposes the motion and brings a separate motion seeking permission to amend its verified answer. Claimant opposes Defendant's motion.
Motion for Summary Judgment M-89929
Claimant seeks summary judgment on the grounds that Defendant has set forth no defense to Claimant's first, second, third and fourth causes of action, and Defendant's affirmative defenses lack merit.
On December 27, 2016, Claimant, an inmate at Cayuga Correctional Facility, filed a claim with the Clerk of the Court of Claim seeking $2,050.00 in compensatory damages for his wrongful confinement in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) and $41,000.00 in compensatory damages for violations of the New York State Constitution. Claimant alleges that on July 30, 2016, at approximately 5:40 p.m., his cubicle was searched by Correction Officer J. Sedowski, based upon an anonymous note indicating that a weapon was located under Claimant's mattress. Officer Sedowski found a weapon under Claimant's mattress, and Claimant was placed in the SHU at Cayuga Correctional Facility. Claimant was served a copy of the misbehavior report on July 31, 2016, and was charged with violating Department of Corrections and Community Supervision regulations (7 NYCRR) section 270.2, rules 113.10 - possession of a weapon, and 113.11 - possession of an altered item (7 NYCRR § 270.2 [14] [i] [ii]).
On August 10, 2016, a Superintendent's Hearing was held and Claimant was found guilty of all charges. A penalty was imposed of 30 days keeplock, loss of packages, commissary, and phone from August 24, 2016 through September 24, 2016. Claimant administratively appealed the misbehavior findings, which were reversed on September 9, 2016, and all the records from the Superintendent's Hearing were to be expunged. Claimant alleges that he was held in the Special Housing Unit from July 30 through September 9, 2016.
The claim asserts four causes of action. His first cause of action raises wrongful confinement, and his second, third and fourth causes of action raise constitutional torts - violations of his right to due process, equal protection, and freedom from cruel and unusual treatment. Defendant interposed an verified answer and asserted 11 affirmative defenses.
Claimant's first cause of action asserts that he was unlawfully and wrongfully confined, because Captain Rocker's misbehavior findings and the written reasons for his determination demonstrate bias, ignored Claimant's defenses, and the likelihood that the contraband weapon was planted. Claimant alleges that Captain Rocker's actions in conducting the hearing and arriving at his determination violated the regulatory due process safeguards set forth in 7 NYCRR V, parts 250-254 and are not protected by immunity. By this motion, he asserts that because Defendant did not deny the allegations in paragraphs 61, 67, 72, and 73 in his claim, his cause of action for wrongful confinement has been established.
A cause of action for wrongful confinement is a "species" of the tort of false imprisonment (Gittens v State of New York, 132 Misc 2d 399, 407 [Ct Cl 1986]). It is Claimant's burden to show that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York,, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975] cert denied sub nom., Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). Defendant is entitled to immunity for claims seeking money damages arising from disciplinary matters within a prison setting that involve discretionary determinations (Arteaga v State of New York, 72 NY2d 212 [1988]; cf Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]; McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194 [2009]). The Court of Appeals in Arteaga, 72 NY2d 212, held that in situations where governmental action "involves the conscious exercise of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature" absolute immunity will attach to those decisions where the "exercise of reasoned judgment . . . could typically produce different acceptable results" (Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 216). In Arteaga, despite the ultimate reversal of the administrative findings of misbehavior, the Court of Appeals adjudged claimants had no viable claim against the State because the correction officers and prison employees were exercising their judgment to assess each inmate's conduct in light of the Department of Corrections' rules and regulations, and in compliance with established procedural requirements; therefore, the State was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity (see also Holloway v State of New York, 285 AD2d 765 [3d Dept 2001]; Davis v State of New York, 262 AD2d 887 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 819 [1999]).
Although Defendant did not deny paragraphs 61, 67, 72, and 73 of the claim, it also did not admit the allegations, and its third, fourth, fifth and seventh affirmative defenses raise potentially valid defenses to Claimant's wrongful confinement cause of action in accordance with Arteaga. By this motion, Claimant has failed to establish as a matter of law his wrongful confinement cause of action or the lack of merit of Defendant's third, fourth, fifth, or seventh affirmative defense relating to his 30 days of confinement in the SHU.
Claimant has established, as a matter of law, excessive wrongful confinement for the one day that he spent in the SHU beyond the 30-day imposed penalty. In its answer, Defendant admits paragraphs 12 and 14 of the claim, admitting that on July 30, 2016, Claimant was placed in Cayuga's SHU, and on August 10, 2016, after the Superintendent's Hearing, a penalty was imposed of 30 days of keeplock, loss of packages, commissary, and telephone privileges. Defendant also admits paragraph 15 of the claim, admitting that Claimant was held in the SHU from July 30, 2016 through September 9, 2016. Defendant admits paragraphs 33 and 39 in the claim that Claimant spent 10 of those 41 days in the infirmary. Having established excessive wrongful confinement, the burden shifted to Defendant and it has not come forward with any proof in admissible form, establishing that its retention of Claimant in the SHU for that additional day was privileged. Accordingly, Claimant is entitled to $30 for the one day he spent in the SHU in excess of the imposed penalty based upon Defendant's admissions in its verified answer.
Claimant has failed to establish his entitlement to summary judgment on his second, third and fourth causes of action for constitutional torts, and after searching the record, those causes of action must be dismissed as matter of law (CPLR 3212 [b]; Sullivan v Troser Mgt. Inc., 15 AD3d 1011, 1012 [4th Dept 2005]). Unlike the Supreme Court which has general jurisdiction, the Court of Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction, having the authority to hear only those actions which are permitted by statute (Court of Claims Act §§ 8 and 9). In Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172 [1996], the Court of Appeals, for the first time, recognized that a constitutional tort cause of action was actionable in the Court of Claims. The Court set the specific and limiting criteria to assess when a damage remedy should be implied for a violation of a constitutional provision. In Brown, the Court of Appeals held that implying a constitutional tort is a "narrow remedy" which should be available only when it is the only means for relief (Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 83 [2001]; Brown, 89 NY2d at 192). Where there is another remedy that will provide redress, there is no reason to imply a constitutional tort cause of action (Brown, 89 NY2d at 192; Bullard v State of New York, 307 AD2d 676 [3d Dept 2003]; Gill v State of New York, 13 Misc 3d 1223[A] [Ct Cl 2006]; De La Rosa v State of New York, 173 Misc 2d 1007, 1010 [Ct Cl 1997]).
Claimant's second cause of action asserts a violation of Claimant's due process rights under the New York State Constitution, Article I, section 6 in that the disciplinary findings were not supported by substantial evidence, and Claimant was held in the SHU, although the penalty imposed was keeplock. Here, Claimant's alleged due process violations could have been addressed by an Article 78 proceeding or are otherwise duplicative of his wrongful confinement cause of action. It is, therefore, unnecessary to resort to a constitutional tort cause of action.
Claimant's third cause of action asserts a violation of his equal protection rights and alleges that he was treated differently and more severely than inmates in a maximum security facility serving keeplock penalties. Claimant alleges that inmates in minimum and medium security facilities are placed in the SHU to serve their keeplock dispositions, while inmates in maximum security facilities in keeplock status are kept in their cells without the restrictions imposed for SHU placement or access to library materials, laundry, religious services, education or notary public. Claimant alleges that this difference in placement is purposed for continued State-funding and to fill the SHU and not by any penological interest. The alleged disparate imposition of disciplinary keeplock penalties for maximum security inmates, as compared to the more segregated disciplinary confinement of inmates in medium and minimum security facilities, does not implicate a protected class or fundamental right. Whether this policy has a rational basis is not for this Court's determination, and prison officials are given broad discretion in maintaining discipline in the State's prison facilities, to the extent that they act in compliance with the rules and regulations (see Arteaga, 72 NY2d at 217-218). Determinations of what inmates and what facilities warrant more restrictive disciplinary confinement involve subjective discretionary determinations that cannot form the basis for a cause of action actionable in this Court (Valdez v City of New York, 18 NY3d 69 [2011]; McLean v City of New York, 12 NY3d 194 [2009]). Claimant could have challenged DOCCS placement of him in the SHU instead of keeplock, in an Article 78 or declaratory judgment proceeding in Supreme Court (see, Matter of Ryan v Selsky, 49 AD3d 926 [3d Dept 2008]; Matter of Rifkin v Goord, 273 AD2d 878 [4th Dept 2000]). With these other avenues of redress, it is unnecessary to imply a constitutional tort cause of action in this Court.
Similarly, Claimant's fourth cause of action raises a violation of Claimant's right against cruel and unusual punishment in violation of New York Constitution Article I, section 5. Claimant alleges that the SHU cell in which he was housed was unsanitary, filthy, deplorable, and he was provided inadequate materials to clean the cell. He also alleges that he developed an abscess on his buttocks from the unsanitary conditions requiring minor surgery and time in the infirmary. These allegations of wrongdoing also do not require constitutional tort relief, but instead can be addressed by a traditional tort cause of action. Claimant could have asserted a personal injury cause of action for Defendant's potential breach of its duty to protect the health and safety of those persons in its care (see Gordon v City of New York, 70 NY2d 839, 840 [1987]), or for breach of its duty as a property owner to maintain its property in a reasonably safe condition (Covington v State of New York, 54 AD3d 1137 [3d Dept 2008]; compare Boggs v State of New York, UID No. 2015-015-097 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., Dec. 9, 2015]).
In reviewing Defendant's Affirmative Defenses, after dismissal of Claimant's second, third, and fourth cause of action, Defendant's eighth and ninth affirmative defenses no longer have potential merit. Additionally, comparative negligence and assumption of the risk are not applicable to a wrongful confinement claim, so Defendant's tenth affirmative defense should be dismissed. Similarly apportionment of liability has no application to a wrongful confinement claim where the State is the only potential wrongdoer, warranting dismissal of Defendant's eleventh affirmative defense.
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, Claimant's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Claimant's second, third and fourth causes of action are DISMISSED and Defendant's eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh affirmative defenses are DISMISSED.
Defendant's Motion Seeking Permission to Amend Its Verified Answer M-90210
Defendant brings a motion pursuant to CPLR 3025 (b) for permission to amend its answer to add the affirmative defense of improper service. Defendant asserts that Claimant served the claim by regular mail, rather than by personal service or certified mail, return receipt requested as required by statute (Court of Claims Act § 11 [a]).
CPLR 3025 (b) permits a party to amend or supplement his pleadings by leave of court. The statute directs that "[l]eave shall be freely given upon such terms as may be just . . ." Leave should be given where the opposing party is not surprised or prejudiced by the proposed amendment and the proposed amendment appears to be meritorious (see Nastasi v Span Inc., 8 AD3d 1011, 1013 [4th Dept 2004]; Paolano v Southside Hosp., 3 AD3d 524). The amendment should not be permitted where it is "palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit . . ." (Blue Diamond Fuel Oil Corp. v Lev Mgmt. Corp., 103 AD3d 675, 676 [2d Dept 2013]).
Defendant's motion must be denied. Court of Claims Act section 11 (c) provides in pertinent part:
"Any objection or defense based upon failure to comply with . . . , (ii) the manner of service requirements set forth in subdivision a of this section, . . . is waived unless raised with particularity, either by a motion to dismiss made before service of the responsive pleading is required or in the responsive pleading, and if so waived the court shall not dismiss the claim for such failure."
Here, the time frame to timely assert any defense of improper service has long-expired. Once expired, the claim may not be dismissed for such failure. Thus, Defendant's proposed amendment is palpably lacking in potential merit (Knight v State of New York, 177 Misc 2d 181, 184 [Ct Cl 1998]; see also Gillard v State of New York, 28 Misc 3d 1139 [Ct Cl 2010]).
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, Claimant's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and his second, third and fourth causes of action in the claim are DISMISSED. Defendant's motion seeking permission to amend its answer is DENIED.
July 10, 2017
Syracuse, New York
DIANE L. FITZPATRICK
Judge of the Court of Claims The Court has considered the following in deciding these motions:
M-89929
1) Notice of Motion. 2) Affidavit of Anthony Coker, sworn to February 11, 2017, in support, with attachments thereto. 3) Affirmation of Ray A. Kyles, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, in opposition, with exhibits attached thereto.
M-90210
4) Notice of Motion. 5) Affirmation of Ray A. Kyles, Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, in support, with exhibits attached thereto.