Whether Vida negligently entrusted a vehicle to Bedolla is a question of fact for the jury to determine. See Green, 2003 OK 55, ¶ 10, 70 P.3d 866, 868-869 ("The question of negligent entrustment is one of fact for the jury."); see also Coker v. Moose, 1937 OK 67, ¶ 7, 68 P.2d 504, 505 ("The question of negligence is a question of fact."). IV. CONCLUSION
Such facts may be proved by circumstantial as well as positive or direct evidence.Shoemake v. Stich, 1975 OK 55, ¶ 13, 534 P.2d 667; Berg v.Bryant, 1956 OK 336, ¶ 5, 305 P.2d 517; Coker v. Moose, 1937 OK 67, ¶ 9, 68 P.2d 504; Waddle v. Stafford, 1924 OK 309, ¶ ___, 230 P. 855. Although this cause involves negligent entrustment of an automobile, we note that liability is not limited to only motor vehicles. See e.g., Sawyer v. Kelly, 1944 OK 256, ¶ 3, 153 P.2d 97 [Permitting child to ride horse.
The Court was correct in overruling defendant's motion for a new trial based on the use by the witness Simmons of the unmodified word "insurance" in a gratuitous remark made by the witness while he was on the witness stand. Byram v. Snowden, 224 Miss. 74, 79 So.2d 541; Chilcutt v. Keating, 220 Miss. 545, 71 So.2d 472; Coker v. Moose, 180 Okla. 334, 68 P.2d 504; Herrin v. Daly, 80 Miss. 340, 31 So. 790; Lancaster v. Lancaster, 213 Miss. 536, 57 So.2d 302; Luster v. Moore (Fla.), 78 So.2d 87; M. A. Motor Freight Lines v. Villere, 190 Miss. 848, 1 So.2d 788; Odom v. Walker, 193 Miss. 862, 11 So.2d 452; Preuitt v. Marshall (Cal.), 115 P.2d 507; Snowden v. Skipper, 230 Miss. 684, 93 So.2d 834; Thompson v. Barnett (Kan.), 227 P.2d 120; Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 242 P.2d 764; Walley v. Williams, 201 Miss. 84, 28 So.2d 579; Wheeler v. Rudek, 4 A.L.R. 2d 748; Williams v. Larkin, 166 Miss. 837, 147 So. 337; Yazoo City v. Loggins, 145 Miss. 793, 110 So. 833. III.
Oklahoma has long recognized the negligent entrustment theory of liability. Coker v. Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P.2d 504 (1937); see also Bennett v. Morris Farrar Truck Co., 520 P.2d 705 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974). In Shoemake v. Stich, 534 P.2d 667, 669-70 (Okla. 1975), we explained that negligent entrustment occurs when an individual supplies a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or should know is likely to use the chattel in a way dangerous and likely to cause harm to others.
Relative to the proposition of Stich giving Lyon permission and authority to drive the vehicle after returning from Enid, Oklahoma, we point out that, in addition to positive testimony on the subject of employees being permitted to drive Aamco vehicles, Lyon had possession of the vehicle and obviously had the keys to the car. In Coker v. Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P.2d 504, we said the jury may infer that the driver of an automobile had implied permission and authority to drive same where the owner thereof placed the automobile under his direction and the keys to the same in his hands. In Greenland v. Gilliam, 206 Okla. 85, 241 P.2d 384, it was held that the question of permission of such other person to operate the vehicle is to be determined as any other essential fact in the case.
who loans the vehicle to an incompetent or unfit person, knowing, or from the circumstances being charged with knowledge, that such person is incompetent or unfit to drive, may be held liable for an injury negligently inflicted by the use made of it by that driver, although such use at the time of the injury is beyond the scope of the owner's consent, provided it is established that the injury complained of was proximately caused by the driver's incompetence or unfitness. While a motor vehicle is generally not regarded as an inherently dangerous instrumentality, and the owner thereof is not generally liable for its negligent use by another to whom it is entrusted, liability may arise if the owner permits operation of his motor vehicle by one whom he knows or should know to be so incompetent, inexperienced, or reckless as to make the vehicle a dangerous instrumentality when operated by such person." It is asserted that this Court has adopted such rule, as evidenced by our decisions in Coker v. Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P.2d 504; Berg v. Bryant, etc., Okla., 305 P.2d 517, and National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. Saul, Admx., Okla., 375 P.2d 922, which will be discussed hereafter. By way of application of the rule plaintiff argues this automobile was a fast, quick steering, racing machine, unsuited for operation upon public streets by an inexperienced driver whose judgment was impaired by drinking.
"It will be noted that in each of those cases testimony injecting insurance into the case comes from the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney or one of the plaintiff's witnesses. "We have further held that whether or not testimony is prejudicial and effectually informs the jury that defendant is protected against a judgment by insurance, depends essentially upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Fixico v. Harmon, 180 Okla. 412, 70 P.2d 114; Westgate Oil Co. v. McAbee, 181 Okla. 487, 74 P.2d 1150; Coker v. Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P.2d 504; see also annotation 4 A.L.R.2d 819." In Pratt v. Womack, Okla., 359 P.2d 223, we held:
III. The lower court was correct in refusing to grant appellants a mistrial on account of a voluntary, unsolicited, inadvertent and incidental answer to a question that called for proper evidence. Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596; City of Jackson v. Reed, 233 Miss. 280, 102 So.2d 342; Coker v. Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P.2d 504; Anno. 4 A.L.R. 784.
In the vast majority of jurisdictions in which the liability of the owner may be predicated upon his consent to the use of the automobile by a negligent driver, the owner of the car is not liable for the negligence of another in operating the same at a time and place (or for a purpose or on an occasion) outside the terms of the consent given. 159 A.L.R. 1314. Plaintiff cites Greenland v. Gilliam, 206 Okla. 85, 241 P.2d 384; Coker v. Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P.2d 504; Sawyer v. Kelly, 194 Okla. 516, 153 P.2d 97; Berg v. Bryant, Okla., 305 P.2d 517; and other cases in which the owner was held liable for the negligent operation by the driver under the "consent" theory. In all of these cases, there was direct or circumstantial evidence of the consent of the owner to the use by the negligent driver of the automobile at the time and place where the accident happened; or there was evidence of a course of conduct from which the consent of the owner could be implied.
It will be noted that in each of those cases testimony injecting insurance into the case comes from the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney or one of the plaintiff's witnesses. We have further held that whether or not testimony is prejudicial and effectually informs the jury that defendant is protected against a judgment by insurance, depends essentially upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Fixico v. Harmon, 180 Okla. 412, 70 P.2d 114; Westgate Oil Co. v. McAbee, 181 Okla. 487, 74 P.2d 1150; Coker v. Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P.2d 504; see also annotation 4 A.L.R.2d 819. Where the statement was voluntarily made by defendant's witness in answer to a proper question on cross-examination, with no further allusion thereto, we hold that the court's refusal to grant a mistrial was proper.