Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 01-00097; c/w 01-00192 SECTION: "R"
December 12, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiff Deborah Coker's motion to reconsider this Court's decision to grant defendant's motion summary judgment on her claims. For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion is denied.
The motion for summary judgment was brought by the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association ("LIGA"), intervenor on behalf of Dixie Motors. LIGA stands in the shoes of Reliance Insurance Co., the insurer of Dixie Motors, which is now in receivorship.
I. Background
Defendant Dixie Motors hired plaintiffs Julie Savoy and Deborah Coker to sell auto parts. Savoy was promoted to Assistant Manager and received numerous raises over the years. Coker also received raises over the years and, in 1999, earned a salary of 6% of gross sales. Coker earned $22,474 in 1997; $27,664 in 1998; and $14,132 during the first six months of 1999. Coker left Dixie Motors in June 1999, when Dixie Motors demoted Savoy from Assistant Manager to Human Resources Manager.
The factual basis for Coker's claims largely turn on the actions of two employees of Dixie-Durham Body Shop, L.L.C., a subsidiary of Dixie Motors. At the time of the events in question, Dixie Motors owned 50% of Dixie-Durham. An oral agreement obliged Dixie-Durham to purchase auto parts from Dixie Motors such that the parent corporation could profit from the sales. In 1997, Lonnie Miles took over the body shop and did not honor the oral agreement. At meetings attended by representatives from Dixie Motors and Dixie-Durham, Miles said that he was not purchasing parts from Dixie Motors because Dixie Motors was inefficient and because Dixie Motors did not keep enough parts on stock in its inventory. There is also evidence indicating that Dixie-Durham stopped purchasing from Dixie Motors because their parts department was run by a woman. On one occasion, Miles indicated that "I'd rather have a man I could work with." (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Dep. of Coker, at 84.) On another occasion, Warren Lividais, an employee of Lonnie Miles at Dixie-Durham, placed an order for an auto part and told Savoy to "[o]rder the f-ing part and stop being a bitch." (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Dep. of Savoy, at 107.) Savoy, however, conceded that "it's not uncommon for service technicians to curse, so it was not that big a deal." ( Id.) Tracy Durham, Coker's boss at Dixie Motors, said that Warren Lividais would be terminated, but this never happened. Durham also said that he would "write up" Lividais. (Dep. of Savoy, at 102.) By 1999, the body shop had stopped purchasing parts from Dixie Motors entirely. Plaintiffs assert that this had a substantial impact on Dixie Motors' sales and, because their salaries were based on commission, on Savoy's and Coker' s income.
In an Order and Reasons entered on November 1, 2002, the Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on Coker's claims and granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion for summary judgment on Savoy's claims. As to Coker, the Court held, first, that Dixie Motors did not exercise the requisite amount of control over Dixie-Durham employees to be liable for the acts under Title VII. Second, the Court held that even if Dixie Motors did control Dixie-Durham employees, here, the actions of the employees in question did not create a hostile work environment. Third, the Court held that Coker did not have a claim for equal pay because she presented no evidence that she was paid less than male counterparts. Fourth, the Court held that Coker did not suffer an adverse employment action and that Coker was not constructively discharged. Coker now moves the Court to reconsider its decision.
II. Discussion
A. Reconsideration Standard
Plaintiff does not specify whether her motion for reconsideration of a dispositive motion for summary judgment is filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) or Rule 60. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and 60. The Fifth Circuit has held that a motion such as plaintiff's may be classified under either Rule 59 or Rule 60, depending on the motion's timing. Pryor v. United States Postal Service, 769 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 1985); Lavespere v. Niagara Machine Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990). A motion filed within ten days of entry of judgment is classified as a motion under Rule 59. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Here, judgment against Coker was entered on November 1, 2002. The ten-day period expired on November 18, 2002, the day on which plaintiff filed this motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 6. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion will be classified as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e)
A district court has considerable discretion to grant or to deny a motion under Rule 59(e). See Edward H. Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 1993). A court's reconsideration of a prior order is an extraordinary remedy, which should be used sparingly. See Fields v. Pool Offshore, Inc., 1998 WL 43217, *2 (E.D.La. 1998), aff'd, 182 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 1999); Bardwell v. George G. Sharp, Inc., 1995 WL 517120, *1 (E.D.La. 1995). The court must "strike the proper balance between the need for finality and, the need to render a just decision on the basis of all the facts." Edward H. Bohlin Co., 6 F.3d at 355. Courts in this district hold that a moving party must satisfy at least one of the following criteria to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion: (1) the motion is necessary to correct a manifest error of fact or law; (2) the movant presents newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence; (3) the motion is necessary in order to prevent manifest injustice; and (4) the motion is justified by an intervening change in the controlling law. See Fidelity Deposit Co. of Md. v. Omni Bank, 1999 WL 970526, *3 (E.D.La. 1999); Jupiter v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 1999 WL 796218, *1 (E.D.La. 1999); Burma Navigation Corp. v. M/V Reliant Seahorse, 1998 WL 781587, *1 (E.D.La. 1998); Fields, 1998 WL 43217, *2.
B. Analysis
1. Hostile Work Environment
Coker re-asserts that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. She requests that this Court reconsider its analysis of whether Dixie Motors controlled Dixie-Durham employees and whether these employees created a hostile work environment. The Court, however, does not find its previous conclusion to be contrary to law. Nor does the Court find that it works a manifest injustice. This is because even if Dixie Motors exercised the requisite control over Miles and Lividais, who were employees of Dixie-Durham, the actions of Miles and Lividais did not create a hostile work environment. Coker cites to only two allegedly hostile remarks: (1) "Don't you have any men I can work with?" (Dep. of Savoy, at 93), and (2) "Just order the f-ing part and stop being a bitch." (Dep. of Savoy, at 107.) In addition, Miles and Lividais allegedly referred to Savoy and Coker as "bitches" on one other occasion. (Dep. of Savoy, at 97.) First, the Court notes that none of these remarks were made in Coker's presence. Second, even if they were, the Court does not find these remarks to be actionable under Title VII. This is because offensive remarks create a hostile work environment only when they are so "severe or pervasive" as to alter a term or condition of employment and create an abusive working environment. Green v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 655 (5th Cir. 2002); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786, 118 S.Ct. at 2283. Offhand comments and isolated incidents do not create a hostile environment unless they are "extremely serious." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787, 118 S.Ct. at 2283. The remarks alleged are not "extremely serious" and are not so "severe" as to alter a term or condition of employment. Indeed, Savoy testified that it is "not uncommon" for service technicians to use the word "bitch" and that its use was "no big deal." (Dep. of Savoy, at 107).
Coker further asserts that the decline in her sales that can be attributed to Miles' and Lividais' decision not to purchase parts from Dixie Motors created a hostile work environment. Plaintiff cites no authority, and the Court finds none, that supports such a conclusion, particularly given that Coker was given pay raises even as her department's sales decreased. (Pl.'s Mot. for Reconsideration, at 4.) Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of her hostile work environment claims.
2. Adverse Employment Action
As part of her prima facie case of sex discrimination, Coker must establish that she was fired or suffered an adverse employment action. Price v. Federal Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2002); Urbano v. Continental Airlines, 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998); LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that "[t]he elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case necessarily vary according to the facts of the case and the nature of the claim."). In its decision to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court concluded that Coker did not suffer an adverse employment action. In her motion for reconsideration, Coker further asserts that she suffered an adverse employment action in two ways: she suffered a loss of income and she was constructively discharged. Again, the Court does not find its previous conclusion to be contrary to law.
First, Coker did not suffer a reduction in salary in the years leading up to her decision to leave Dixie Motors. To the contrary, Coker benefitted from a steady increase in pay: Coker's salary increased from $22,474 in 1997, to $27,664 in 1998, to $14,132 during the first six months of 1999. (Dep. of Coker, at 70.) She attributes these increases to "pay raises." (Pl.'s Mot. For Reconsideration, at 4.) Plaintiff asserts that she would have made more had Dixie-Durham purchased more parts from Dixie Motors in 1993 and 1999. Commission lost on hypothetical sales is not an adverse employment action, particularly where the employer has, in the face of such losses, nevertheless given the employee a pay raise. Second, Coker was not constructively discharged. As the Court discussed in its decision to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment, a constructive discharge occurs only when "the employer makes working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign." Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 771 (5th Cir. 2001). Among the factors courts consider are (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) badgering, harassment, or humiliation calculated to encourage resignation; or (6) offers of early retirement. Id. at 771-72. Here, Savoy was demoted, but Coker was nor. Nor was Coker subjected to a reduction in salary or job responsibility. Indeed, Coker failed to establish any of these factors the first time around and has not introduced any new evidence supporting her claim. Instead, Coker asserts that Dixie Motors engaged in badgering and harassment calculated to encourage resignation. This assertion is flatly contradicted by Dixie Motors' decision to give her a pay raise in the very year that she left. The Court's conclusion regarding constructive discharge is supported by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Barrows v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 10 F.3d 292, 297 (5th Cir. 1994), which is the only case to which plaintiff cites in her motion for reconsideration. The plaintiff in Barrows failed to establish a claim for constructive discharge because he presented no evidence on any of the six factors listed above. The same is true here. Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiff's motion.
The only new evidence that Coker attaches to her motion for reconsideration is a sales chart purportedly indicating a drop in Dixie Motors' Parts Department's sales in 1998 and 1999. (Pl.'s Mot. For Reconsideration, Ex. A.) The chart indicates that sales declined in 1997 and 1998 but held steady in 1999. This fact that was already before the Court when it granted defendant's summary judgment motion in the form of deposition testimony of Coker and Savoy. The sales chart also indicates that sales continued to decline in 2000, at which time neither Coker nor Savoy were still employed by the company. ( Id.)
3. Plaintiff's State Law Claims
In her complaint, Coker asserts employment discrimination claims under Louisiana's employment discrimination law. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:301-369. Louisiana's employment discrimination law does not provide employees with any greater protection than that provided by Title VII. This is because Louisiana courts "routinely look to federal law" in determining whether a viable sexual harassment claim has been asserted. Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, (5th Cir. 2002); Boudreaux v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 762 So.2d 1200, 1204 (La.Ct.App. 2000). Coker did not argue these claims in response to defendant's motion for summary judgment. Now, however, Coker asks the Court to reconsider its opinion and dismiss these claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Having thoroughly addressed the facts underlying Coker's complaint and the applicable law, the Court will not decline jurisdiction of the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies plaintiff's motion.