That amounts to commenting on the crime rate, which is something this Court has repeatedly disallowed. See Coker v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. 230, 223 P. 711 (1924); Jones v. State, Okla. Cr. 554 P.2d 830 (1976); Coats v. State, Okla. Cr. 589 P.2d 693 (1978). One prosecutor hinted that the appellant had committed other crimes than the one for which he was on trial:
We disapprove of such comments. See, Sizemore v. State, Okla. Cr. 507 P.2d 1330 (1973); Coker v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. 230, 223 P. 711 (1924). On the other hand, the reference complained of was brief; the evidence in the case strong; and the defendant was given the minimum sentence.
It does not appear by the verdict that the defendant was prejudiced by any remarks of the county attorney to the jury. 17 C. J. 297, § 3637, 24 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1901; Coker v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. 230, 223 P. 711; Tapedo v. State, 34 Okla. Cr. 165, 245 P. 897; Sweet v. State, 68 Okla. Cr. 44, 95 P.2d 242; Gregg v. State, 69 Okla. Cr. 103, 101 P.2d 289; Wagner v. State, 73 Okla. Cr. 317, 121 P.2d 322. Finding no error, the judgment of the district court of Garfield county is affirmed.,
Often too many instructions tend to make the instructions, as a whole, confusing, instead of elucidating the pertinent issues involved. Hopkins v. State, 28 Okla. Cr. 405, 231 P. 97; Coker v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. 230, 223 P. 711; Newcomb v. State, 23 Okla. Cr. 172, 213 P. 900; Thompson v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. 121, 222 P. 568; Horn v. State, 31 Okla. Cr. 347, 238 P. 966."
It is next contended that the trial court erred in failing to limit the jury to a consideration of evidence offered by the state for impeachment purposes by a proper instruction to that effect. It is not contended that any request was made for any such instruction, either written or orally. In the absence of such request, it was not error for the trial court to fail to instruct along that line. Coker v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. 230, 223 P. 711; Hopkins v. State, 28 Okla. Cr. 405, 231 P. 97; Motsenbocker v. State, 29 Okla. Cr. 305, 233 P. 487; Wise v. State, 34 Okla. Cr. 284, 246 P. 656; Klaber v. State, 35 Okla. Cr. 238, 250 P. 142; Roberts v. State, 36 Okla. Cr. 28, 251 P. 612; York v. State, 40 Okla. Cr. 312, 269 P. 323. The defendant next contends that the court erred in permitting the state's witnesses to give improper and incompetent testimony in rebuttal in an attempt to impeach the defendant on a collateral issue.
Often too many instructions tend to make the instructions, as a whole, confusing, instead of elucidating the pertinent issues involved. Hopkins v. State, 28 Okla. Cr. 405, 231 P. 97; Coker v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. 230, 223 P. 711; Newcomb v. State, 23 Okla. Cr. 172, 213 P. 900; Thompson v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. 121, 222 P. 568; Horn v. State, 31 Okla. Cr. 347, 238 P. 967. The defendant claims that a new trial should have been granted on the showing made on newly discovered evidence.
The county attorney was within his rights in arguing that the defendant was engaged in bootlegging as a reasonable and fair deduction from the evidence, and within his rights in vigorously exhorting the jury to severely punish the offense charged. It is only where the argument is unfair and not a proper deduction from the evidence and calculated to arouse the passions and prejudice of the jury that it will amount to reversible error. Coker et al. v. State, 26 Okla. Cr. 230, 223 P. 711. Upon an examination of the entire record, it appears that the verdict is fully sustained by the evidence, that the contentions made are purely technical, and that there is no error that is prejudicial to the substantial rights of defendant.
To warrant a reversal on account of the argument of the prosecuting attorney, it must be grossly improper upon some material point which might injuriously affect the defendant's rights. Williams v. State, 4 Okla. Cr. 524, 114 P. 1115; Morgan v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 22, 130 P. 552; Coker v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 388, 223 P. 711; Beason v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 388, 195 P. 792; Spann v. State, 19 Okla. Cr. 9, 197 P. 531. The argument complained of is not of such prejudicial character as to have caused the jury to lose sight of the evidence and the law.