Citizens countered that its reasonable reliance on Kiernan-O'Toole's representation of the publication date justified enlargement of the limitations period under Cohenv. Thoft, 368 N.J.Super. 338, 845 A.2d 1281 (App.Div. 2004). Moreover, based on the "totality of the equitable circumstances" presented, Citizens argued that it was entitled to enlargement because it was advancing environmental issues with broad impact on the public.

However, a trial court's authority to grant an enlargement of time under Rule 4:69-6(c) is not limited to these three categories of cases. Cohen v. Thoft, 368 N.J.Super. 338, 345-47, 845 A.2d 1281 (App.Div. 2004). Even if a case involves purely private interests, a court may conclude that the "interest of justice" warrants an enlargement of the forty-five day period.

In dismissing the complaint under Rule 4:69-6, the judge relied on the first category and found plaintiff had not "present[ed] a constitutional issue or an issue of law." Acknowledging that these categories are not exhaustive, Cohenv. Thoft, 368 N.J.Super. 338, 346 (App. Div. 2004) (stating that under Rule 4:69-6(c), enlargement is not dependent on fitting into one of these categories but rather provides "more flexible criteria" (quoting Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 262 (1958))), plaintiff however argues primarily that the third category, "important public rather than private interest which requires adjudication or clarification," applies.

Div.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1000, 115 S. Ct. 510, 130 L. Ed. 2d 417 (1994). See also Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co., 204 N.J. 569, 583-84 (2011) (recognizing that the intent of the rule is not to restrict enlargement to one of these three categories); Cohen v. Thoft, 368 N.J. Super. 338, 346-47 (App. Div. 2004) (explaining that the three categories of grounds for enlargement are not exclusive and enlargement depends on all relevant equitable considerations under the circumstances). The determination of relaxation should be made in light of "all the relevant equitable considerations under the circumstances."

(Id. at 14 (citing. N.J. Ct. R. 4:69-6)); see Cohen v. Thoft, 845 A.2d 1281, 1284-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (explaining the procedure "for filing an action in lieu of prerogative writs to challenge the grant or denial of a land use application.") The Complaint alleges, however, that the Township Defendants refuse to consider Plaintiff's application, let alone render a final appealable decision. (Compl. *21, ¶ 50, *27, ¶ 59.)

We have broadly interpreted the ability of a trial court to enlarge the time period for filing a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs. See Cohen v. Thoft, 368 N.J.Super. 338, 345-47 (App. Div. 2004) (holding the "interest of justice" standard under Rule 4:69-6(c) exceeded the categories of cases previously identified as subject to enlargement, namely cases "involving[:] (1) important and novel constitutional questions; (2) informal or [e]x parte determinations of legal questions by administrative officials; and (3) important public rather than private interests which require adjudication or clarification"); see also Mullen v. Ippolito Corp., 428 N.J.Super. 85, 106 (App. Div. 2012).

The time period for filing a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs may be enlarged when a plaintiff demonstrates the interest of justice is implicated. See Cohen v. Thoft, 368 N.J.Super. 338, 345-47 (App. Div. 2004) (holding the "interest of justice" standard under Rule 4:69-6(c) "provided 'more flexible criteria' for determining when a prerogative writ action that had not been brought within the applicable time period should nonetheless be heard" (quoting Oldfield v. Stooeco Homes, Inc., 26 N.J. 246, 262 (1958))).

However, a trial court's authority to grant an enlargement of time under Rule 4:69-6(c) is not limited to these three categories of cases. Id. at 189 (citing Cohen v. Thoft, 368 N.J.Super. 338, 345-47 (App. Div. 2004)). When considering an application for relaxation of the filing deadline, "a court must weigh the public and private interests that favor an enlargement against 'the important policy of repose expressed in the forty-five day rule.'" Id. at 189 (quoting Borough of Princeton, 169 N.J. at 152-53).

The trial judge granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice as untimely and denied plaintiffs' cross-motion, finding plaintiffs' complaint did not implicate the public interest, and plaintiffs were not otherwise entitled to relief in the interest of justice. See Cohen v. Thoft, 368 N.J. Super. 338, 345-47 (App. Div. 2004). Plaintiffs appeal, contending the trial court erred in finding their complaint untimely; in granting defendant's motion to dismiss; and, in the event the complaint was untimely, in failing to enlarge the time for filing.

That assessment is commonly fact-dependent on the particular circumstances involved, and the explanation proffered for missing the deadline. See Hopewell Valley Citizens' Grp., Inc. v. Berwind Prop. Grp. Dev. Co., LP, 204 N.J. 569, 584 (2011); Cohen v. Thoft, 368 N.J. Super. 338, 345-47 (App. Div. 2004). We cannot tell from this record whether Carrington was supplied with notice of his right to appeal the Board's decision, or advised of the time limits for doing so.