Opinion
Civil Action No. 18-163
07-23-2018
FREDERICK L. COGER, Plaintiff, v. THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS, FAMILY DIVISION, ADULT SECTION, and HONORABLE KIM D. EATON, Defendants.
Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell/Chief District Judge Joy Flowers Conti REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ROBERT C. MITCHELL, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. RECOMMENDATION
Presently pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss the pro se Complaint (ECF No. 6), with brief in support (ECF No. 7), filed by the Hon. Kim Eaton (Judge Eaton) and the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Family Division, Adult Section (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiff Frederick L. Coger (Coger) has filed a response. (ECF No. 12). In addition, Coger has filed a petition to seeking enjoin Judge Eaton from enforcing any court orders against him (ECF No. 4), as well as a motion for default judgment (ECF No. 16). For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice, and the outstanding motions be denied as moot.
I. REPORT
a. Factual and Procedural History
At the present time, Coger has two support cases pending before Judge Eaton in the Family Division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. (ECF No. 7, pg. 1). On February 6, 2018, Coger, acting pro se, filed a complaint against both Defendants, alleging violations of his constitutional rights, as well as claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961, et al. (ECF No. 1). Coger alleges that these violations occurred during, or as a result of, the underlying state court litigation. (Id. at pg. 4). Coger seeks one million dollars in monetary damages for the loss of his "personal time and money" and for the mental suffering allegedly inflicted by the Defendants. (Id. at pg. 5).
On May 11, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and brief in support thereof (ECF Nos. 6, 7), arguing, inter alia, that Coger's pro se complaint is not only insufficient but must be dismissed pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity, and that this Court lacks jurisdiction over the on-going state court domestic relations proceedings. Id. Coger has filed a response (ECF No. 12), and the matter is ripe for disposition.
b. Standard of Review
A defendant moving to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) bears the burden of proving that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also, e.g., Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005). The United States Supreme Court opinions in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and, more recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), have shifted pleading standards from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss. With the Supreme Court instruction in mind, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has outlined a two-part analysis that courts should utilize when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. In other words, while courts must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, they may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, courts then decide whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to demonstrate that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. That is, a complaint must do more than allege the entitlement to relief; its facts must show such an entitlement. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Finally, as Coger has filed his complaint pro se, this Court must liberally construe his pleadings, and will "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999).
c. Discussion
Coger's complaint indicates that the basis for this Court's jurisdiction is purported violations of "Title 18 U.S.C. 1961," as well as the "4th, 5th [and] 14th amendment of the United States Constitution." (ECF No. 1 at pg. 4). Although he purports to raise a federal question, it is clear that the basis of Coger's complaint is his dissatisfaction with the support actions that are currently being litigated before Judge Eaton. (ECF No. 1, pg. 5). In general, federal courts will not hear divorce and custody cases because of "the virtually exclusive primacy ... of the States in the regulation of domestic relations." United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 767 (2013) (citations omitted). Insofar as Coger's complaint relates to ongoing support proceedings, it is respectfully recommended that federal abstention is required here. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987) (mandating "application of Younger abstention not only when the pending state proceedings are criminal, but also when certain civil proceedings are pending, if the State's interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disregard the comity between the States and the National Government.").
Additionally, it is respectfully submitted that Coger's complaint be dismissed in its entirety as, under the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of judicial immunity, both defendants are immune from suit. See Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that "a suit may be barred by the Eleventh Amendment even though a state is not named a party to the action, so long as the state is deemed to be the real party in interest," and extending Eleventh Amendment immunity to Pennsylvania's sixty Judicial Districts); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is deemed a suit against the state); Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding "[a]ll courts and agencies of the unified judicial system . . . are part of 'Commonwealth government.'"); and Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006) ("A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial acts. A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.'") (citations omitted).
Further, this Court would recommend that the Honorable Chief District Judge reject Coger's argument that Judge Eaton and the Court of Common Pleas were "operating in an executive capacity" with respect to the contempt proceedings. (ECF No. 12 ¶ 3). It is well-settled that a judge "is not immune from liability for nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity," nor is a judge immune for "actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). However, the Third Circuit has recognized that "there can be little doubt that holding an individual in contempt is an act normally performed by a judge" in his or her judicial capacity. Id. As Judge Eaton's actions were related to the support proceedings over which she has jurisdiction, it is recommended that judicial immunity acts as a complete bar to suit.
Further, to the extent that Coger takes issue with a state court ruling, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars such claims. See McAllister v. Allegheny Cty. Family Div., 128 F. App'x 901, 902 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that "[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits District Courts from adjudicating actions in which the relief requested requires determining whether the state court's decision is wrong or voiding the state court's ruling. Stated another way, Rooker-Feldman does not allow a plaintiff to seek relief that, if granted, would prevent a state court from enforcing its orders.") (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Accordingly, giving Plaintiff's Complaint the most liberal construction, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), this Court determines it is legally frivolous, fails to state a claim, and that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, this Court respectfully recommends that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("if the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
Ordinarily, upon dismissing a complaint a district court must grant the plaintiff the opportunity to amend. However, where, as here, amendment cannot cure the deficiencies of the complaint, the court may dismiss the complaint with prejudice without leave to amend. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112-113 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[D]ismissals of frivolous claims do not require leave to amend."). Because this Court believes that amendment would be frivolous in light of the above analysis, it is recommended that leave to amend be denied.
d. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this Report and Recommendation, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted (ECF No. 6), and Coger's complaint (ECF No. 1) be dismissed with prejudice. It is further recommended that the motion for injunctive relief (ECF No. 4) and the motion for default judgment (ECF No. 16) be denied.
In accordance with Magistrate Judge's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72(D)(2) of the Local Rules pertaining to Magistrate Judges, the parties are permitted until August 6, 2018 to file written objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so may waive the right to appeal. Any party opposing written objections shall have fourteen days after the service of such objections to respond thereto.
DATED this 23rd day of July, 2018.
BY THE COURT:
s/Robert C. Mitchell
ROBERT C. MITCHELL
United States Magistrate Judge
See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).