[Cits.]" Coffin v. Barbaree, 214 Ga. 149, 151 ( 103 SE2d 557) (1958). See also Whitaker Acres v. Schrenk, 170 Ga. App. 238, 240 (2) ( 316 SE2d 537) (1984).

When the damages occurred was not proven. For this reason alone we could not approve punitive damages. Whatever damages defendant may have caused plaintiff had to result from its activities after the date plaintiff obtained title on February 25, 1975, until the time the case was tried. If the land was damaged while owned by another, plaintiff could not recover. Coffin v. Barbaree, 214 Ga. 149 ( 103 S.E.2d 557) (1958); Shirling v. Hester, 201 Ga. 706 ( 40 S.E.2d 743) (1946). The evidence is uncontradicted that during the period overlapping February 25, 1975, to trial, defendant was engaged in carrying out a reclamation project upon its lands in keeping with the requirements of the Surface Mining Act (Code Ann. § 43-1401 et seq.), and under direction of the state officials charged with the responsibility of enforcing that Act.

"`To maintain an action for trespass or injury to realty, it is essential that the plaintiff show either that he was the true owner or was in possession at the time of the trespass.' [Cits.]" Coffin v. Barbaree, 214 Ga. 149, 151 ( 103 S.E.2d 557) (1958). "[The] true owner (that is, the person holding the legal title) may maintain an action of trespass, though he was not in possession at the time the wrong was committed; but . . ., the burden is upon him to show that he is the true owner; and this he can do only by showing title.

"`To maintain an action for trespass or injury to realty, it is essential that the plaintiff show either that he was the true owner or was in possession at the time of the trespass.' [Cits.]" Coffin v. Barbaree, 214 Ga. 149, 151 ( 103 S.E.2d 557). See also Gen. Refractories Co. v. Rogers, 240 Ga. 228, 232 ( 239 S.E.2d 795). Since appellee was in possession of the land, it is imperative to appellant's cause of action that he had title to the land when the damage was done.

The grant of Adams' motion to exclude the subsequent vendees as plaintiffs is not in issue as Barber concedes they were misjoined, having no legal or equitable interest in the property at the time the alleged negligent act occurred. Code § 3-109; Coffin v. Barbaree, 214 Ga. 149, 150 ( 103 S.E.2d 557) (1958). Barber purchased the property for $275 an acre and sold it on January 2, 1973, after the trees were allegedly damaged during the Fall of 1972, for $330 to $335 an acre.

The Defendants support their contention that a third party who is not a property owner cannot maintain a trespass action, and the Court agrees. SeeCoffin v. Barbaree , 214 Ga. 149, 151, 103 S.E.2d 557 (1958) ("To maintain an action for trespass or injury to realty, it is essential that the plaintiff show either that he was the true owner or was in possession at the time of the trespass.") (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Plaintiffs accuse the Defendants of "an inaccurate recitation of the law as addressed" and cite contrary ‘authority.’

The Defendants support their contention that a third party who is not a property owner cannot maintain a trespass action, and the Court agrees. See Coffin v. Barbaree, 214 Ga. 149, 151, 103 S.E.2d 557 (1958) ("To maintain an action for trespass or injury to realty, it is essential that the plaintiff show either that he was the true owner or was in possession at the time of the trespass.") (quotation marks and citations omitted). The Plaintiffs accuse the Defendants of "an inaccurate recitation of the law as addressed" and cite contrary 'authority.'