Opinion
6:20-cv-00637-AC
08-25-2021
DERRICK DEAN COFFELT, Plaintiff, v. EMILY PENA and JAMES WELSH, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
JOHN V. ACOSTA, United States Magistrate Judge.
Introduction
Plaintiff Derrick Dean Coffelt (“Coffelt”), an inmate currently housed at the Snake River Correctional Institution appearing pro se, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against Officer Emily Pena (“Pena”) and Sergeant James Welsh (“Welsh”) (collectively “Defendants”) asserting violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments arising from Coffelt's December 2019 arrest. Currently before the court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants based on the absence of the requisite personal participation or a constitutional violation and, alternatively, qualified immunity (the “Motion”).
The court finds Coffelt failed to adequately support his claim by establishing a violation of his constitutional rights or that Welsh personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Alternatively, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Coffelt's claims. Accordingly, the Motion should be granted and Coffelt's complaint dismissed with prejudice.
Preliminary Procedural Matter
On January 25, 2021, three days after Defendants filed the Motion, the court issued and mailed to Coffelt a Summary Judgment Advice Notice and Scheduling Order (“SJ Notice”). The SJ Notice advised Coffelt:
The defendants have made a motion for summary judgment (Motion for Summary Judgment [19]) by which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case.
Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine dispute of material fact - that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials, as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants' declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.(Summ. J. Advice Notice and Scheduling Order, ECF No. 24.) The SJ Notice directed Coffelt to file his opposition to the Motion within thirty days of the SJ Notice, or on or before February 24, 2021.
On February 24, 2021, Coffelt filed a “Declaration in Support of Complaint” as well as definitions of relevant terms “taken from ‘Barron's Law Dictionary 5th Edition.'” (Coffelt Decl. dated February 24, 2021, ECF No. 25 (“Coffelt Decl.”).) The court views Coffelt's declaration and the definitions to be Coffelt's opposition to the Motion and will consider them accordingly.
Background
On August 27, 2019, Kayte Coffelt (“Kayte”), Coffelt's wife, obtained a Restraining Order to Prevent Abuse against Coffelt (“Order”) after he was arrested for a domestic abuse incident. (Gaddis Decl. dated January 22, 2021, ECF No. 23 (“Gaddis Decl.”), Exs. 2, 3.) The Order prohibited Coffelt from: 1) “intimidating, molesting, interfering with, or menacing [Kayte], or attempting to do so;” 2) “contacting or attempting to contact [Kayte] in person . . ., by private or commercial delivery, including mail . . . [, ] by email, social media, or any other electronic method . . .[, or] by phone or text message;” or 3) “entering, attempting to enter, or remaining in the area” within five hundred feet of Kayte or her current or future residence. (Gaddis Decl. Ex. 2, at 1-4.) The Order remained in effect for at least one year or until the Order was dismissed, modified, or replaced, whichever occurred fist. (Gaddis Decl. Ex. 2, at 8.) After a September 26, 2019 hearing, the court also issued a Family Abuse Prevention Order (“Family Order”) which continued the Order and additionally restrained Coffelt “from harassing, stalking, or threatening [Kayte] or [Kayte's or Coffelt's] children or engaging in other conduct that would place [Kayte] in reasonable fear of bodily injury to [Kayte] or [Kayte's or Coffelt's] children” and “explicitly prohibit[ed] the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical for against [Kayte] or [Kayte's or Coffelt's] children that would be reasonably expected to cause bodily injury.” (Gaddis Decl. Ex. 4.)
Coffelt was released from custody pursuant to the terms of a Release Agreement executed by Coffelt on November 22, 2019 (“Agreement”). (Gaddis Dec. Ex. 5 at 1.) By signing the Agreement, Coffelt agreed to have no direct or indirect contact, in any manner, with Kayte unless authorized by the court. (Gaddis Dec. Ex. 5 at 1.) The Agreement defined “prohibited conduct with a person” as follows:
• Coming into the visual or physical presence of the person(s).
• Following the person(s).
• Waiting or driving by the outside of the home, property, place of work or school of the person(s) or of a member of the person(s) immediate family or household.
• Sending or making communication with the person(s), including in writing, by telephone, by computer, or in any other form. This includes the use of e-mail, text messaging and communication through web sites.
• Communicating through a third person with the person(s).
• Committing a crime against the person(s).
• Communicating with a third person who has some relationship to the person(s) with the intent of affecting the third person's relationship with the person(s).
• Damaging the home, property, place of work or school of the person(s).
• Delivering directly or through a third person any object to the home, property, place of work or school of the person(s).(Gaddis Dec. Ex. 5 at 1.) The Agreement expressly informed Coffelt that if he violated any condition of the Agreement, a warrant for his arrest could be issued and he could be prosecuted for contempt of court. (Gaddis Dec. Ex. 5 at 1.)
On December 3, 2019, Pena responded to a request for service from Marci Myers-Olivera, Kayte's mother (“Marci”) who reported Coffelt had been contacting Kayte both on the phone and in person. (Pena Decl. dated January 22, 2021, ECF No. 20 (“Pena Decl.”), Ex. 1, at 1.) Marci indicated “[Coffelt] had been texting Kayte and they met up at the Shiloh Inn to take the kids swimming, ” “Coffelt and Kayte have seen each other fives times since he was bailed out of jail on 11/15/19, ” and “[Coffelt] had called Kayte from the jail multiple times.” (Pena Decl. Ex. 1, at 1.) Marci provided a screenshot of messages Coffelt sent Kayte which she believed were sent in early December 2019, but the screenshots did not contain a date. (Pena Decl. Ex. 1, at 1.) When Pena questioned Kayte, she denied any contact or communication with Coffelt but reported Coffelt had “been sending their daughter letters asking to have the family get together.” (Pena Decl. Ex. 1, at 1.) Marci explained Kayte was “terrified” of Coffelt and “was not telling the truth because she was scared of her name being in a police report.” (Pena Decl. Ex. 1, at 1.)
In the early morning hours of December 4, 2019, Kayte changed her story and admitted to Officer Aryn White (“White”) that Coffelt had been texting her in violation of the Order and Agreement. (White Decl. dated January 21, 2021, ECF No. 21 (“White Decl.”) Ex. 1, at 1.) Kayte provided White access to her telephone which contained text a text message from Coffelt sent the evening of December 3, 2019. (Pena Decl. Ex. 1, at 1.)
Pena arrested Coffelt at his barbershop the afternoon of December 4, 2019, for violation of the Agreement and the Order based on the texts he sent to Kayte, as documented by Pena and White (“Arrest”). (Pena Decl. Ex. 2, at 1.) Welsh signed Pena's arrest report on December 5, 2019, as Pena's supervisor, indicating he “had reviewed the [arrest] report, no follow-up investigation was necessary and that the arrest met the standard of probable cause.” (Pena Decl. Ex. 2, at 1; Welsh Decl. dated January 22, 2021, ECF No. 22 (“Welsh Decl.”) ¶¶ 3, 4.) The Deputy District Attorney charged Coffelt with two counts of contempt of court based on violations of the Order and the Agreement in an Information dated December 5, 2019. (Gaddis Decl. Ex. 6.) The charges were dropped on March 13, 2019, based on a finding “further investigation reveals it would be in the interest of justice that said action be dismissed.” (Gaddis Decl. Exs. 7, 8.)
Coffelt filed this lawsuit alleging the Arrest was made without a warrant and violated his rights under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Compl. for Violation of Civil Rights, ECF No. 2 (“Compl.”) at 3-4.) He alleges the Arrest at his barbershop injured his reputation as a business owner, caused half of his barbers to leave, and the embarrassment prevented him from returning to his business after his release. (Compl. at 5.) He seeks a declaration Defendants' actions violated his rights protected by the constitution, compensatory damages in the amount of $3,500,000, and punitive damages in the amount of $500,000. (Compl. at 5.)
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (2020). Summary judgment is not proper if material factual issues exist for trial. Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995).
The moving party has the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party shows the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324. A nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by relying on the allegations in the complaint, or with unsupported conjecture or conclusory statements. Hernandez v. Spacelabs Medical, Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003). Thus, summary judgment should be entered against “a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Bellv. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1982). All reasonable doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact should be resolved against the moving party. Hector v.Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976). Where different ultimate inferences may be drawn, summary judgment is inappropriate. Sankovich v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 638 F.2d 136, 140 (9th Cir. 1981).
However, deference to the nonmoving party has limits. A party asserting that a fact cannot be true or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion with admissible evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (2020). The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [party's] position [is] insufficient.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Therefore, where “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotations marks omitted).
Discussion
I. Defendant Welsh
Defendants move for summary judgment on Coffelt's claim against Welsh, contending Coffelt fails to “plead any factual allegations demonstrating wrongful conduct on the part of Sergeant Welsh.” (Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 20-637 (“Mot.”), at 7.) Liability under § 1983 must be based on a defendant's personal participation in the alleged deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Barron v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). A cognizable claim under Section 1983 also requires a plaintiff to show causation, or that a particular defendant engaged in ‘“an affirmative act, participated] in another's affirmative act, or omit[ted] to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'” Preschooler II v. Clark Cty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 63233 (9th Cir. 1988).
To establish causation, a plaintiff most provide evidence of each individual defendant's causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Leer, 844 F.2d at 634. Accordingly, when determining causation, a court “must take a very individualized approach which accounts for the duties, discretion, and means of each defendant.” Id. at 633-34. Similarly, “[a] supervisor is only liable for the constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Likewise, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045.
Coffelt fails to present evidence of Welsh's personal involvement in the Arrest or in any constitutional violations resulting therefrom. To the contrary, Coffelt alleges, and the evidence before the court establishes, “Welsh is the supervisor that signed off on the arrest.” (Compl. at 4.) The evidence makes clear Welsh signed Pena's arrest report after the arrest occurred and only for the purposes of possible follow-up and confirming the arrest met the standard of probable cause. This evidence fails to establish the requisite causal connection between Welsh's conduct and any injuries resulting from the Arrest. Consequently, Coffelt fails to establish a viable Section 1983 Welsh and Welsh is entitled to summary judgment on Coffelt's claims against him.
II. Defendant Pena
While the claims Coffelt asserts in his complaint are not clear, his claims clearly are limited to violations of his constitutional rights based on the Arrest, which Coffelt alleges was warrantless and unjustified. Accordingly, the court construes the complaint to assert claims for wrongful arrest and, possibly, malicious prosecution. Defendants move for summary judgment on these claims, based on Coffelt's failure to present evidence of a constitutional violation.
A. False Arrest
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against “unreasonable searches and seizures” by the government. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968). Coffelt appears to allege a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, based on the Arrest and, specifically, that Pena arrested him without probable cause. Pena seeks summary judgment on this claim, arguing he had adequate probable cause to arrest Coffelt.
To support a claim for false arrest under § 1983, a plaintiff must show he was arrested without probable cause or other justification. Dubner v. City and County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2001); Caballero v. City of Concord, 956 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Arrest by police officers without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of security from unreasonable searches and seizures, giving rise to a claim for false arrest under § 1983.”). An arrest is constitutional if supported by probable cause, even if state law does not authorize arrest for that offense. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). Probable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists if “under the totality of circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had committed a crime.” United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Smith, 790 F.2d 789, 792 (9th Cir.1986)). Probable cause is an objective standard. Id.
Here, Marci informed Pena that Coffelt texted Kayte in early December 2019. While Kayte initially denied any communication with Coffelt, she later admitted to White that Coffelt had been texting her and she showed White text messages Coffelt sent to her the evening of December 3, 2019. Pena, after reviewing the report from White, had information establishing more than a fair probability Coffelt had committed contempt of court by violating both the Order and the Agreement when he contacted Kayte by text. Accordingly, Pena had probable cause to arrest Coffelt, and he has not established a violation of his constitutional rights based on his Arrest.
B. Malicious Prosecution
Broadly reading Coffelt's allegations, he appears to assert Pena initiated malicious prosecution based on the criminal proceedings resulting from the Arrest. A claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 is typically based on state-law elements. Libby v. City of Medford, Case No. 1:15-cv-00298-CL, 2017 WL 2219995, at *5 (D. Or. Mar. 17, 2017). To establish a claim of malicious prosecution under Oregon law a plaintiff must prove: “(1) the defendant initiated or prosecuted a judicial proceeding against the plaintiff, (2) the proceeding terminated in the plaintiff's favor, (3) the defendant lacked probable cause to prosecute the action, (4) the defendant acted with malice or with the ‘primary purpose other than that of securing an adjudication of the claim by the defendant,' and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages.” Gregory v. City of Newberg, Case No. 3:15-cv-00473-BR, 2015 WL 5577755, at *7 (D. Or. Sept. 21, 2015) (quoting Perry v. Rein, 215 Or.App. 113, 125 (2007)).
The court already has found Pena had probable cause to arrest Coffelt. This determination applies equally to Coffelt's claim for malicious prosecution and thus defeats it. Moreover, the Deputy District Attorney evaluated the evidence and independently found she had probable cause to charge Coffelt with the crimes of contempt of court based on the evidence of Coffelt's communications to Kayte in violation of the Order and Agreement, thus providing further support the Arrest was proper. Coffelt has failed to present evidence Pena violated his constitutional rights by engaging in conduct that resulted in the initiation of criminal proceedings.
III. Qualified Immunity
Defendants alternatively argue they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Coffelt's claims. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects “government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Therefore, public officials are generally immune from civil liability unless their actions violated clearly established law because “a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct.” Id. “The qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent of those who knowingly violated the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The key inquiry in determining whether an officer has qualified immunity is whether he or she has “fair warning” that the conduct was unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-40 (2002).
To determine whether the doctrine of qualified immunity applies to individual defendants, the court must decide whether a plaintiff has shown a constitutional or statutory right has been violated and whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Courts may “exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 236 (2009).
The clearly established inquiry “must be undertaken in the light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Officials may be held liable only for violation of a right the “contours [of which are] sufficiently clear [so] that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Id. at 202. Therefore, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. To be clearly established, the law need not be a “precise formulation of the standard” where “various courts have agreed that certain conduct is a constitutional violation under facts not distinguishable in a fair way from the facts presented in the case at hand.” Id.
Coffelt has failed to show Defendants arrested or initiated criminal proceedings against him in violation of his constitutional rights under either the Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments. Consequently, the court need not consider whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. However, assuming a constitutional violation occurred, the court finds the specific constitutional rights at issue were not clearly established at the time of the conduct and Defendants could not reasonably have known their conduct would result in constitutional violations. Accordingly, Defendants are, alternatively, entitled to qualified immunity.
Conclusion
Defendants' motion (ECF No. 19) for summary judgment should be GRANTED and Coffelt's complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.