Coffee v. Henry

9 Citing cases

  1. Indep. Sch. Dist. of Okla. Cnty. v. Hofmeister

    2020 OK 56 (Okla. 2020)   Cited 34 times
    Awaiting mandate

    70 O.S.2011 § 18-105, states in part: "The State Board of Education shall furnish the Director of the Office of Management and Enterprise Services with a copy of the apportionments made from the funds appropriated for each fiscal year to each of the several school districts of the state, and warrants shall be drawn by the State Treasurer against appropriations for each fiscal year in accordance with such apportionments."Reynolds v. Fallin , 2016 OK 38, ¶ 15, 374 P.3d 799 (the expressed legislative intent of the Legislature to spend public moneys for an identified purpose allowed by law is sufficient to conclude an appropriation was made); Calvey v. Daxon , 2000 OK 17, ¶¶ 22-23, 997 P.2d 164 (Legislature has authority to transfer existing revenues and unappropriated money from one fund to another); Coffee v. Henry , 2010 OK 4, ¶ 14, 240 P.3d 1056, 1061 (Kauger, J., concurring) ("this state is committed to the rule that no particular words need be used in making an appropriation, and that an appropriation may be implied where the language used reasonably leads to the conclusion that such was the intention of employment of those words.") quoting Riley v. Carter , 1933 OK 448, 165 Okla. 262, 25 P.2d 666, 672.Miller v. Childers , 1924 OK 675, 107 Okla. 57, 238 P. 204, 208 ("it would seem that everything authorized by law to be paid out of the state treasury is payable out of the general fund, if not specially made payable out of some specific fund") quoting with approval Proll v. Dunn , 80 Cal. 220, 22 P. 143 (1889).

  2. Vasquez v. Dillard's, Inc.

    2016 OK 89 (Okla. 2016)   Cited 16 times
    Determining opt out provisions of the AWCA to be an unconstitutional special law in violation of Okla. Const. art. 5, 59

    Coffeev. Henry, 2010 OK 4, ¶ 3, 240 P.3d 1056. ¶ 27 3) The Opt Out Act is not a constitutionally permissive special law.

  3. Prescott v. Okla. Capitol Pres. Comm'n

    2015 OK 54 (Okla. 2015)   Cited 4 times

    Use of the words “no,” “ever,” and “any” reflects the broad and expansive reach of the ban. See Coffee v. Henry, 2010 OK 4, ¶ 3, 240 P.3d 1056, 1057. ¶ 5 To reinforce the broad, expansive effect of Article 2, Section 5, the framers specifically banned any uses “indirectly” benefitting religion.

  4. Prescott v. Okla. Capitol Pres. Comm'n

    2015 OK 54 (Okla. 2015)

    Use of the words "no," "ever," and "any" reflects the broad and expansive reach of the ban. See Coffee v. Henry, 2010 OK 4, ¶ 3, 240 P.3d 1056, 1057. ¶5 To reinforce the broad, expansive effect of Article 2, Section 5, the framers specifically banned any uses "indirectly" benefitting religion.

  5. Gentges v. Okla. State Election Bd.

    319 P.3d 674 (Okla. 2014)   Cited 7 times

    She points out that this Court has recently interpreted the “every bill” language in Article 6, § 12 (a related veto provision) to mean “any” and “all” bills. Coffee v. Henry, 2010 OK 4, ¶ 3, 240 P.3d 1056, 1057. ¶ 15 Despite the logical appeal of this analysis, its chief problem lies in giving literal meaning to the single word “every” and ignoring important qualifying language in Article 6, § 11.

  6. Leftwich v. the Court of Criminal Appeals of State

    2011 OK 80 (Okla. 2011)   Cited 3 times
    Noting that appropriate relief, if any, is found in the Court of Criminal Appeals

    This Court should assume original jurisdiction in such cases. Coffee v. Henry, 2010 OK 4, ¶ 6, 240 P.3d 1056, 1058. ¶ 2 The Executive Branch acting through the District Attorney for Oklahoma County has asserted that former State Senator Deborah Leftwich announced that she would not seek reelection in 2010, based on promises by State Representative Randall Terrill that he would (1) secure passage of legislation to create and fund a position in State government and (2) use his influence to secure her appointment to the position.

  7. Leftwich v. Court of Criminal Appeals

    2011 OK 80 (Okla. 2011)

    This Court should assume original jurisdiction in such cases. Coffee v. Henry, 2010 OK 4, ¶ 6, 240 P.3d 1056, 1058. ¶ 2 The Executive Branch acting through the District Attorney for Oklahoma County has asserted that former State Senator Deborah Leftwich announced that she would not seek reelection in 2010, based on promises by State Representative Randall Terrill that he would (1) secure passage of legislation to create and fund a position in State government and (2) use his influence to secure her appointment to the position.

  8. Knowlton v. Linder

    No. 82694 (Nev. Apr. 27, 2022)

    Because the assignment plainly and unambiguously states that Knowlton assigned away any and all claims, we conclude that he assigned away every claim (i.e., both prospective and retrospective claims) related to his ownership interest in Valley Ascent. Cf. Coffee v. Henry, 240 P.3d 1056, 1057 (Okla. 2010) (stating that "[t]he term 'every' ordinarily means 'any' or 'all"'). Thus, Knowlton lacked standing, as he no longer "possesse[d] the right to enforce" any claim related to his interest in Valley Ascent.

  9. Hamrick v. State

    2011 OK 60 (Okla. 2011)   Cited 4 times
    In Hamrick, an employee of the state's Office of the Chief Medical Examiner ("OCME") asserted, inter alia, that he was entitled to recover damages, liquidated damages and attorney fees for unpaid wages, including alleged overtime, under OPLA.

    Use of "every" means "any" and "all," and conveys a broad expansive meaning indicating inclusion is intended. Coffee v. Henry, 2010 OK 4, 110, 240 P.3d 1056, 1057. The term "Every employer in this State" includes the State. Although the opening sentence also requires that such regular pay-days should occur at least twice a month, the Legislature provided an exception to this requirement in the next sentence for "state employees" and certain other employees by allowing a regular payday once a month.