The default rule, which specifies that monthly spousal support payments accrue and become vested when they are due and unpaid, operates only in the absence of a statute that modifies this default rule. See Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 424, 229 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1976) (per curiam) (“ ‘[ in] the absence of statute, payments exacted by the original decree of divorce become vested as they accrue and the court is without authority to make any change as to past due installments' ” (emphasis added) (quoting Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 838, 140 S.E.2d 663, 666 (1965))). Here, there is a statute, Code § 20–109(C), which provides that the agreement of the parties controls.

Indeed, prompt disposition of the business of the trial courts would be jeopardized if Rule 1:13 were interpreted to require notice or endorsement under these circumstances; counsel of record have the duty and responsibility to examine the public record and to determine the date of entry of such orders. The circumstances of this case are significantly different from the situations existing in prior cases construing the Rule, or its predecessor, where we have found an abuse of discretion for failure to require notice or endorsement. For example, in Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 836, 140 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1965), the rights of infants to support money was affected by an order entered without notice to counsel for the infants. In Iliff v. Richards, 221 Va. 644, 649, 272 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1980), a cross-claim was effectively eliminated from the case by an order entered without notice to the cross-claimant.

They argue that the division's failure to comply with Rule 1:13 made the remand order void and that it could be vacated at anytime upon proper application. They cite Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 140 S.E.2d 663 (1965), for support. In Cofer, the wife moved the court to vacate an order which granted her husband a reduction in child support payments and relief from payment of support arrearages.

The wife argued in the trial court that her right to the support payments for Theresa became vested when due and that to allow the husband credit for payments during the years when Theresa lived with him would be to modify, without the court's approval, the terms of the final decree regarding the method of payment. She relies on the holdings in Fearon v. Fearon, 207 Va. 927, 154 S.E.2d 165 (1967); Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 140 S.E.2d 663 (1965); and Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 118 S.E.2d 656 (1961). The husband acknowledges the holdings of these cases, but he contends that they can each be distinguished on the facts.

However, laches is not a defense to noncompliance with the provisions of a lawful decree. Richardson v. Moore, 217 Va. 422, 423-24, 229 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1976); see Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 837, 140 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1965); Newton v. Newton, 202 Va. 515, 518, 118 S.E.2d 656, 658 (1961). Discovery

Our cases consistently apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the action of the trial court. Fredericksburg Constr. Co. v. J.W. Wyne Excavating, Inc., 260 Va. 137, 147, 530 S.E.2d 148, 154 (2000) (entry of final order without endorsement of counsel not an abuse of discretion);Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 148, 466 S.E.2d 90, 93-94 (1996) (exercising discretion to dispense with counsel's endorsement proper);Smith v. Stanaway, supra (dispensing with notice and endorsement requirements not abuse of discretion); Rosillo v. Winters, supra (dispensing with notice requirement abuse of discretion); Iliff v. Richards, 221 Va. 644, 649, 272 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1980) (in exercise of discretion, court should have required notice); Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 837, 140 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1965) (court should not have dispensed with requirements of rule). An additional case which addressed Rule 1:13, State Highway Comm'r v. Easley, 215 Va. 197, 207 S.E.2d 870 (1974), is also consistent with our treatment of the failure to comply with the Rule as a matter of court error, and not court jurisdiction.

Under either version, the draft order should not have been entered. The endorsement of defendant's counsel should have been obtained or counsel should have been furnished with reasonable notice of the time and place of presenting the draft for entry. Rule 1:13; Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 836, 140 S.E.2d 663, 665 (1965). The fact that the attorneys were at odds on the form of the order made the requirement of notice and an opportunity for a hearing all the more important in this case.

No support order may be retroactively modified. Code § 20-108; Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 839, 140 S.E.2d 663, 667 (1965). Past due support installments become vested as they accrue and are thereafter immune from change.

Because the "best interest of the child or children is the paramount and guiding principle in setting child support," Watkinson v. Henley, 13 Va. App. 151, 158, 409 S.E.2d 470, 474 (1991), the court must approve modifications to the amount of support at the time the modification is made. See Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 838, 140 S.E.2d 663, 666 (1965); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 684, 696, 472 S.E.2d 668, 674 (1996); Goodpasture v. Goodpasture, 7 Va. App. 55, 58-59, 371 S.E.2d 845, 847-48 (1988). As we noted in Goodpasture, modifications by agreement without prior court approval "substitute the self-determined interests of one or both of the parents over the court-determined best interests of the child."

A court is without authority to modify its decree retroactively and relieve a husband of obligations to pay past due installments. See Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 839, 140 S.E.2d 663, 666 (1965); Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Va. App. 681, 683, 394 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1990); Goodpasture v. Goodpasture, 7 Va. App. 55, 58, 371 S.E.2d 845, 847 (1988). Past due support payments become vested when they accrue and are immune from change. See Goodpasture, 7 Va. App. at 58, 371 S.E.2d at 847 (citing Cofer, 205 Va. at 839, 140 S.E.2d at 667).